




(WHAT THE BORK-BRENNAN DEBATE IGNORES)
Guido Calabresi
I. INTRODUCTION
TN recent years, critics have accused the Rehnquist Court of prac-
J.ticing a politically conservative version of the very judicial activism
for which supporters of the current Court often attack the Warren
Court.' These critics have pointed to instances in which the Rehn-
quist Court has eschewed traditional procedural principles of consti-
tutional adjudication, such as the principle that the Court should
decide cases on constitutional grounds only when absolutely neces-
sary.2 Critics have also attacked the Rehnquist Court for straining to
* Dean and Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School. In a much earlier version, some
of the ideas in this Foreword formed the core of the Alexander Meikeljohn Lecture, which I
delivered at Brown University on May 4, i989. Other parts were significant in lectures I gave
at the University of Alabama on the occasion of the centennial of Justice Hugo Black's birth,
at Emory Law School, the University of Georgia Law School, and the University of Bologna.
My colleagues at the Yale Law School made helpful suggestions and criticisms at a faculty
workshop at which some aspects of this Foreword were discussed. Frank Michelman of the
Harvard Law School read the whole manuscript and made many very useful comments. I am
very grateful to all of them, as I am to Jeffrey Rosen, Yale Law School class of 199i, and
Margo Schlanger, Yale Law School class of 1993, who helped with some of the footnotes. I
would particularly like to thank Daniel Egger, Yale Law School class of 1992, for his extraor-
dinary assistance with both text and footnotes. Finally, I have nothing but praise for the
courtesy, promptness, and assistance with style and substance given to me by the Editors of
the Harvard Law Review.
I See, e.g., Al Kamen, Liberals Uneasy over High Court Review of Discrimination Laws,
WASH. POST, May I, i988, at A4 (quoting Professor Philip Kurland as describing a Rehnquist
Court action as a "suggestion of reactionary activism, judicial activism on the right"); David A.
Kaplan, Good for the Left, Now Good for the Right, NEWSWEEK, July 8, 1991, at 20, 22
(quoting Professor A. E. Dick Howard as saying that "[this majority is as willing to act as the
Warren court" and Professor Walter Dellinger as remarking that "[t]his court has abandoned
any pretense of neutrality").
2 See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, iII S. Ct. 1759, 1778 (199i) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority for "[c]asting aside established principles of statutory construction and
administrative jurisprudence" by "unnecessarily pass[ing] upon important questions of constitu-
tional law"); infra pp. 141-45.
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give the Constitution a broad, substantive reading in order to reach
political results.
3
Although I wholeheartedly agree with these criticisms, this Fore-
word focuses on a more general failure of the Rehnquist Court's
jurisprudence, one that has not received much popular or scholarly
attention: the Court's disregard for two traditional approaches to ju-
dicial review that often more effectively protect fundamental rights
- whatever their content - than currently prevailing approaches.
The past Term was no exception.
At the core of the modern Western political tradition lies the notion
that there are certain things government should not do, certain places
it should not go - except in the most extreme circumstances. In
referring to these figurative "things" and "places," people often use the
language of "fundamental rights." But what is the best way to protect
such rights? To what extent should we allow majoritarian legislatures
and elected executives4 to police themselves and to what extent should
we instead rely on more independent, perhaps less representative
bodies, such as courts, to keep legislatures and executives in bounds?
The general power of courts to keep legislatures and executives from
violating fundamental rights is what many people, including myself,
mean by the power of judicial review. 5 The central object of this
3 See infra pp. 137-40 (discussing the various excesses of the Rehnquist Court).
4 Although I refer here to legislatures and executives, I am equally concerned with other
government action such as that of administrative agencies and government bureaucrats. As
shorthand, however, I use the terms "legislatures" or "political processes" to refer to all forms
of nonjudicial governmental action.
5 An alternative, but ultimately untenable, definition conceives of judicial review as the
power conferred upon judges to enforce the Constitution because it is properly enacted law,
regardless of its terms or implications for rights. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING
OF AMERICA 143-44 (I9go); Edwin Meese, III, Speech Before the American Bar Association
(July 7, 1989), in MAJOR POLICY STATEMENTS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL EDWIN MEESE, III,
z985-i988, at I, 7 (1989). This conception may help explain why judges instead of legislatures
should enforce such conventional constitutional provisions as that requiring the President to be
at least 35 years old. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § x, cl. 5. Yet as an exhaustive conception, it
is clearly inadequate. It would enforce a static conception of rights that could not evolve over
time; moreover, strict adherence to the text of the Constitution would require a more limited
judicial role than has ever been practically possible. Even enforcement of such traditional
concepts as the "separation of powers" requires going beyond the literal text of the Constitution.
See Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc.,
I I I S. Ct. 2298, 2317-18 (I991) (White, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority, which had relied
on separation of powers doctrine, for "expanding nontextual principles"). As a practical matter,
our polity has always relied on judges to play a role in the enforcement of some categories of
rights or principles not explicitly declared in the Constitution. Finally, as an historical matter,
there can be no doubt that Americans have come to rely on constitutional law to help protect
rights beyond those covered by a cramped and literalist interpretation of the text of the Con-
stitution. Interestingly, Bruce Ackerman's theory of constitutional moments, to which I return
throughout this Foreword, could be interpreted as a synthesis of both the rights-based and
positivistic conceptions. See infra note 8o.
In this Foreword I am frequently severely critical of Robert Bork's views. He and I have
I991]
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Foreword is to take yet another look at what mix of judicial and
legislative power produces the optimal protection of fundamental
rights.
What makes the answer to this question so problematic is that
both courts and legislatures may terribly abuse their power to protect
fundamental rights. Each may serve its own purposes or its own class
or caste interests. Thus, the issue inevitably becomes under what
circumstances is each most needed to protect fundamental rights, and
under what circumstances is each more threatening to rights. Part II
of this Foreword surveys what I regard as the four basic approaches
to judicial review, the relation that each has to fundamental rights,
and the role that each gives to judges. The first approach - which
I refer to in shorthand as Type I - emphasizes a decisive judicial
role and requires that, however rights are defined, judges ultimately
be responsible for enforcing them against government action. 6 At the
other extreme, the pure majoritarian deference approach, Type IV,
allows the political processes to develop, define, and enforce funda-
mental rights and leaves judges only the task of interpreting and
enforcing the parameters of the rights that "ordinary" politics estab-
lishes. 7
Two middle approaches, Types II and III, have been largely
ignored by the current Court. These approaches, however, have much
long disagreed on most issues of law while remaining friends. Because he was, in my judgment,
unfairly caricatured and attacked by those who, perhaps understandably, wished to defeat his
Supreme Court nomination, I would like to reaffirm that my criticism should in no way associate
me with the ad hominem attacks that were made on him.
6 "Ultimately" is, in fact, too strong a word. As Alexander Bickel long ago suggested, even
a Type I judicial decision is by no means the end of the process of constitutional lawmaking.
See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 264 (1962) (discussing
how opponents of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (z954), "[i]f they succeeded in turning
public opinion could realistically look to the day when the principle announced by the Court
would be rescinded or allowed to lapse without enforcement"). Amendments, both formal and
informal, can alter the Constitution and reject almost any "right" the courts have asserted.
Virtually the whole of our Constitution can be formally amended with the concurrence of two-
thirds of the Congress and three-fourths of the states. See U.S. CONST. art. V; see also infra
note 91 (discussing in part the formal unamendability of some parts of foreign constitutions and
the limitations on formal amendability in the United States Constitution). De facto or informal
amendment can occur in a variety of interestingly complex ways. See, e.g., r BRUCE ACKER-
MAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 283 (1991) (arguing that the Constitution has been
transformed, although the "modern" path of constitutional revision differs from that of the
"classical"); BICKEL, supra, at 259-61 (distinguishing between Lincoln's belief that the decision
in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (x9 How.) 393 (856), was "wrong," and translation of that
belief into active "resistance" against the Supreme Court); Akhil R. Amar, Philadelphia Revis-
ited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1044 (1988).
Many philosophers and judges dedicated to fundamental rights fail to consider the significance
of constitutional amendability for their theories. Ackerman criticizes this blindness as a failure
of both "monist" and "foundationalist" members of the "fundamental rights" school. See ACK-
ERMAN, supra, at IO-I2.
7 See infra pp. io8-o9.
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to commend them. They are not only well established historically as
methods for safeguarding those rights most likely to be left unprotected
by legislatures, but they also reduce the danger of judicial autocracy.
Type II judicial review gives judges the authority to invalidate gov-
ernment action only when it violates what I refer to as the antidis-
crimination principle. Type III judicial review gives courts the power
to send back for reconsideration any governmental action that argu-
ably violates some fundamental right whenever that action seems
either the product of undue haste on the part of the decisionmakers
or the product of what I refer to as "hiding."
Part III examines the varying emphases placed on these prototypes
of judicial review in different polities, particularly in Canada, Eng-
land, and the United States. The comparisons serve to show that,
despite the recent emphasis on Type I review in American jurispru-
dence, the other prototypes can play a vital role in functioning polities.
In Part III, I also speculate a bit on why the different nations seem
to emphasize different approaches to judicial review.8 My ultimate
purpose in this Foreword, however, is polemical, not comparative. I
argue that despite the popular and scholarly focus on Type I judicial
review in the United States, Type II and Type III approaches have
been crucial to American constitutional jurisprudence - albeit not
always explicitly.
Part IV of this Foreword examines and evaluates some of the
normative assumptions underlying the four approaches to judicial
review, assumptions about the relative effectiveness and trustworthi-
ness of judicial versus legislative power with respect to different types
of government actions. In particular, Part IV argues that Type II
and Type III judicial review deserve reinvigoration by U.S. courts,
and that this should be so regardless of whether one starts with a
narrow or broad conception of Type I judicial review - whether one
is former Judge Robert Bork or whether one is former Justice William
Brennan.
Part V then offers a discussion of several cases, including some
from the past Term, in which the Rehnquist Court has failed to
recognize the merits and applicability of Type II and Type III ap-
proaches. Part V concludes with my belief that this collection of
missed opportunities ranks along with the Rehnquist Court's failure
to control procedural abuses in criminal trials as the current Court's
greatest failure and that, like the Court's retrograde view of procedural
due process, this failure can ultimately be explained only by an activist
outlook of the most virulent and blinding sort.
" I make no claim of causation, however. That is, the English or Canadian or United States
constitutions may be what they are because those polities have a given view of rights enforce-
ment. But it is also possible that the constitution of each arose through a series of almost
chance events and compromises and that the existence of that kind of constitution was itself
responsible for the view of rights enforcement that prevails in each polity.
,991]
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In this Foreword, I am not primarily concerned with the existence
and nature of fundamental rights. It is precisely the indeterminacy
of such an inquiry - theorists and judges have yet to reach any sort
of consensus on what counts as a fundamental right - that strongly
commends the use of alternative modes of judicial review in addition
to Type I review. In any event, the definition of fundamental rights
and the judicial enforcement of those rights are two very different
inquiries. The latter inquiry is concerned not only with outlining a
theoretical notion of fundamental rights, but also with determining
who should enforce those rights. In any given polity, with, its own
peculiar traditions, demography, and history, rights could be enforced
by judges - who usually come from a particular social class with a
particular education and who are often appointed for life - or by the
political processes generally, that is, by majoritarian legislatures,
elected executives, administrative bureaucrats, or referenda voters.
Of course, the choice is not exclusive; rights could be enforced by all
of these concurrently or by each of them at particular times and under
particular circumstances.
There is nothing particularly new in all this; indeed, John Hart
Ely's seminal book on judicial review could be said to depend on just
this distinction. 9 Nonetheless, many distinguished philosophers and
philosopher-lawyers still fail to separate these two issues.1 0 The as-
sertion of a "fundamental right," such as my right to my body and its
parts, becomes conflated with a constitutional right protected by a
court that in practical terms has the last say in the matter. Substitute
"property" or "contractual" rights for body parts, and the issues smell
9 See JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). Indeed, much of this Foreword
could have been written in the language of the legal process school, of which Ely is a distin-
guished member. The legal process school asks which institutions are best suited to do which
job in a given polity. It also asks what controls or roadblocks should be put in the way of any
institution to prevent abuses of power.
The general problem with the legal process approach, however, is that it presumes that such
questions can be answered without an underlying substantive theory of rights. Indeed, Ely's
otherwise extraordinary book can justly be criticized for shading this point. But cf. Frank I.
Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 659, 677-79
(deriving substantive minimal entitlements from Ely's premises). Without a theory of rights -
a theory outlining what they are, where they come from, and how they are defined - it is
impossible to know what institutions are best suited to articulate and defend them. Of course,
one can duck this task - as I do here - by looking to particular polities and seeing what their
views of rights are and hence what process decisions seem appropriate for each polity. Even if
the outer boundaries of such rights are difficult to define, the core values in any polity, including
our own, are relatively easy to identify. Far from negating the importance of an adequate
theory of rights, my approach emphasizes the need for such a theory in order to complete any
legal process analysis. It is equally true, however, that the initial definition of particular rights
as fundamental does not answer the legal process question.
10 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 355-413 (1986); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1-9, at 15-17 (2d ed. 1988); see also ACKERMAN, supra
note 6, at I 1-13 (claiming that conservatives, liberals, and collectivists have all been guilty of
failing to distinguish between the two issues).
[Vol. lO5:8o
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of old "New Deal" conflicts and seem somewhat dated, although in fact
they remain the same. 11 Fundamental rights, as I use the term, should
not be conflated with constitutional rights. They may be broader than
those rights properly entrusted to courts for protection. Conversely,
there undoubtedly are some rights embedded in the Constitution and
enforced by courts that few, if any, would deem fundamental.
Notice that the question also remains the same regardless of what
the initial entitlement is. A libertarian society may believe each person
should have a fundamental right to his or her kidneys 12 or land. A
communitarian society may wish to hold fundamental the right of
those who need a transplant or property to get kidneys or land from
those who happen to possess them. Societies, of course, may be
hybrids; they may be libertarian with respect to some categories of
rights and communitarian with respect to others. 13 In each case the
11 Before the New Deal, the Supreme Court protected property and contractual rights under
the doctrinal rubric of substantive due process, an approach illustrated most famously by the
decision in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (19o5), in which the Court invalidated a statute
limiting bakery workers' hours to io hours per day and 6o hours per week, see id. at 52-53.
The doctrine's collapse during the New Deal is usually said to have occurred in West Coast
Hotel v. Parrish, 3oo U.S. 379 (937), which upheld a state statute establishing minimum wages
for women, see id. at 391-400. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938),
which sustained a federal ban on interstate shipment of filled milk, see id. at 154, set the
modern standard of judicial deference to economic regulation.
12 So far, courts in the United States have reflected American society's generally libertarian
bent concerning people's bodies. See, e.g., McFall v. Shimp, io Pa. D. & C.3 d 90, 91 (1978)
(holding that forcing someone to undergo compatibility tests to determine whether the person
would be a suitable bone marrow donor would "change every concept and principle upon which
our society is founded"). See generally Guido Calabresi, Do We Own Our Bodies?, i HEALTH
MATRL 5, 5-6 (i99 i ) (discussing McFall).
Despite its rather dramatic language, however, the court in McFall did not decide whether
the entitlement was a constitutional right, because the issue was not before it. The question
whether the legislature could validly change the entitlement - in effect, give the right to bone
marrow to the person who needs a transplant - has, to my knowledge, never been decided by
an American court.
13 Consider again the example of the right to body parts. In the United States, at least,
most people assume that their bodies are their own and cannot be taken by the community for
its purposes or to help others. At the same time, most Americans also accept compulsory
military service in wartime. The Court went even further in a communitarian direction in
United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987). There the Court held that no remedy against
the state was available to a master sergeant who was involuntarily subjected to LSD experiments,
because the "'unique disciplinary structure"' of the military counseled judicial deference. Id. at
683-84 (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983)). To use the Calabresi-Melamed
terminology, the soldiers in Stanley did not have an entitlement protected by a "liability rule,"
let alone by a "property rule." See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, iio6-
10 (1972). Similarly, state laws against abortion can be seen as examples of a communitarian
approach under which women's bodies - and, significantly, only women's bodies - are "taken"
for a common "good," for the sake of the lives of fetuses. The same can also be said of state
rules requiring pregnant women to behave in certain ways to "protect" an unborn child. See
Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality,
and the Right of Privacy, xo4 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1428-32 (i99r); Tamar Lewin, Court in
i991]
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issue remains: should courts or legislatures or some mixture of each
protect this right, this starting point, from those who would use their
political influence or legal acumen to undermine it.
II. FOUR APPROACHES TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. Type I: Judicial Supremacy
Perhaps the most salient description of this model of judicial re-
view comes from James Madison's statement, beloved of Justice
Black, that with a written constitution "'independent tribunals of
justice . . . will be an impenetrable bulwark against . . . every
encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the Constitu-
tion.' 14 The explicit adoption of Type I review by the Supreme Court
dates to a few years later in Marbury v. Madison. is
Type I judicial review has many forms and adherents. For one
group of adherents, today often politically conservative, this approach
limits itself strictly to the "original" rights "enumerated" in the Con-
stitution. There are, however, significant differences of opinion within
Florida Upholds Conviction for Drug Delivery by Umbilical Cord, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1991,
at A6.
In the most notorious recent case involving judicial intervention against a mother in the
interests of a fetus, the court permitted a hospital to perform a caesarean section over the
objections of a terminally ill woman who was 26 weeks pregnant and in extremis. See In re
A. C., 533 A.2d 6iI (D.C. 1987), vacated and reh'g granted, 539 A.2d 203 (D.C. I988), trial
court decision vacated, 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 199o) (en banc). Thus, the guiding principle in
some contexts has become the extreme communitarian notion, "from each according to his
ability, to each according to his needs." Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program, in THE
MARX-ENGELS READER 525, 531 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978) (i89i). Perhaps because
I think I got a particularly good assignment of attributes in the transcendental lottery, I generally
oppose communitarian tendencies with respect to body parts. But see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE 86 (1971) (arguing that the justice of a society should be evaluated from the point
of view of one who does not know where in the social hierarchy he will be placed and that a
fair lottery exemplifies "pure procedural justice"). Then again, Marie Antoinette and J.P.
Morgan probably felt the same way about the caste and property "rights" that they were dealt.
The point ultimately is not whether I prefer a libertarian starting point with respect to body
parts or many other rights. It is rather that there is no necessity in adopting such a starting
point and, indeed, that even in our society there are many deviations from it.
14 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. I8, 21 n.4 (1967) (Black, J.) (quoting I ANNALS OF
CONG. 439 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (describing the courts "as the bulwarks of a limited
Constitution against legislative encroachments"). The quotation in the text is not meant to
suggest that Madison was a strict adherent to Type I. Indeed, Madison is often remembered
for his emphasis on the importance of a national legislature as a guardian against encroachments
on fundamental rights. See THE FEDERALIST No. io, at 80-83 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., i96i). For his part, Justice Black was a strong Type I adherent, but only within
very circumscribed boundaries. I discuss Justice Black's constitutional theory below. See infra
notes 17, 167, r69 and accompanying text.
15 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137, 176-8o (803).
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this group concerning how to find such original, enumerated rights.
Some point to the adamantine notion of "original intent." 16 Others,
like Justice Scalia, are somewhat more flexible, and look instead to
the Founders' language, which is inevitably subject to reinterpretation
and reconstruction. 17 Still others, such as former Judge Robert Bork
16 Former Attorney General Edwin Meese has taken the position that fundamental rights
should be limited to entitlements the Framers specifically intended to hold fundamental. See,
e.g., Edwin Meese, I, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited
Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L.J. 455, 464-66 & n.6o (1986). But it is not even certain how one
could determine original intent. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note io, at 359-63 (arguing that
determining intent is a logically incoherent task with respect to recent statutes, let alone the
Constitution); LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION at
xii, 389 (1988) (arguing that determining the Framer's intent is an historically problematic task).
If it were possible to determine a fixed original intent, such an intent, precisely because it would
be static even though the world changed, would overprotect some rights and leave others totally
outside the constitutional framework, except for the possibility of amendments. Cf. H. Jefferson
Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REv. 885, 935-36 (19S5)
(arguing that the Framers themselves did not expect the Constitution to be interpreted according
to evidence of their intentions, at least partly because they wanted to preserve some flexibility
in the document).
17 Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Hugo Black have been the principal proponents of a
view of rights that finds its base and its limits in the language of the charter. Examples of
Justice Black's perspective can be found in many cases. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 377 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 175 (1952) (Black,
J., concurring); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia's emphasis on constitutional language derives from a more general belief that
legislative intent is generally impossible to find and that we have little choice but to let language
govern. See, e.g., Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, III S. Ct. 2476, 2490 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (eschewing the use of legislative history and stating that "we are a Government
of laws not of committee reports").
The majority of the Court, of course, explicitly rejected Justice Scalia's strict view. See
Mortier, i x I S. Ct. at 2485 n.4. Civil law countries, whose law has been primarily statutory,
have similarly rejected such a strict approach. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Public Values
in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1007, 1012 (1989) (stating that "[c]ivil law
interpretation is different in its more systematic tendency to seek coherence across statutes").
Even in common law jurisdictions such as Britain, where text-bound literalism once had its
strongest following, this method of legal interpretation is now regarded as foolish. British
common law courts are willing to reach beyond statutory language. See cases cited infra note
155.
Nevertheless, plain language interpretivism allows the Constitution to grow more than a
Meese-like approach, under which the meaning of words stays fixed at an imputed original
intent. Just as "fault" in the twentieth century, see Delair v. McAdoo, 188 A. 181 (Pa. 1936)
(finding defendant negligent for not checking a worn tire before driving his car and then having
a blow-out that caused a collision), has little to do with what was "fault" in the nineteenth
century, see Holmes v. Mather, io L.R.-Ex. 261 (875) (accepting a jury verdict of no negligence
when the defendant, who had used the public streets to exercise his horses in double harness
for the first time, was unable to control them), and may only by chance have some similarities
to what was "fault" in the seventeenth century, see Weaver v. Ward, 8o Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B.
1616) (holding that showing absence of fault requires a showing that the plaintiff hit the
defendant or that the defendant was used by a third party as an instrument), the plain language
of the Constitution inevitably acquires new meaning over the years.
Despite Justice Scalia's protestations, however, plain language interpretivism does not
1991l
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(before the Senate's failure to confirm his appointment to the Supreme
Court), rely on a broader concept which might be termed "structural"
or "functional" intent.' 8
strengthen the position of democratically elected legislators (or constitutional conventions) against
judges and thus cannot be defended on this ground. The precise language used in statutes or
constitutions is rarely the product of representative democracy, but rather of chance, hired
drafters, or of arbitrarily selected "committees on style." To be sure, the majority of a convention
or a legislature must formally approve the language, but such final votes are often pro forma
and are rarely genuinely deliberative. Cf. House Approves Budget Formula, CHI. TRIB., Oct.
28, 199 o , at 17 (noting that the House passed the second largest tax increase in history in the
middle of the night, without members having had a chance to read the bill); Anne Wexler, Son
of Gramm-Rudman, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 1990, at C7 (criticizing Congress's hurried, late-night
passage of deficit-reduction legislation without adequate deliberation).
If one reads behind Justice Scalia's remarks, his defense lies not so much in the capacity of
language to restrict judges and restore legislative authority, but rather in its capacity to restrict
both courts and legislator-framers. My guess is that the appeal of language to Justice Scalia is
similar to the appeal of the gold standard: let us rely on something relatively fixed, arbitrary
even, and government in general will be restricted. It does not matter that the gold standard
resulted in the greatest inflations and depressions known; it is still preferable to flexible monetary
policy, because people are bound to fail. Fortunately, not everyone shares such a deeply
pessimistic view of human nature.
Interestingly, some have suggested that the inevitable effect of such restrictions on legislatures
and courts is to add to presidential power (what else is left?). See Peter L. Strauss, Legal
Process and Judges in the Real World, 12 CARDozo L. REV. 1653, x656 (ggx) (arguing that
when agencies use a textualist approach in interpreting their own statutory mandates, they free
themselves from legislative politics and thereby increase the power of the executive vis a vis
the legislative branch).
Ultimately, however, the most salient observation to make about Justice Scalia's approach,
as Justice Black knew quite well, is that language is simply not very restrictive (even apart
from changes of meaning over time). One need not follow those current scholarly views that
argue that language provides little or no constra'mts on courts at all, see, e.g., SANFORD
LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 191-93 (1988); MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 60-69 (x988), to realize how much power a
language standard in fact gives to the interpreters, that is, to the courts. It is as if we had a
gold standard in which the Federal Reserve Board controlled the supply of gold.
Inevitably, Justice Scalia himself does not hesitate to use that power - how could he help
it? For an example of Justice Scalia's willingness to exploit the power of statutory construction,
see Church of Scientology v. IRS, 792 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (en banc), aff'd, 484 U.S. 9
(1987). There a divided court held that a statute that authorizes release of IRS information only
"in a form which cannot be associated with . . . a particular taxpayer," I.R.C. § 61o 3 (b)(2)(B)
(1988), also requires that the material must first be "reformulated" by the government. See
Church of Scientology, 792 F.2d at 169-71. No statutory language required this interpretation,
and the legislative history indicated a contrary intent. See id. at 172 (Wald, J., dissenting).
Having said all of this, language linked to the original charter clearly imposes some limits, as
Justice Black also knew. It is these limits that many scholars and judges (such as Justice
Brennan) have in recent years found not to their liking.
18 Former Judge Bork, at least before he was denied confirmation, seemed to ask: what
values were the Framers concerned with and how do these values apply to the modern world?
This approach can be seen, for example, in Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985), in which Judge Bork argued for according
politically significant libellous newspaper writings First Amendment protection even though the
language of the First Amendment did not cover such writings and the specific intent of the
[Vol. 105:80
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The other principal group of Type I adherents, typified generally
by former Justice Brennan, 19 would accord Type I protection to a far
broader set of rights, however tenuous the link between rights and
the language of the original charter or the intent of the Framers.
Again, however, internal differences abound concerning how to de-
termine these rights. Some regard fundamental rights as arising from
the changing vision of philosophers and "enlightened" jurists;20 others
regard them as changing not at the whim of judges and philosophers
but, as Professor H.L.A. Hart of Oxford says of morality generally,
slowly over time and not in response to any single argument or
event. 2 1 Still others would justify a Type I approach to protect rights
they derive from vague or general language associated with the fram-
ing of the Constitution. Adherents of unenumerated "structural
rights,"22 as well as proponents of rights linked to the Declaration of
Framers was not to protect individuals from private libel suits. See id. at 995-98 (Bork, J.,
concurring).
This position is as different from Meese's as rule utilitarianism is from case utilitarianism.
If Bork were not quite so constipated in his finding of the Framers' structural intent, see Robert
H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. i, 22 (1971)
(arguing that the Framers "appear not to have been overly concerned" with free speech and
often sought to punish speech they considered dangerous to the government), many of his critics
would find his approach acceptable and would perhaps share it. See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK,
JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 39-47 (1969) (arguing that the
structure of the Constitution prohibits state interference with freedom of speech, apart from the
First Amendment). Contemporary "structural" approaches can be traced back to Charles Black.
See, e.g., ELY, supra note 9, at 225 n.48 (acknowledging indebtedness to Charles Black's
structural view); see also infra note 97 (discussing structural rights in the United States and
abroad). The structural intent theory remains, of course, subject to some of the criticisms
levelled against originalism in general. See supra note 16.
Bork's writings since his hearings suggest a narrowing of his already strict views. See BORK,
supra note 5, at 165-66 ("[W]hen the original understanding really is lost ... the judge should
refrain from working.").
19 See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, 27 S. TEx. L. REv. 433, 438 (1986).
20 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 137 (1977) (discussing "the
program of judicial activism"); TRIBE, supra note Io, at vii, § 1-8, at 14-15; Bruce Ackerman,
Constitutional PoliticslConstitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 488-9o (1989); Brennan, supra
note 19, at 66.
21 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 172 (i961) ("[Mlorals and traditions cannot be
directly changed . . . by legislative enactment. . . . [But] the enactment or repeal of laws may
well be among the causes of a [gradual] change or decay of some moral standard or some
tradition."). This last view of rights, linked philosophically to Edmund Burke, is similar to the
one that Alexander Bickel came to hold. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 9, at 71-72 (arguing that
this was Bickel's view). It had great influence on Justices Felix Frankfurter and John Marshall
Harlan as well. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501-02 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, x69 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.) (linking due process
to the evolving canons of decency among English-speaking peoples); Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46, 67-68 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
22 See, e.g., BLACK, supra note 18, at 39-47; ELY, supra note 9, at 88-104. Some suggest
that all Type I rights are structural rights designed to make legislatures more democratically
responsible. I do not think so. See infra note x67.
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Independence's reference to "the Laws of Nature and of Nature's
God," fit into this category. 23 For all of these Type I proponents,
however, rights are trumps - while they last - and courts must
protect them. 24 For example, if the Court decides that I have a right
to my body or my land, any legislative act that removes these from
me must ultimately fall, unless and until the Constitution itself is
changed or falls. Even when rights conflict, this approach to judicial
review - in its pure form - would say that it is up to courts to
decide which trump is higher. Given the stakes here, it is not sur-
prising that the issue of what rights are becomes the critical conflict
between the warring Type I camps, between the Borks and Brennans.
The judicial supremacy approach to judicial review can accom-
modate a communitarian society as easily as it can our own largely
libertarian one. In a communitarian society, philosophers and judges
might plausibly maintain that as a matter of fundamental right my
body or my property belongs to the ill or to those who need and
would use my land. Until and unless the society's constitution is
changed or falls, Type I judicial review would require courts to strike
down any legislative act that would allow me to keep my body parts
or my land from those in need. Once again, courts will be an impen-
etrable bulwark against any encroachment upon the rights of the
people.25
23 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. I (U.S. 1776). For discussions of the role
of natural law in constitutional law, see, for example, Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387-
89 (1798); CLARENCE THOMAS, WHY BLACK AMERICANS SHOULD LOOK TO CONSERVATIVE
POLICIES (The Heritage Foundation, The Heritage Lectures No. ii9, 1987); Edward S. Corwin,
The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 153
(1928); and Suzanna Sherry, The Founder's Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127,
1165 (1987).
24 The notion of rights as "trumps" comes from Ronald Dworkin. See DWORKIN, supra note
20, at xi.
25 Adherence to all versions of Type I judicial review stems from one of two normative
assumptions. Some believe that judges, however dangerous, are generally better able than
legislators to find or define and to protect certain categories of fundamental rights. Judges'
independence, special education, and social class, for example, are said to combine to make
them much more trustworthy than majoritarian legislatures.
Other proponents of Type I are less clear that legislative abuses are more dangerous than
judicial ones, even in limited areas, but argue that the Constitution, in some legal sense, requires
Type I judicial review: what point could there be to a written charter designed to check the
power of government if the enforcers of those limits were legislatures, themselves the primary
holders of that power? Chief Justice Marshall used a similar argument in his opinion in Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176-8o (1803).
Haste or hiding, or discrimination against an outcast group, Type II and III dangers, are
not the only evils legislatures may fall into. For example, legislatures may also be considered
more dangerous because they can be controlled by well-placed interest groups and lobbies. At
least as important is the fear of the tendency for legislatures to modify rules to preserve the
power of the group or party currently in control or, more broadly, to favor incumbents regardless
of group or party. See Michael Kranish, No Chance for GOP House, Parties Agree, BOSTON
HeinOnline -- 105 Harv. L. Rev.  90 1991-1992
THE SUPREME COURT - FOREWORD
B. Type II: Judicial Enforcement of the
Antidiscrimination Principle
Type I judicial review agrees that the people have fundamental
rights, but maintains that by and large legislatures are less dangerous
than judges in defining and enforcing them - with one fundamental
exception. When an identifiable social group has been consistently
and significantly underrepresented or in other ways excluded from the
legislative process, traditional political processes cannot be relied upon
to protect that group. The courts must therefore step in to guard the
group from unjustified selective treatment, that is, discrimination.
The group must not be just a temporary political loser. It must have
experienced a history of discrimination or must face a real danger of
long-run exclusion. To constitute a violation of the antidiscrimination
principle, which is obviously closely linked to John Hart Ely's concept
of representation-reinforcing judicial review,26 the selective treatment
must also affect the underrepresented group in ways that courts deem
fundamental.
Under this view of judicial review, for instance, if men could
become pregnant, anti-abortion laws would be clearly valid; because
men cannot, such laws must be subject to judicial scrutiny. Women
count as an excluded group, or at least did at the time of Roe v.
Wade, 27 and anti-abortion laws impose a degree of control over wom-
en's lives and behavior that is not imposed on men. It is, of course,
no answer to argue that if men became pregnant, anti-abortion laws
would not exist. Indeed, that is just the point. 28 Similarly, consider
a law requiring people who are optimal donors to give up their bone
marrow for transplant. Under a Type II approach, such a law would
generally be valid, although one may doubt whether such a law could
ever be passed in our relatively libertarian society absent dramatic
changes in social attitudes. 29 And again, the general belief in the
GLOBE, Oct. 31, 1988, at 9 (noting a high reelection rate for congressional incumbents and
"huge advantages" for incumbents in mailing, fundraising, and media access); cf. Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 258 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring) ("If present [apportionment] representation has
a policy at all, it is to maintain the status quo .. .at any cost."); Robert D. Hershey, Jr.,
Members' Conduct May Be in Line but Out of Step, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1988, at A2o (noting
that political action committee campaign contributions favored incumbents by a nine-to-one
margin in the 1986 congressional election cycle when Congress exempted itself from certain
ethical regulations).
26 See ELY, supra note 9, at 87-104 (arguing for judicial review to ensure an open political
process and prevent discrimination by decisionmakers).
27 4io U.S. 113 (1973).
28 None of this is to say that anti-abortion laws cannot be subject to Type I review. A
strongly libertarian Type I constitution would in all probability view anti-abortion laws as
unconstitutional even if men could become pregnant. A communitarian Type I constitution, in
contrast, might well mandate anti-abortion laws even if men could become pregnant.
29 Even if there were not dramatic changes in our social attitudes, such a law might actually
,9911
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capacity of legislatures to protect us from such a law is the essence
of Type II philosophy. But if "it just turned out" that optimal donors
were exclusively or predominantly those who had recessive sickle cell
anemia or recessive Tay Sacks - blacks or Jews, respectively - it
would be quite a different story. The law would be singularly suspect.
Once more the issue is independent of whether a society's initial
view of rights is generally libertarian or communitarian. The legis-
lature in a communitarian society with a Type II judiciary could
validly exempt all individuals from the fundamental duty to give their
kidneys to the needy. But it could not do this without judicial ap-
proval if it happened that those who needed kidney transplants were
predominantly or exclusively sufferers from sickle cell anemia or Tay
Sacks.
Thus, this view allows legislatures to require each of us to donate
our kidneys, our blood, our bone marrow, or even our chicken farms
30
to those who need them. And it also allows our legislatures to say
that we can keep some or all of these despite the alleged "rights" of
those who need them. But it allows this legislative dominance only
if all are burdened. If all must give up their kidneys, if all must
abjure extramarital or oral sex, 3 1 the issue is very different than if
only some must. Nor can the question be just a matter of how such
laws are written; it is also a matter of how they are applied. 32 The
be passed if there was a great emergency such as a generalized and severe failure at a nuclear
plant, greater even than the Chernobyl accident in 1986. The explosion of the Chernobyl
nuclear reactor released 5o tons of evaporated nuclear fuel into the atmosphere, see GRIGORI
MEDVEDEV, THE TRUTH ABOUT CHERNOBYL 78 (Evelyn Rossiter trans., 1991), and ultimately
contaminated over 13,000 square miles with radioactive material, see Felicity Barringer, Cher-
nobyl Five Years Later: The Danger Persists, N.Y. TimEs, Apr. 14, 199 I , § 6 (Magazine), at
28, 36. Suppose that, as a result of such an emergency, many people desperately needed bone
marrow transplants and too few volunteer donors were available. Under such circumstances,
one could imagine a law being passed requiring everyone who had suitable bone marrow to
donate it to those who needed transplants.
30 Chicken farms were, in fact, at stake when President Franklin Roosevelt tried to regulate
the poultry industry through the "live Poultry Code," approved under the authority of the
National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 3, 48 Stat. 195, 196-97 (1933) (amended 1935)
(history of the Act at I U.S.C. §§ 703, 744 (1988)). In one of its last cases before it yielded
to New Deal jurisprudence, the Supreme Court struck down the Act as an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power and an unconstitutional attempt to regulate intrastate commerce.
See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55I (1935).
31 See infra note 32.
32 The Georgia sodomy statute challenged in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986),
applied on its face to heterosexuals and homosexuals alike. See id. at 200-01 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). The Georgia law and others like it, however, were not applied, except under the
most extraordinary circumstances, to heterosexual acts. See id. at 203 n.2; THE EDITORS OF
THE HARVARD LAW REVIEW, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 5, 16 (1990); cf. Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, iS U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause was violated
when a municipal ordinance was selectively enforced against Chinese owners of public laundries).
The irony of Hardwick is that, to shield the statute from Type I constitutional attack, the
[Vol. 1o5:8o
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ultimate question must be: in practice do they burden all of us, or
only those who do not carry weight in the legislature?
If the latter is the case, legislatures cannot be relied upon. And
this is so regardless of whether or not legislators intend to discrimi-
nate. They may sincerely wish to save fetal or transplant recipients'
lives and not mean to harm women or a disfavored group of donors.
But good intentions cannot matter. If the burdened group has tradi-
tionally carried little weight in the political process, the results of that
process are necessarily untrustworthy, whether or not intent to dis-
criminate is manifest. 33 The appropriate analogy here is Takings
Clause jurisprudence. 34 Even with a good motive (a public purpose),
eminent domain takings of property are invalid unless we all bear the
burden (that is, unless there is just compensation). 35 To say in these
various contexts that certain laws are suspect and that courts must
step in, however, does not necessarily mean that the laws will be
struck down. It means that courts cannot take the legislature's word
for their necessity. Courts must do precisely what Justice Black failed
to do in Korematsu v. United States36 when he deferred to the ex-
Court decided first to interpret the law to apply only to homosexuals, see Hardwick, 478 U.S.
at 188 n.2, thereby making it discriminatory on its face. Nevertheless, the Court refused to
employ Type II review.
33 Perhaps the best evidence of discriminatory results without discriminatory intent can be
seen in how unresponsive legislatures already are to underrepresented groups. In theory, of
course, legislatures might be able to recognize their own limitations and declare that they are
unable to protect a group. The adoption or proposal of a constitutional amendment aimed at
protecting certain groups may constitute one such example of a legislative assertion of the need
for extra-legislative protection. In practice, though, such events are all too rare to be relied
upon for adequate relief.
34 Under traditional eminent domain jurisprudence, motive is significant only to the extent
that a public purpose for the taking is required. See Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska ex rel.
Board of Transp., 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896) (holding that the taking by a state of private
property for private use by another violates the Due Process Clause, even if the state is willing
to pay for it); Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 373 (1875) (holding that the United States
may exercise its right of eminent domain "to take private property for its own public
uses").
35 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without
just compensation."); TRIBE, supra note 1o, § 9-2, at 59o, § 9-6, at 605-07 (arguing that the
just compensation requirement for takings serves as "surrogate assurance for public purpose"
and limits the "government's power to isolate particular individuals for sacrifice to the general
good"). Even Vf the state has no discriminatory motive in exercising its powers of eminent
domain, it must make sure that its citizens are willing to pay for the property with their own
taxes. In that way, the burden is spread throughout society and does not fall solely on the
unfortunate - and perhaps politically insignificant - landowner. Again, to use the terminology
of Calabresi and Melamed, the right not to have one's property taken is given property rule
protection if discriminatory motives are present, but it is given liability rule protection regardless
of motive. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at iio6-xo. That compensation for
takings is explicitly required by the Constitution, of course, makes this case easy. But the
principle that underlies this requirement is far broader and more generally applicable to Type
II analysis and the antidiscrimination Constitution.
36 323 U.S. 214 (I944) (upholding a military commander's decision forcibly to evacuate
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pertise of a military general, 37 and what Judge Bork failed to do in
Dronenburg v. Zeck38 when he accepted without question the state-
ment by the military that permitting lesbians and gays in the Navy
would harm discipline. 3 9 They must seriously examine whether the
only way to further a valid (nondiscriminatory) legislative value is to
burden those who are inadequately protected by elected legislators.
40
Courts must, in other words, determine for themselves whether the
legislature would have passed such a law if the burden rested on those
to whom the legislators had to answer at the polls and not just on
"outcasts." 4 1
Of course, if the discrimination in a particular case were genuinely
intentional in the sense that the whole point of the law was to burden
a powerless social group, legislatures would have no interest in "uni-
versalizing" the burden across all social groups. The law would re-
American citizens of Japanese ancestry to concentration camps). Forty years later, Mr. Kore-
matsu's petition for a writ of coram nobis to vacate his conviction on the grounds of governmental
misconduct was granted. See Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 14o6, 1420 (N.D. Cal.
1984).
37 See Korernatsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24.
38 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that the Navy's policy of mandatory discharge
for homosexual conduct does not violate any constitutional right to privacy or equal protection).
But cf. Pruitt v. Cheney, No. 87-5914, i991 U.S. App. LEXIS 18797, at *23 (9th Cir. Aug.
i9, i99i) (sustaining an equal protection challenge and requiring the Army to demonstrate that
its ban against lesbians and gay men is "rationally related to a permissible government purpose").
39 See Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1398 ("The Navy is not required to produce social science
data or the results of controlled experiments to prove what common sense and common expe-
rience demonstrate."). The plaintiff worked as a top-security clearance linguist and cryptogra-
pher. He had an unblemished service record and many citations for his job performance. See
id. at 1389. Judge Bork, however, was willing to accept a broad prohibition of homosexual
conduct without much further inquiry. Of course, Judge Bork's analysis differed from Justice
Black's in that Judge Bork did not consider the group burdened by the regulation - homosex-
uals - an outcast group deserving any Type II protection. In this, I believe, he was mis-
taken.
40 Perhaps what the armed forces, and Judge Bork, had in mind was the fear that homo-
sexuals might be disliked by other enlisted members and could therefore undercut the efficiency
of the military. The same argument was made by the Roosevelt administration with respect to
racial integration in the military and was ultimately rejected by the Truman administration.
See Exec. Order No. 9982, 3 C.F.R. 722 (1943-2948) (creating mechanisms to integrate the
armed forces). If so, the military's position is merely a different version of the generally rejected
argument that an employer's discrimination can be justified if clients, co-workers, or society are
also bigoted. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (i958) (rejecting the argument that
racial integration of public schools should be delayed simply because the prejudice of the
opponents to integration might lead to violence and disorder). It is rejected, of course, because
it does not reflect a valid, that is, nondiscriminatory, value.
41 There are unusual circumstances under which even racially discriminatory infringement
may be deemed justifiable. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216 ("Pressing public necessity may
sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions [that curtail the civil rights of a single racial
group]; racial antagonism never can."). Ironically, Korematsu, the case in which the strict
scrutiny of racial minorities was announced, see id., is one of the very few occasions in which
the Supreme Court has upheld a race-specific statute disadvantaging a racial minority. See
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 572 (2d ed. 2992).
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main permanently struck down. But in all other cases, the legislature
may show that it really meant to further some nondiscriminatory value
by seeking to universalize the burden. In such cases, imposing iden-
tical burdens may not be necessary to survive judicial scrutiny -
analogous burdens will often be sufficient. Thus, in the context of
eminent domain, financial compensation is enough to make a "taking"
constitutional.
The same reasoning can be applied to harder cases. Take the
abortion example. Compensation is not feasible, 42 and men obviously
cannot become pregnant. Still, an anti-abortion law might readily
survive Type II review if the legislature also required all "expectant
fathers" or all men who engaged in sex to make available their bodies
- their blood, bone marrow, and perhaps even kidneys - if needed
to save lives. 43 Such a polity could then correctly describe itself as
42 Compensation is not feasible for at least two reasons. First, monetary compensation in
this context may strike many as morally offensive. Although the law of torts presumes that
physical injury and money (at least for lost wages, medical bills, and pain and suffering) are
partly fungible, many people understandably find these presumptions inapplicable in this context.
Second, paying women for avoiding abortions and carrying pregnancies to term potentially
creates a perverse moral hazard. Women who become pregnant might falsely claim a "prefer-
ence" for abortion in order to receive payments for later "avoiding" an abortion. And some
women who would not otherwise wish to become pregnant might become so, willingly or under
pressure from their partners, in order to obtain the right to compensation.
43 Apart from making men's bodies do lifesaving work as sources of organ transplants, there
are plenty of alternative forms of compulsory, lifesaving duties that could be imposed on men:
building fences next to railroads, see Calvin Sims, Vandals Damage Fence Installed Along Tracks
Where Child Died, N.Y. TmIEs, June 5, i99i, at B4 ; putting up barriers in windows in ghetto
housing, see Dennis Hevesi, Child Dies After She Falls from Unguarded Window, N.Y. TiNIES,
July 30, 1986, at Bi; and performing public health and sanitation work.
These requirements, and the analogous requirement that all fathers be required to give up
their jobs to look after their neonates (to keep them alive) during the first few months after
birth, sound outlandish only because these male burdens seem "forced," while the requirements
that a woman bear "her" fetus to parturition and take care of "her" neonate still seem for many
to be "natural." That, however, is precisely what a significant part of the abortion debate is
about. Pro-choice advocates could well argue that in either case it is the law, and only the law,
that creates the necessity to endure hard labor and bodily risks in lifesaving activities for the
common good. Without legal intervention, a woman could freely decide whether or not to
engage in (fetal) lifesaving hard labor (perhaps at the cost of her job). Similarly, under my
"proposals," a man would be compelled to engage in such activities only through legal interven-
tion.
Even in cases such as rape pregnancies, in which it might seem that a symmetrical burden
on men cannot be devised, something (albeit inadequate) can be done. It would entail subjecting
all men, regardless of fatherhood expectancy or engagement in sex, to the risk of having to
contribute their organs for transplants to someone they abhor. The statistical probability of
being picked as a donor would be fixed at the same level as that of a woman becoming pregnant
due to rape.
In the end, the "outlandishness" of my proposals is just one more bit of evidence that the
polity is totally committed to life only when others have to bear the burden of preserving it,
and it reinforces the intuition that we would not have anti-abortion laws if men could become
pregnant.
Let me be clear. I am not saying that pro-choice laws are necessarily a good thing. I may
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being pro-life but antidiscrimination. It would also be communitarian
and anti-choice, and many might object to that because they would
want a libertarian Type I protection to apply to bodies. But the
society would be communitarian with respect to all, and not just with
respect to women. As a result, to advocates of Type II jurisprudence,
the question whether libertarian or communitarian values should pre-
dominate and be protected as fundamental could comfortably be left
to legislatures and other "popular" bodies, rather than to the courts. 4 4
Two questions immediately arise here. First, exactly which groups
deserve protection? All laws treat some people better than others;
must courts scrutinize all of them? There are some groups whom the
Constitution explicitly singles out for Type I protection - for ex-
ample, those whose land would be taken by eminent domain, and all
religions.45 But a Type II approach would, as I have said, protect
others as well - those who have a long record of social marginali-
zation and relative powerlessness in the legislative process. But what
does that mean? The classic statement in the celebrated footnote in
Carolene Products46 - explaining that courts must protect "discrete
and insular minorities"47 - does not adequately answer the question.
Minority interests are sometimes politically very powerful. 48 And at
well believe that we should be more communitarian, that our bodies, male and female, should
be used for lifesaving for the common good. But although that is an issue for majoritarian
bodies to decide, the issue of whether such a burden can be put only on those who have
traditionally been excluded from decisionmaking power should not be ultimately decided by the
majoritarian holders of such power. It is and should be, in our antidiscrimination Constitution,
an issue for the courts.
44 I will return to the abortion issue in Part V.
45 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. I. But see Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as
a Constitution, Ioo YALE L.J. 1131, 1157 (I99i) (arguing that the Establishment Clause was
meant to preserve the states' right to establish a religion).
46 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
47 Id. at 152 n.4; see also ELY, supra note 9, at 75-77, 148-5 1 (drawing on Carolene Products
to support a theory of judicial review). For discussions of the impact of this footnote, see, for
example, J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 275 (1989); and Lea Brilmayer,
Carolene, Conflicts and the Fate of the "Insider-Outsider," 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1291 (1986).
48 Even before Professor Ackerman told us, we knew that Chief Justice Stone, when he
wrote the Carolene footnote, had not read Professor Robert Dahl, because Dahl had not yet
written. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARv. L. REV. 713, 719 n.i
(I985). Although Dahl does not focus on Carolene Products in particular, he does argue that
on some issues "discrete and insular minorities" may exercise enormous power. See ROBERT
DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 125, 132 (1956). By "single-issue voting" and
concentrated lobbying, well-organized minorities may even cow and dominate legislatures. The
capacity of the National Rifle Association to defeat gun control legislation in the face of
apparently substantial majority support is but one example. See Helen Dewar, NRA Begins
Drive to Stall Crime Bill, WASH. POST, July Io, 199 i , at Ai 3 (discussing the willingness of
pro-NRA Senators to use filibuster power to thwart legislation that would command a majority
if voted upon).
Apart from fanatical single-issue voting, minorities in the legislatures may build coalitions
and trade votes to protect their core interests and often even their second-order interests.
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HeinOnline -- 105 Harv. L. Rev.  96 1991-1992
THE SUPREME COURT - FOREWORD
times, majority groups may be so diffuse and disorganized that they
not only wield very little power in the legislative arena but, in fact,
are consistently mistreated. Women and, in some southern states,
blacks are two classic examples of diffuse majorities.
49
Ultimately the inquiry must look past the political arena to society
generally. It must try to identify the scapegoats in a particular society,
the society's outcasts.50 Thus, homosexuals, at least as long as many
remain "in the closet" out of fear of social and political rejection,
clearly count as such a group, and so, given our history, must blacks,
Jews, and women - even though on some legislative issues each of
these groups may be very powerful indeed. 5 ' Difficult as the issue
Occasionally a small minority may even hold the balance of power between two or more strongly
divided groups or parties. In such cases, that minority may be able to make its agenda the
national one well beyond the few key issues around which the minority members originally
coalesced. See, e.g., Jackson Diehl, Religious Party Joins Israeli Government, WASH. POST,
Nov. 17, i99o, at A16 (describing the disproportionate influence of small factions in Israeli
politics).
4" Blacks in some southern states and in parts of other states certainly fit the category before
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C §§ 1973 to 19 7 3 ff-6 (1988), and may fit the description
still. See Chandler Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution: An Overview, in MINORITY VOTE
DILUTION, I, 12-14 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984). There is little doubt that at the time of
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 133 (i973), women also fit the category. It is possible that in time,
perhaps even now, women will no longer need judicial protection. Indeed, it may well be that
Roe and the recent retreat from it, see infra pp. 145-49; cases cited infra note 22o, are bringing
about just the kind of involvement by women in the political process that would make judicial
power over anti-abortion laws unnecessary and unjustified in the future. Then again it may
not, for centuries of exclusion do not end easily.
50 The antidiscrimination principle gives courts their greatest power when it allows them to
define the groups in need of protection. On that issue, the courts do have the last say and thus
hold a power that is not simply of a "second look" sort. However, unlike the power of definition
in Type I judicial review, which is based on the Court's own principles and values, the power
to determine the outcasts in any given society is more objectively based and thus can be more
easily limited and controlled. Courts and judges who abuse this power can be criticized in far
more specific ways than courts who abuse the power to create fundamental rights. Historical
data concerning which categories of people when they deal with which sorts of issues are subject
to systematic exclusion is, of course, crucial and available. Indeed, the whole judicial definition
of suspect classifications, although not as sophisticated as it might be, is essentially an exercise
of this type of power. See infra note 52.
s For instance, predominantly Jewish, pro-Israel lobbying groups have been extremely pow-
erful in the United States. Still, that does not mean that Jews have not been subject to
discrimination in other areas. I do not know of an analysis that adequately explains when and
why some minority groups have power on some issues but are truly and secularly outsiders on
others, but such an analysis would be extremely useful to the full development of a theory of
representative democracy and thus to the theory of an antidiscrimination constitution.
Two observations may still be instructive. First, occasionally an outsider group cares greatly
about an issue that for other reasons long-standing insiders also care about. Although the
insiders may be an equally small minority, the combination can often be extremely powerful.
Perhaps the pro-Israel iobby is an example of this phenomenon, as might be the success of
blacks in promoting certain types of civil rights laws. But in such cases one should not assume
that the outsider group has power except on the given issue.
Second, although a minority cares passionately about an issue and would even be willing to
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may seem to be, it is in fact similar to, and no harder than, that
regularly faced by courts in seeking to define suspect classifications.
5 2
The question whether the economically deprived - the poor -
need Type II protection deserves special mention. Economically de-
prived groups have often been excluded from the political system.
Unfortunately, courts are not very good at protecting the fundamental
engage in single-issue voting over it, it can sometimes only engage in the political process by
identifying itself in ways that are physically or economically dangerous for it. The position of
homosexuals in many parts of the country and that of blacks in the South for many years are
obvious examples. In earlier times, the same was probably true of the union movement. That
the same group can, on other issues, wield weight without so identifying itself in no way suggests
that it is exempt from discrimination.
Although, as I said, a full political science analysis of the extent and nature of the power of
such groups would be very helpful, one need not wait for it. A careful historical examination,
even if it does not explain why, gives a fairly solid basis for deciding which groups are not
protected by the ordinary political processes and when they are not.
52 Under equal protection analysis, a statute classifying by race, national origin, or alienage
is "suspect" and, therefore, subject to strict judicial scrutiny. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). The Court has addressed each of these presumptively
illegitimate bases of classification. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971)
(concluding that a state's desire to preserve welfare benefits for its citizens does not justify
restrictions on the eligibility of aliens); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 193 (1964) (finding
no essential purpose in a statute punishing the promiscuity of one racial group and not that of
another); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (i954) (holding that systematic exclusion of
persons of Mexican descent from juries deprived members of that class of equal protection).
But see Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1976) (applying only "some degree"
of scrutiny to invalidate under the Due Process Clause a federal regulation barring noncitizens
from civil service employment).
A statute classifying by gender or on the basis of illegitimacy, however, is currently subject
to an intermediate level of judicial scrutiny. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41. In Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (,973), the Supreme Court recognized that women have been
severely discriminated against and concluded that classification by gender is subject to strict
scrutiny. See id. at 688. The Court then retreated and classified women as a semi-suspect class
in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), as it applied only a somewhat heightened standard of
review to invalidate an Oklahoma statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of "nonintoxicating"
beer to males under 21 and females under i8. See id. at 191-92. For a case addressing the
level of scrutiny applied to classifications made on the basis of illegitimacy, see Mills v. Ha-
bluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982). There the Court found that a one-year statute of limitations on
paternity suits to determine the natural father for purposes of child support denied equal
protection to illegitimate children. See id. at 98-IOO.
All in all, the strict scrutiny categories are woefully rigid and incomplete. When they apply,
invalidation of the government action is virtually certain. But there are instances in which
genuine judicial intervention is appropriate without thereby predetermining the result. For a
particularly interesting example of a court's willingness to intervene without deciding the un-
derlying issue without more data, see Pruitt v. Cheney, No. 87-5914, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS
18797 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 199T). In this case, the court required the Army to demonstrate that
its ban against lesbians and gay men is "rationally related to a permissible government purpose."
Id. at *23.
Apart from groups qualifying for Fourteenth Amendment strict and other scrutiny, there are
various other groups to whom specific clauses in the Constitution grant Type II protection. See
infra p. I 14.
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rights of poor people from discriminatory undermining. I discuss why
this is so, and its consequences, later in my discussion of England. 5 3
Suffice it to say now that possible legislative bias alone is not enough
to justify vigorous Type II jurisprudence. Type II review will only
work when judges have less bias than the legislature - and that is
unlikely when economics defines the underrepresented group.
Once courts have determined that a group needs Type II protec-
tion, they must face a second and equally knotty question. What
kinds of selective treatment are sufficiently significant to support ju-
dicial intervention? I have already mentioned that the selective treat-
ment need not be specified by a statute on its face; it may also be
manifested in the law's application. 54 Nor does such treatment need
to be genuinely intentional.5 5 Still, these considerations do not indi-
cate when such treatment is sufficiently significant in substance. The
answer seems to be that the antidiscrimination principle is always
presumptively violated when the legislation works to impose a signif-
icant practical disadvantage or burden on the group, such as the denial
of access to the courts or to a quality education. 56 But it is also at
risk when, although the tangible burden is slight or nonexistent, the
selective legislation reinforces the very sort of discriminatory attitudes
and treatment that earned the group its disfavored status in the first
place. Thus, for some kinds of groups, historically excluded racial
groups are a prime example, almost any selective treatment - even
selective treatment with respect to things like running laundries or
access to toilets, that, apart from the history of discrimination, would
have little practical significance - is sufficient to justify judicial in-
tervention. 5 7 For others, such as women and religious groups, the
issue is more complex. 58
The foregoing concerns immediately raise the issue of favorable
selective legislation. If the legislation is genuinely and distinctly fa-
vorable, such as certain affirmative action programs, Type II is con-
siderably more accommodating. I should emphasize here that the
principle in a Type II approach is antidiscrimination, not equal pro-
53 See infra pp. 128-30.
54 See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing discrimination in application).
-1 See supra note 35 and accompanying text; infra note lo6 and accompanying text (discussing
discriminatory intent).
56 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (954); Strauder v. West Virginia, Ioo U.S.
303 (1879).
57 See Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153, 156-57 (1964) (holding that regulations requiring
separate toilets for blacks violate the Fourteenth Amendment); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, xI8 U.S.
356, 374 (1886) (ordering the release of Chinese subjects imprisoned for violating an ordinance
enforced only against Chinese launderers in San Francisco).
58 See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (198i) (upholding a legislative decision to
exempt women from draft registration); Michael M. v. Superior Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981)
(upholding a statutory rape law against an equal protection challenge).
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tection. The issue is one not of equality, but of when the people put
burdens on themselves, on those who by and large can protect their
fundamental interests through the legislative process, and when, in-
stead, the people put burdens on those whose fundamental interests
the legislature can readily ignore. As a result, Type II judicial review
does not have any difficulty, in principle, with affirmative action or
even with so-called reverse discrimination.
5 9
Sometimes, however, seemingly "favorable" legislation nevertheless
raises antidiscrimination issues because of its severe stigma-reinforcing
effect: legislation to "protect" women, by excluding them from the
draft or from combat duty, is a prime example. 60 At other times,
what passes for affirmative action is the result of a coalition of pow-
erful minorities who combine to create new losers, 6 1 or to discriminate
s9 Thus, the antidiscrimination principle has no theoretical problem with the Court's most
recent affirmative action decision - and Justice Brennan's last - in Metro Broadcasting, Inc.
v. FCC, 11o S. Ct. 2997 (igo). There the Court upheld the use of racial preferences by the
federal government in the awarding of television broadcast licenses. See id. at 301o-16. In
Metro Broadcasting and Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), the Court
suggested that furthering the value of diversity itself could justify affirmative action. See Metro
Broadcasting, iro S. Ct. at 3010 (holding that "the interest in enhancing broadcast diversity is
. . . an important government objective and is therefore a sufficient basis for the Commission's
minority ownership policies"); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 3 11-12 (opinion of Powell, J.) (declaring that
attaining a diverse student body "clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal"). In City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), however, the Court held that affirmative
action programs could be justified only as efforts to remedy identified past discrimination. See
id. at 505-o6. The two theories have generated significant comment. See, e.g., Charles Fried,
The Supreme Court r989 Term - Comment: Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts
of Equality, 104 HARV. L. REV. 107, 110-13 (z99o). The distinction, however, is irrelevant to
some aspects of Type II jurisprudence. As long as a majority has decided to burden only itself
through an affirmative action program and its action does not in fact burden others, it has not
offended the antidiscrimination principle.
60 Because very few people like being drafted, the practical burdens here clearly fall on men.
Yet the burden on women in terms of stereotype reinforcement seemed a great one to the
plaintiffs in cases such as Rostker. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 94-95 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(citing Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979)); cf. Michael K. Frisby, Senate Votes to Lift Ban on
Women War Pilots, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. I, 199x, at I (noting that new opportunities will
allow women pilots to prove themselves). At times the issue is even more complex. Some self-
described beneficiaries of clearly favorable affirmative action programs continue to support such
programs but argue nonetheless that the programs are laden with costs to the very groups they
are designed to protect. For a particularly subtle and powerful discussion of this difficult issue,
see STEPHEN CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 59-69 (1991).
61 Perhaps this is what the Court had in mind in the recent Richmond, Virginia, "set-asides"
case. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989) (overturning minority
set-aside statute as not necessary to achieve a "compelling [governmental] interest"). The ordi-
nance required those who obtained construction contracts from the city to subcontract at least
30% of the contract's dollar value to "Minority Business Enterprises" (MBEs). See id. at 477.
MBEs were defined as those businesses at least 51% owned by "minority group members,"
including Blacks, Hispanics, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts. See id. at 478. Justice
O'Connor's opinion for the first time applied strict scrutiny to a law that (ostensibly) discrimi-
nated against whites. See id. at 493-94. At the time the set-aside ordinance was adopted, only
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against old losers in a new context. At still other times, it constitutes
a genuine attempt to benefit an outcast group, but only by placing
the burden on another group of traditional losers rather than on "all
of US." ' 6 2 Interestingly, in some contexts, the danger of discrimination
is deemed symmetrical. Thus, the selection of one group to be ben-
efitted - a particular religion, for example - itself automatically
defines and injures another group in need of Type II protection -
all other religions. 6 3 In other contexts, laws favoring particular
0.67% of the city's construction contracts had been awarded to minority businesses in the
preceding five years. See id. at 479-8o. Richmond, however, was 5o% black, and the City
Council that passed the ordinance was more than half black. See id. at 495. It is possible that
Justice O'Connor was persuaded (wrongly, I think) that whites were actually a discriminated-
against minority group in Richmond's political process.
62 It is hard to deny that, in some instances, affirmative action could be a cover for
discrimination, new or old. See, e.g., Julie Johnson, Wider Door at Top Colleges Sought by
Asian-Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1989, at I (discussing charges that policies aimed at
achieving a "delicate balance" within the student body at elite universities work disproportion-
ately against Asian-Americans). Again, whether a particular affirmative action program dis-
criminates against some traditional losers who still need protection is a hard, empirical question
that courts must face. The need to bar such discrimination does not justify, in principle, a
universal prohibition on the majority putting burdens on itself for the benefit of previously
mistreated outsiders. Cf. Metro Broadcasting, I I S. Ct. at 3025-26 (holding that FCC minority
ownership policies do not impose impermissible burdens on nonminorities); Bakke, 438 U.S. at
311-15 (opinion of Powell, J.) (striking down racial quotas for admission to University of
California medical schools and arguing that, although racial distinctions between students must
be subjected to strict scrutiny, such distinctions may sometimes stand when they are used to
achieve the educational benefits that accrue from an "ethnically diverse" student body).
One could see the entire abortion debate in these terms. One could say that anti-abortion
laws favor fetuses, but only at the expense of a traditionally powerless group in society, women.
Conversely, pro-life advocates argue that Roe v. Wade favors women, but only at the expense
of an even less protected group, fetuses. As I point out, neither side seems inclined to demand
that men bear analogous burdens. See supra note 43; infra pp. 145-48.
63 In the United States, no religion is so dominant that it can be viewed as exempt from
discrimination, that is, as a majority group that can constitutionally take such a burden on
itself. That is the success story of the Establishment Clause, whatever its original intent with
respect to the protection of state religious establishments may have been. See Amar, supra note
45, at 1157-62 (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment might best be read not to incorporate
establishment principles against the states). For a general discussion of the Establishment
Clause, see TRIBE, supra note Io, §§ 14-2 to 14-3, at 1155-66. Taken together with the fact
that all religions have historically been the subject of violent hatred from other religions, this
may explain the apparent "symmetry" in religion cases and the absence of affirmative action
and reverse discrimination arguments in this area.
But this does not mean that a form of affirmative action has not existed in this area. Indeed,
the historical dominance of religious feeling in the United States may help explain the validity
of rules designed to protect the non-religious, even when such rules, in practice, burdened
religion and the religious. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (applying
to challenged governmental acts criteria requiring a secular purpose, a primarily secular effect,
and an absence of excessive entanglement of government in religious activities); see also Edwards
v. Augillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593-94 (1987) (invalidating a Louisiana law forbidding the teaching
of the theory of evolution without instruction in "creation science"); School Dist. v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373, 397-98 (1985) (invalidating a state-funded education program because it had the
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groups - such as the poor or the handicapped - do no such
thing. 
6 4
Thus, although there is no problem in principle with affirmative
action under Type II jurisprudence, the question whether a particular
affirmative action or reverse discrimination plan violates the antidis-
crimination principle often raises immensely complex empirical ques-
tions. Type II advocates recognize the difficulties but insist that courts
are best suited to resolve them. Legislatures cannot deal with them
adequately, precisely because discrimination against "outsiders" is in-
volved.
65
"primary or principal" effect of advancing religion). Such rules could be viewed as examples of
the dominant majority accepting burdens on itself for the benefit of outcasts.
One can even conjecture that the discomfort the Court currently feels concerning some of
these rules may stem from an unarticulated and barely conscious view that now the "insiders"
are no longer the "faithful," but may instead also be the "secularists." Greater tolerance of
government "entanglement" in religious activities has been hinted at recently. See, e.g., County
of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 621 (i98g) (holding that a Nativity scene on the staircase
of a county courthouse is impermissible, but that a menorah next to a Christmas tree outside a
city building is permissible). Ironically, the current call for "affirmance of" or at least "nondis-
crimination against" religious values may be justified not by the predominance of religious
feelings in American society, but rather by the decline in such feelings. This decline may mean
that we cannot now, without judicial consideration, accept rules that once were perfectly
acceptable and constitutionally justified forms of reverse discrimination.
I do not mean, here, to argue that the facts today justify such a change, but only to suggest
that judicial discomfort may not be as mindlessly populist-majoritarian as it is often described.
64 To my knowledge, no law favoring the handicapped has been successfully challenged as
an unconstitutional discrimination against the non-handicapped. And very recently Justice
Scalia, an ardent opponent of racial affirmative action, was quoted as favoring affirmative action
programs for the poor. See Steven A. Holmes, Mulling the Idea of Affirmative Action for Poor
Whites, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. i8, 1991, § 4, at 3.
65 Because this theoretical defense of affirmative action may seem way out of line with the
current thinking of the Supreme Court, it may be well to point out that the seeming paladins
of anti-affirmative action on the Court are far from consistent on this issue. Thus, in Califano
v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. i99 (i977), Justice Rehnquist dissented and, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Stewart and Blackmun, argued that a law, which would be suspect and
probably invalid if it discriminated against women, was valid because it discriminated against
men. See id. at 235-42 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Surely this is a reverse discrimination
position. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Powell, also took a reverse
discrimination position. He argued that the law discriminated against women rather than men
and hence was invalid. See Califano, 430 U.S. at 204-17. The telling vote was Justice Stevens,
who found that even though the statute discriminated against men rather than women, it was
invalid on other grounds. See id. at 217-24 (Stevens, J., concurring). Nor is this the only case
suggesting that the Court would uphold legislation "favoring" women. See, e.g., Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 82-83 (ig8i) (upholding draft registration legislation that exempted
women); Michael M. v. Superior Ct., 450 U.S. 464, 476 (xg8i) (upholding a statutory rape law
that criminalized sexual relations only with female minors). Thus, despite its language, the
Court does not appear to have reached a principled rejection o" the concept of reverse discrim-
ination. Rather, the Court's anti-affirmative action stance appears to be directed only against
some specific categories of reverse discrimination that the Court dislikes. The Court's position
may reflect intuitive and half-articulated empirical assumptions about the discriminatory effect
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In the end, both the question of affirmative action and the question
of which selective treatments are sufficiently significant to support
judicial intervention turn on the empirical question of what in the
particular context constitutes discrimination. The antidiscrimination
approach is based on the notion that legislatures should be required
to minimize the discriminatory effects of laws that gained support
when they primarily burdened societal outcasts. Legislatures would
be made to choose whether the values such laws furthered were
important enough to warrant burdening the society as a whole and
not just its "little ones." The antidiscrimination principle itself, how-
ever, has deeper roots. It depends on the idea that to be free from
discrimination is a fundamental right,66 at least as important and as
firmly embedded in the structure of our Constitution as the separation
of powers, federalism, and the concept of enumerated rights itself,
and that as a fundamental right it deserves equally absolute protec-
tion. It would not be incorrect, then, to regard Type II review in
effect as Type I protection of the fundamental right of outcast groups
to be free from discrimination. 67
C. Type III: Judicial Enforcement
of Constitutional Accountability
Type I judicial power could appropriately be called the "Bick-
ellian" approach after the late Professor Alexander Bickel of Yale Law
School. Bickel did not, of course, believe in courts having only this
function. In fact, he supported giving courts limited Type I and very
substantial Type II powers. Still, his great works are the ones that
identified the Type III function. 68
Type III review, unlike Type II review, is triggered by a variety
of dubious legislative actions. Legislatures often act hastily or
of these forms of reverse discrimination. The assumptions may be correct or may be misguided,
but they certainly do not constitute a thoughtful and thorough consideration of the question.
66 The interdependence between a group's history and what constitutes discrimination, see
supra p. 99, which was pointed out to me by the late Professor Albert Sacks of Harvard Law
School, in no way undermines the need for judicial oversight. Indeed, it highlights the need
for such oversight to protect outcasts from discriminatory violation of fundamental rights not
spelled out in the founding document. If the very definition of fundamental rights is linked to
the history of discrimination against a particular group, it is essential that a non-majoritarian
body, such as a court, define both the rights and the group.
67 I will return to these "deeper roots" in Part IV.
68 A reader of the "essential Bickel" may wish to read: ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975) [hereinafter BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT]; ALEXANDER
M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970) [hereinafter BICKEL,
THE SUPREME COURT AND PROGRESS]; ALEXANDER Al. BICKEL, POLITICS AND THE WARREN
COURT (1965); BICKEL, supra note 6; Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 196o Term -
Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961); and Alexander M. Bickel & Harry
H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1957).
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thoughtlessly with respect to fundamental rights because of panic or
crises or because, more often, they are simply pressed for time. At
other times, they hide infringements of rights through vague language
or give no thought to the reach of the language they have used. At
still other times, they delegate to bureaucrats who are not accountable
to the people and who therefore cannot be trusted with the protection
of rights. Legislatures also often shirk responsibility by failing to
repeal old laws that have come - either through growth in rights or
through change in the effect of the old laws - to violate entitlements
that would be deemed fundamental if the issue were truly addressed
today. All the above cases are instances of a breakdown of account-
ability that affects fundamental rights, and thus could be called fail-
ures of "constitutional accountability." The two most general cate-
gories of such breakdown are "haste or thoughtlessness" and "hiding."
The Bickellian approach to judicial review is based on the notion
that, even if majoritarian legislatures are generally more trustworthy
and less dangerous than courts as the definers and bulwarks of fun-
damental rights, when there is haste or hiding we cannot rely only on
legislators to protect such rights. 6 9 When there is hiding, neither the
people nor their representatives are genuinely speaking; when there is
haste, they may be speaking, but without the attention required for
the protection of rights.
As a result, Type III jurisprudence requires that when the legis-
lature has acted with haste or hiding in a way that arguably infringes
even upon the penumbra of fundamental rights, courts should inval-
idate the possibly offending law and force the legislature to take a
"second look" with the eyes of the people on it. 7° According to this
conception, judges do have to offer provisional definitions of funda-
mental rights - otherwise judges cannot know when legislative haste
or hiding implicate rights. 7 1 At the same time, such provisional def-
69 BICKEL, supra note 6, at 22-29.
70 See, e.g., Bickel & Wellington, supra note 68, at 34-35 (arguing that the proper judicial
response to a broad delegation of power was to remand the case to Congress because the
delegation infringed on the penumbra of fundamental structural rights). It may often seem that
most laws are ultimately the result of either haste or hiding, because the democratic structures
instituted to avoid one often encourage the other. For instance, the requirements for a bill to
become law - bicameral passage and presidential presentment, to name only the constitutional
requirements - seek to ensure that bills are not too hastily passed into law. Yet these same
requirements also make the government less responsive, allowing if not encouraging hiding.
See infra notes 86, 139 and accompanying text. The rejoinder is that, as long as fundamental
rights are implicated, it is irrelevant that to avoid haste and hiding government is forced to
walk a very fine line. Indeed, that is just the point of Type III review. The more seri-
ously such rights are implicated, the finer the line that Type III review forces legislatures to
walk.
71 Critics may assert that Type III review gives judges just as much power as Type I review
in creating such provisional rights, but simply with slightly less power to enforce them. On the
contrary, Type III review plainly leaves the last word with the democratically elected legislature.
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initions can be countered by legislatures if they reenact the contro-
versial provision openly.72 In such cases, the legislative counter is
valid only for a limited time. At a certain point - if the law continues
to implicate possible fundamental rights - new politicians in a new
set of circumstances, and with a new set of people looking at them,
must reaffirm the possibly offending law. 73 Once again, the approach
applies whether society is generally libertarian or communitarian. In
a communitarian state, a bureaucrat's decision permitting individuals
to refuse their kidneys for transplant to the needy would be as subject
to judicial invalidation, pending a legislative determination, as would
a bureaucrat's decision requiring kidney donations in our relatively
libertarian polity.
One example of the legislature having the last word can be seen in Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972), and in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). After the Supreme Court struck
down Georgia's capital sentencing procedures in Furman, see 408 U.S. at 239-40, Georgia
modified its death penalty statutes to comply with the Court's requirements. In Gregg, the
Court upheld Georgia's revised procedures for imposing capital sentences and pointed out that
the "standards of decency" rationale used in Furman for invalidating the death penalty, see 408
U.S. at 257, had been undermined by the pro-death penalty measures adopted by 35 state
legislatures in the wake of the Furman decision. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179-80.
When he first described such a scheme of judicial review, Bickel was criticized for providing
too narrow and conservative a role for the judiciary. The criticism was that judges who could
use Type III remands would hesitate to employ Type I nullifications in the hope that the
legislature would fail to reenact the offending law and the issue would disappear. If, instead,
the legislatures repassed the law, the same judge who, absent Type III review, would have
initially struck down the law once and for all might now hesitate to use Type I powers in the
face of so clear and powerful a reaffirmation of the legislature's desire to violate the alleged
right. In essence, the two criticisms are analogous and demonstrate the utility of Type III
review. The first fears its use because it may encourage courts that would otherwise give no
protection to such rights to give provisional protection to them, pending legislative reconsider-
ation. The second fears that judges who would otherwise give ultimate protection to these
rights may end up not doing so after legislative reconsideration and reaction. In other words,
Type I would restrain those courts that are overly inclined to enforce newly minted rights,
and would encourage some defense of such rights by those courts that tend to give them little
weight. And that is precisely its value. For these reasons, I would expect Type III jurisprudence
to be criticized by rights activists during the tenure of Warren-like courts and by rights skeptics
during the tenure of Rehnquist-like ones.
72 Sometimes, as provided by the California Constitution, the second-look remand occurs
through referenda and ballot initiatives addressed to the public. In California, amendments to
the state constitution are relatively easily achieved through citizen-initiated referenda. See CAL.
CONST. art. II, §§ 8-11. As a result, a holding of unconstitutionality by the California Supreme
Court may have no greater effect than a remand for a second look. The remand is simply to
the public rather than to the legislature. Cf. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE
AGE OF STATUTES 10-12 (1982) (discussing the California Constitution).
7- Canada requires such a reexamination every five years. See infra note 143. American
courts could develop an equivalent arbitrary time period. They might instead, and preferably,
look to developments in other jurisdictions, or in related areas of law in their own jurisdictions,
for specific indications that the previous popular determination is outdated and could no longer
be relied on. Cf. CALABRESI, supra note 72, at 129-41 (delineating the factors that can justify
the use of judicial power to force reconsideration of an old statute).
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It is instructive to distinguish here between a Type III approach
to judicial review and the very different view sometimes attributed to
me in my book, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes:74 that courts
should send back for a second look hasty, unclear, or old laws that
derogate from the common law, regardless of whether or not a fun-
damental right seems to be involved. 75 Type III jurisprudence, in-
stead, like most traditional approaches, allows haste and hiding and
insulates them from judicial review unless the rules under considera-
tion implicate rights - Type I or Type II rights in effect - that
philosopher-judges in their wisdom consider fundamental.7 6 In other
words, my previous book involved a theory of appropriate starting
points in law and thus concerned itself with the judicial enforcement
of "common law accountability" rather than with the more limited,
but perhaps more important, issue of constitutional accountability.
77
It is also instructive to contrast Type I jurisprudence with Bruce
Ackerman's theory of constitutional moments. 78 To Ackerman, the
ultimate power to define rights rests with "We The People," when
"The People" speak with constitutional authority. In his recent bril-
liant book, he describes a whole series of requirements and events
that must occur before "The People" can be said to have left their
day-to-day preoccupations and, in a constitutive moment, determined
74 CALABRESI, supra note 72.
75 In A Common Law for the Age of Statutes, I raise the question whether inertial force
should be given to rules that fit well in the legal topography generally (a topography made up
of both statutes and common law rules), or to specific statutes that do not fit this topography
and that have certain attributes such as obsolescence or haste that make them suspect. I note
that one possible way of giving inertial force to rules that fit the landscape as a whole would
be to permit courts to send such "out-of-phase" statutes back to the legislature for a second
look. Although I suggest that under some circumstances such a remand may be justified, I also
propose many other less dramatic approaches and techniques for dealing with the issue. See
id. at 8i-ii9 (discussing judicial sunsetting of obsolete statutes); id at 146-62 (discussing other
less dramatic judicial techniques).
76 The idea that haste and hiding by legislatures are impermissible only if the result impinges
upon a fundamental right is implicit in Bickel's argument. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 6, at
165 (arguing that the Court invoked the delegation doctrine in Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. x6
(1958), only because the right to travel is so "jealously regarded").
77 One could, of course, have a definition of fundamental rights that conflates the two
approaches. Cf. Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 94 N.E. 431, 439-42 (N.Y. 1911) (noting that the
shift from fault to strict liability embodied in worker's compensation laws implicates the fun-
damental, constitutional right of due process because it derogates from the common law of tort),
overruled by Montgomery v. Daniels, 34o N.E.2d 444 (N.Y. 1975). Thus, someone could say
that all people have a fundamental right to be treated in a way consistent with the legal
landscape as a whole, that is, in a way consistent with the common law generally. Although
some deviations from the legal landscape are commonly viewed as so egregious as to violate
something fundamental, many other deviations would not be considered to justify rights-violation
treatment. This may be reflected in the old maxim that "no one has a vested interest in the
common law."
75 See ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 6-7, 44-57.
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the framework (defined the rights) that should govern the ordinary
politics of their representatives for years to come. 79 The structure and
rights so defined are to be enforced by courts (among others) against
those who in an everyday political way would undercut them.80
To Ackerman, then, our polity is dualist. It contemplates rare,
charismatic, constitutive moments - the Founding, post-Civil War
Reconstruction, and the New Deal - when "The People" speak.8' In
my terminology, it is at such constitutive times that "We The People"
define the extent of Type I protections desired and adopt or reaffirm
the Type II antidiscrimination principle.
To Bickel and adherents of the Type Ill approach, however, the
world is not so binary.8 2 Between the great constitutive moments
when the Constitution is reframed, there are crucial intermediate
moments. At such times "The People" may not be sufficiently awake
or engaged to reframe the whole system, but they may still be roused
enough to be the best decisionmakers - better than courts or everyday
legislatures - for determining whether or not a potential individual
infringement of rights is serious.
Type III jurisprudence seeks to use both courts and legislatures to
create such "mini-constitutional moments." It seeks to raise an issue
that involves putative fundamental rights above the level of ordinary
politics by having courts impose on legislatures the requirement of an
open and thoughtful second look, with "The People's" eyes upon them.
It seeks to prompt a careful consideration of fundamental rights with-
out demanding the kind of all-out engagement of "The People" that
Ackerman's great moments contemplate. Indeed, it is not absurd to
suppose that in their constitutive moments, "The People" might opt
to (re)authorize not only Type I and Type II protections, but also
Type I supervision as well. Bickellian jurisprudence maintains that
when putative fundamental rights are in play, the right to open and
thoughtful consideration by representatives or by the people is as
deserving of Type I protection as are other such fundamental notions
79 See id. at 6-7.
0 See id. at 185-95, 263-65. Bruce Ackerman's theory of constitutional moments could be
interpreted as a synthesis of the positivist, law-enforcement conception of judicial review and
the rights-based conception. Each constitutional moment, in a sense, gives renewed legal effect
to the conceptions of fundamental rights that moment made part of the Constitution.
31 See id. at 40-41.
82 At the beginning of his book, Ackerman seems strictly dualist between ordinary politics
and constitutional moments. See id. at 32 ("America is a dualist democracy." (emphasis in
original)). Toward the middle, however, he seems to leave room for governmental actions that
fit somewhere in between as he asserts that the adoption of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment,
which lowered the voting age to iS, "did not serve as the organizing focus of the turbulent
constitutional politics of the late i96o's," but was merely a "super-statute" that overrode the
Supreme Court's invalidation of a previous congressional attempt to lower the voting age. Id.
at 91.
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as separation of powers, federalism, enumerated rights, and of course,
the antidiscrimination principle.
D. Type IV: Judicial Deference to the Majority
Type IV jurisprudence maintains that fundamental rights should
be defined by the people or their representatives. Even if rights are
initially proposed by philosophers, judges, and scholars, their best
protection lies in the ordinary political processes.8 3 The violation of
antidiscrimination principles and the breakdown of constitutional ac-
countability represent pathologies of the legislative process, even evils.
The cure of handing over the power to enforce rights to untrustworthy
courts, however, would be worse. Type IV proponents argue that
judicial power too often leads to the erosion of some people's funda-
mental rights in the name of the rights of others to whom courts feel
especially tied.84
For example, in a communitarian society it would be feared that
despite a clear legislative exemption from the general collectivist rule,
kidney transplants would be deemed constitutionally mandated by
courts, because many of those who needed kidneys belonged to the
same class as the bulk of the judiciary. Conversely, in our more
libertarian society, the fear would be that the judicial abrogation of a
law requiring kidney transplants would be based on the particular
vision of the judges whose class by and large had good kidneys.85
3 Strictly speaking one can take the "majoritarian" position on two grounds. The more
intuitive ground - and the one presumed in the text - is that fundamental rights exist
independently of the political process, but that it is too dangerous to entrust their definition and
protection to anyone but executives and legislatures. Some role for courts still remains. Thus
the courts' statements that an action violates rights might, like the Declaration of Independence's
or Magna Carta's statements of rights, have a hortatory or political effect.
The second ground is more positivist. It defines rights in terms of what a legislature has
done. Unless such bodies treat certain things as rights and protect them, they are not rights at
all. And this is so regardless of whether possible discrimination is involved or whether the
relevant bodies acted openly or not. Obviously, this approach leads to the exclusion of judicial
review; indeed, it implicitly denies the existence offindamental rights altogether. See William
H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REv. 693, 703-05 (i976). It
should go without saying that this Foreword rejects such a skeptical view of rights.
Although the two majoritarian positions are technically quite distinct, in practice proponents
of the majoritarian constitution often skip back and forth between them and assert that rights
are what legislatures say they are, and even if they were not, the protection of rights by anyone
else is far too dangerous to be countenanced.
84 The most common fear expressed is that courts will represent elitist values rather than
those of the people at large. See, e.g., Simon Lee, Bicentennial Bork, Tercentennial Spycatcher:
Do the British Need a Bill of Rights?, 49 U. PITT. L. REv. 777, 785 (1988) (commenting on
the British distrust of the judiciary given the justices' elitist backgrounds); cf. LEARNED HAND,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958) ("[I]t would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic
Guardians, even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not.").
85 This scenario is, of course, analogous to the fear of what the "Old Court" did to New
Deal statutes concerning property rights.
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Rather than risking such evils, Type IV adherents would argue, one
should seek to limit the dangers of discrimination and of haste and
hiding by improving the legislatures themselves. Voting rights acts to
ensure greater participation, structural reforms to guarantee open law-
making, and perhaps even fewer checks and balances8 6 are the ways
to create responsible, responsive legislatures. Reliance on courts will
ultimately lead only to still more abdication of responsibility. Finally,
some proponents of Type IV review lament the potential of judicial
review to undermine the people's self-participatory democratic sensi-
bilities.8 7
III. A LOOK AT THREE COUNTRIES' APPROACHES
TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. The American Approach
The irony of today's great American debate between former Judge
Robert Bork and other recent judicial appointees on one side, and
Justice William Brennan and much of the academic constitutional law
establishment on the other, is that both sides share the same approach
to judicial review. They are both, to a perverse and startling degree,
Type I fundamentalists.
But here the two groups part company. Robert Bork and his
fellow travellers understandably fear abuse of judicial power if courts
grant constitutional protection to every value philosophers and judges
believe to be fundamental. As a result, they retreat into a narrow
originalism that is impossible in theory and produces outrageous re-
sults in practice.8 8 Justice Brennan and others, seeing the foolish
56 One must remember that although reducing checks and balances may decrease the like-
lihood of legislative hiding, it may increase the likelihood of haste. See infra note 139. Nor is
this an academic concern: the laborious, time-consuming requirements for the passage of a bill
into law - a classic instance of checks and balances - did in fact help arrest the frenzy to
pass a federal anti-flag burning law in 199o. Thus, a structural feature of the political processes
preempted the need for Type III review. Cf. Joel Chineson, A Skeptic's View of the Government
at Work, THE RECORDER, June 27, 199i, at 5 (book review) (pointing out that the national
frenzy over flag burning dissipated quickly and stating that "I can't even remember what my
own opinion was on the flag issue, though I remember I had a strong one").
87 See JAMES B. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 107 (i9OI) ("The tendency of a common and
easy resort to this great function . . . is to dwarf the political capacity of the people, and to
deaden its sense of moral responsibility."). This lamentation could also be phrased in terms of
rights: every act of judicial intervention, according to this view, violates the people's right to
self-participatory democracy. But, like John Ely and Alexander Bickel, I would maintain that,
without some Type I safeguards - for example, free speech - and many Type II and Type
HI protections, judicial deference to legislators does not ensure democratic self-participatory
decisionmaking at all, and hence fails its own test.
I See supra notes 5 & 16.
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results of the Bork position, cheerfully find and enforce rights wher-
ever and whenever they desire. Each side points gleefully to the
absurdity or extraordinary dangers of the other side's approach, and
Justices Black and Stewart - not to mention Professor Alexander
Bickel - spin in their graves.
Unfortunately, the popular and scholarly attention heaped upon
this debate has obscured the fact that the United States Constitution
has not been - at least since the New Deal - limited, or even
primarily devoted, to Type I judicial review. The New Deal heralded
a substantial change in the attitude of the Court toward the definition
of fundamental rights. It was, in Ackerman's terms, a paradigmatic
"constitutional moment" in which the unitary libertarian conception
of fundamental rights that had been in the ascendancy since the late
nineteenth century was decisively rejected.8 9 The New Deal did not,
however, create a polity in which an equally dominant communitarian
view of rights was adopted. It created instead a hybrid, although one
with decidedly more libertarian than communitarian leanings.
In polities in which either a virtually pure libertarian or commu-
nitarian notion of rights is accepted, it is much easier to vest broad
Type I powers in the courts. Courts are less in need of notions of
"enumerated rights" or "original intent" to hem them in. They and
their potential critics know instinctively, because it pervades the whole
system, what government ought and ought not to do, what seems
"natural" and "unnatural." As a result, the dangers of judicial abuse
are limited, even if courts use vague clauses and loose constitutional
language to support Type I decisions.
The danger of judicial abuse multiplies when absolutes are aban-
doned and libertarian and communitarian rights are mixed. Judges
applying Type I judicial review under loose and undefined language
are more likely to be enforcing only their own views rather than the
polity's notions of what the government should and should not do.
Such is the predicament that America finds itself in today. Little
wonder then that, to many, legislatures have come to seem less dan-
gerous than the elitism of courts and scholars.
I would contrast our experience not only with that of Canada and
England, 90 but also with that of some countries that have recently
been dominated by dictators. In these lands, "the government," "the
political processes," have too openly and clamorously let down all the
89 See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 41 (arguing that the New Deal was one of three
"decisive moments" in which deep changes in popular opinion gained "authoritative constitutional
recognition"); Ackerman, supra note 20, at 5i-is (arguing that the New Deal Court's "switch
in time" inaugurated a period in which the Court ratified the practical equivalent of constitutional
amendments that had been enacted as laws by political branches legitimized by decisive electoral
mandates).
90 1 discuss these two nations' experiences below. See infra pp. 124-31.
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people, not just the outcasts, and in reaction relatively unadulterated
Type I constitutions have been adopted. Judicially enforced funda-
mental rights are paramount. In such countries, both libertarian and
communal rights are enumerated, often in great detail. And even the
possibility of constitutional amendments abrogating them is, not sur-
prisingly, suspect.91
One should also contrast the United States and these countries
with another kind of Type I country. There are lands, such as Iran
or the pre-Glasnost U.S.S.R., in which a view of what is proper for
government to do prevails apart from the will of the people and in
which some set of religious or political-philosophical values that can-
not be abrogated by the majority is deemed essential. Even though
these values are enforced against the state by "the Imam" or "the
party" rather than by the courts, the approach is essentially Type I.
Guardians are chosen because they are thought to be most able to
discern and enforce the higher values, and no amendment or awak-
91 Italy and Germany are obvious examples. When Italy's Constitution was created in 1949,
"every precaution was taken to provide for effective constitutional safeguards. Among the most
interesting innovations [was] the provision for a Constitutional Court .... " 8 CONSTITUTIONS
OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD I5-16 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1987)
[hereinafter CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD]; see also COSTITUZIONE [Constitution] [COST.] arts.
134-137 (Italy) (establishing a constitutional court), translated in 8 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
WORLD, supra, at 81-83. In addition to many traditional libertarian rights, such as rights to
assemble, to religious worship, and to free expression, see id. arts. 17, 19, 21, translated in 8
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD, supra, at 51-52, the Italian Constitution also guarantees
numerous "social rights," including rights to work, to health care, to an education, and to
disability benefits, see id. arts. 4, 32, 34, 38, translated in 8 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD,
supra, at 48, 54, 55, 56. It also declares that "[t]he Republican structure is not subject to
constitutional amendment." Id. art. 139, translated in 8 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD,
supra, at 83.
The German Basic Law also enumerates fundamental human rights that cannot constitu-
tionally be amended. See GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 79, § 3, translated in 6
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD, sUpra, at 16 (making amendments of the basic principles laid
down in Articles I and 20 inadmissible). See generally infra note 94 (discussing the repealability
of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution). Among these unrepealable rights is "the
right to resist any person or persons seeking to abolish [the] constitutional order, should no other
remedy be possible." GG art. 20, § 4, translated in 6 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD, supra,
at 9o. The German Basic Law, like the Italian Constitution, creates a Constitutional Court to
protect these "basic rights." See id. art. 93, translated in 6 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD,
supra, at 127.
These protections place fundamental rights outside the range of ordinary lawmaking and
majoritarian pressures because majoritarian pressures have in the past led to violations of such
rights. See generally MAUURO CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD
25-28 (1971) (discussing the functional origins of judicial review in the United States and other
polities).
The U.S. Constitution contained only two explicit limitations on the power of amendment.
It forbade amendments concerning the slave trade before 18o8 and protected every state from
being stripped of an equal number of senators. See U.S. CONST. art. V. I discuss the amend-
ability of the U.S. Constitution above. See supra note 6.
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ening by "The People," nor any ordinary political legislative action,
is supposed to alter that structure. 92
None of this is to say that America has not had and does not
continue to have a strong Type I tradition. The lengthy discussion
of the many Type I adherents and their varying approaches suggests
the influence of Type I jurisprudence in American history,93 and so
does the existence of several areas of constitutional case law that have
consistently attracted Type I protection. First Amendment cases are
the paradigm, 94 although there are others, and they are by no means
92 The 198o Constitution of Iran, for example, explicitly requires legislation to be vetted by
a self-perpetuating group of "protectors of the faith." Article 4 declares:
All civil, penal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, laws and
regulations, as well as any other laws or regulations, should be based on Islamic prin-
ciples. This principle will in general prevail over all of the principles of the Constitution,
and other laws and regulations as well. Any judgment in regard to this will be made by
the clerical members of the Council of Guardians.
QANUN-I AsASI [Constitution] art. 4 (Iran), translated in 7 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD,
supra note 91, at 18. Similarly, Article 94 provides that "[t]he Council of Guardians shall...
examine [all legislation] from the perspective of its adherence to Islamic and Constitutional
principles, and in case of conflict, such legislation will be returned to the Assembly for revision."
Id. art. 94, translated in 7 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD, supra note 91, at 47.
93 See supra pp. 86-90.
94 See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S.
238, 263 (i986) (asserting that when the Justices strike down restrictions on speech that they do
not believe are justified by a compelling state interest, "we do not assume a legislative role, but
fulfill our judicial duty - to enforce the demands of the Constitution"); Metromedia, Inc. v.
City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 519 (ig8i) (plurality opinion) ("[i]t has been this Court's
consistent position that democracy stands on a stronger footing when courts protect First
Amendment interests against legislative intrusion, rather than deferring to merely rational leg-
islative judgment in this area . . . ."); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 16i (939) ("This court
has characterized the freedom of speech and that of the press as fundamental personal rights
.... [T]he delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts . . . to appraise the substantiality
of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights.").
Given the Court's consistent Type I review of First Amendment cases, Justice Souter's
concurrence in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., iiI S. Ct. 2456 (i99i), and then-Justice Rehnquist's
opinion in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), can only be described
as bizarre. In Renton, Justice Rehnquist failed to conduct an independent inquiry into the
sufficiency of the government's interest in restricting adult movie theaters, despite the fact that
the city of Renton offered no evidence specific to its circumstances that would justify the
regulation. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 50-52. According to Justice Rehnquist, "Renton was
entitled to rely on the experience of Seattle and other cities." Id. at 5i. In Barnes, Justice
Souter voted to uphold a law prohibiting nude dancing based on the strength of the evidence
presented in Renton - he did so even though the state legislature that enacted the regulation
in Barnes had not even referred to the sort of "secondary effects" held subject to regulation in
Renton. See Barnes, iii S. Ct. at 2468-71 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter thus deferred
to a hypothetical legislative rationale based on a study conducted in another state. This approach
is as careless as that used by Justice Black in Korematsu and Judge Bork in Dronenburg. See
supra pp. 93-94. Such a failure to exercise the Court's supervisory role is troubling enough in
Type II cases; I should have thought it unthinkable in a Type I situation.
Given the central importance of the First Amendment, it is not surprising that some have
argued that it cannot constitutionally be repealed. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 6, at 1045 n.I
(arguing that abolition of the First Amendment would be unconstitutional because "abolition of
speech would effectively immunize the status quo from further constitutional revision"); cf.
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limited to those - such as free speech - whose principal role may
well be to make the political process function better. 95 One could
argue, as Justice Black did, that all the rights enumerated in the first
eight amendments have enjoyed, and should enjoy, Type I protection
from encroachment by both federal and state governments. 9 6 One
could add Professor Charles Black's "structural" rights - those rights
without which properly elected "checked and balanced" legislatures
could not exist 97 - and end up with quite a list.9 s
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., PERSPECTIVES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 91 (1970) ("Our federal polity
is a public-opinion polity; whatever kills the expression of opinion frustrates its assumed working.
This would be true even if there were no First Amendment."). In testimony to the Senate
Judiciary Committee in 1989, one commentator argued that a proposed flag burning amendment
might be unenforceable to the extent that it clashed with rights protected by the First Amend-
ment. See Measures to Protect the Physical Integrity of the American Flag: Hearings on S.
Y338, H.R. 2978, and S.J. Res. 18o Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, ioist Cong.,
Ist Sess. 536-39 (1989) (testimony of Prof. Walter Dellinger). It is, of course, simply incorrect
to say that the First Amendment cannot be amended. The idea is rather that any serious
change in that amendment would so alter the nature of our polity that it could no longer be
viewed as the same state.
95 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I (guaranteeing freedom of religion); id. amend. V (pro-
hibiting double jeopardy). Even if one could, if one wished, conceive of these rights as struc-
tural, they remain at heart classic libertarian rights to individual autonomy. Conversely, free
speech, although it is protected primarily because it is necessary to the functioning of democracy,
is also protected in part as a libertarian right to be oneself.
9 See infra pp. 132-33 (discussing Justice Black's constitutional theory).
97 See BLACK, supra note IS, at 34-35 (explaining that the guarantees of individual rights
rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment can be "transferred . . . to the process of inference" made
possible by the structural method of constitutional exegesis).
The content of structural rights, of course, differs from polity to polity. Thus, it can be
persuasively argued that in the context of Latin America, Costa Rica's constitutional prohibition
of a standing army is as much a structural safeguard for its democracy as the First Amendment
and federalism are for ours. See CONSTITUCION POLITICA art. 12 (1949) (Costa Rica), reprinted
in 4 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD, supra note 91, at 3 ("The army as a permanent institution
is proscribed."); see also Elaine Scarry, W1ar and the Social Contract: Nuclear Policy, Distri-
bution, and the Right to Bear Arms, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1257, 1266-68 (iq9i) (arguing that
the Second Amendment serves to ensure that wars will be fought only with popular consent).
Some members of today's Supreme Court seem to favor according similar Type I status to
some second-order, non-enumerated structural rights that are themselves derived from the non-
enumerated core concepts of separation of powers and federalism. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654, 708-09, 726-27 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that any limitation on the
President's power to fire a special prosecutor is an unconstitutional violation of separation of
powers principles); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733-34 (1986) (holding that the Gramm-
Rudman deficit control statute violates separation of powers principles because it gives the
Comptroller General, an agent of the Congress, executive powers). But it can be argued that
according Type I, instead of Type III, status to these penumbral rights is just as dangerous as
according such status to the penumbral rights, such as privacy, of which the current Court is
so profoundly skeptical. See infra pp. 135-36 (discussing the right to privacy).
93 Judges who believe that Type I rights are relatively few and limited can nonetheless, like
Justice Black, be very aggressive in defending these rights. Alternatively, they can, like Justice
Stewart, be relatively restrained, or like Judge Bork, be very passive. See, e.g., New York
Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714-15 (1971) (Black, J.) ("I believe that every moment's
continuance of the injunctions against the newspapers amounts to a flagrant, indefensible, and
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My point in this Foreword, however, is not to describe the myriad
instances of Type I judicial review in American constitutional law,
nor to suggest areas in which such review might be expanded. Rather,
my objective is to demonstrate that, as a descriptive matter, there is
also ample constitutional language and precedent supporting Type II
and Type III review - albeit not always explicitly.
In finding sources for Type II review, one obviously begins with
the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection language 99 and doctrine
- the most significant but by no means the only basis for the anti-
discrimination principle.'10 0 Dozens of Fourteenth Amendment cases
have required severe judicial scrutiny - and usually invalidation -
of governmental action that discriminated against various outcast
groups. 1 1 But much other constitutional language can be read to
support Type II review as well, including the clauses forbidding the
establishment of religion, 10 2 uncompensated takings of property,
10 3
"cruel and unusual punishment,"'01 4 and bills of attainder. 0 5 Inter-
estingly, although there has been one line of cases that upholds against
continuing violation of the First Amendment."); id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring) (agreeing
that the First Amendment required vacating the injunction against the New York Times because
allowing speech in this case would not surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage
to our nation or its people); Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1462-63 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (rejecting
in an opinion by Judge Bork a First Amendment challenge to a statute that forbade the carrying
of placards criticizing a foreign government in front of its embassy and required a police permit
to congregate near an embassy), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Boos v. Barry, 485
U.S. 312 (1988).
The same is true of judges who believe in many Type I rights. Justice Brennan believed in
open-ended rights and was aggressive in their definition and defense. Conversely, although
Justice Frankfurter was also a staunch believer in Type I rights, he was quite reluctant to use
judicial power to protect them. See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 599-600
(1940) (Frankfurter, J.) (upholding the constitutionality of a state law requiring public school
students to recite the pledge of allegiance); Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646
(i943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the majority's determination that requiring
the pledge of allegiance is unconstitutional). Activism and passivism are, in fact, quite different
issues from adherence to one or another constitutional paradigm.
99 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § i.
100 See infra pp. 115-18.
101 Such cases include both those in which government officials act with racist discriminatory
intent, see, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (invalidating racial school
segregation); Strauder v. West Virginia, ioo U.S. 303, 307 (1879) (invalidating the conviction of
a black defendant by a jury on which only white males could sit), and those in which the
government pursues an ostensibly valid purpose but does so by identifying an outcast group
and imposing on it a special burden, cf., e.g., Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred
Compensation Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983) (holding that smaller monthly pension
benefits for female employees based on actuarial tables reflecting women's longer life spans
violate title VII).
102 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
103 See id. amend V.
104 Id. amend. VIII.
105 See id. art. I, § 9, cl. 3-
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equal protection attack - incorrectly in my view - statutes or policies
that do not on their face discriminate by group, but which nevertheless
achieve their values by grievously burdening outcasts, 0 6 analysis un-
106 See, e.g., Hernandez v. New York, iii S. Ct. 1859, x866 (1991) (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause was not violated by a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges, despite a
potentially disproportionate exclusion of Latino jurors, because in dismissing jurors who under-
stood Spanish, the prosecutor had not acted with discriminatory intent); McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279, 297-99 (1987) (holding that a statistical study showing that the death penalty is
imposed disproportionately on black defendants convicted for killing whites does not necessarily
imply discriminatory purpose, and therefore does not demonstrate a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause was not violated when the District of Columbia administered a job test
measuring verbal ability, vocabulary, and reading comprehension oi which black police officer
applicants performed worse than white applicants).
This is not to say that Type II jurisprudence does not recognize a distinction between core
equal protection cases, in which a government official has expressly classified and burdened an
outcast group (for whatever purpose, discriminatory or not), and Washington v. Davis type
cases. In Type II review, given the focus on impact, the distinction is simply not dispositive.
As I have already discussed, outcast groups may be burdened in two ways: they may be
stigmatized by the very act of being classified, and they may be practically disadvantaged by
the effect of the law. The stigmatic harm inflicted when the government does the classifying is
frequently sufficiently great to make even the most trivial practical disadvantage - being
deprived of drinking from common water fountains, for instance - a violation of a fundamental
right. But even when the stigmatic harm is less because the government is not actually
classifying according to membership in an outcast group, the practical disadvantage imposed on
an outcast group by the government action may still be so great that the action should be
deemed a violation of a fundamental right. In this category might fall disadvantages such as
scoring worse on a reading and vocabulary test and thus being deprived of a job on a police
force, or being the only ones required to donate kidneys for transplant. See supra p. 99.
Of course, core equal protection cases differ from Washington v. Davis type cases in another
fundamental but ultimately nondeterminative respect. By definition, we know that the group
being burdened in a core equal protection case is an outcast group. One simply reads the statute
or listens to the stated policy that mentions, for example, a racial classification (in some
circumstances, one can also infer from other evidence - an internal government memo perhaps
- that the government has classified by race). The same is not true in Washington v. Davis
type cases; Type H review in such cases requires more work. In these cases, the primary group
that is burdened is, again by hypothesis, not an outcast group. Thus, for example, the primary
disadvantaged group in Washington v. Davis was those who fared poorly on such tests, the
"less literate," and in the kidney example, "all the best donors." Type I review must look
behind this grouping and explore whether the "less literate" applicants were mainly members of
an outcast group and the "more literate," generally not, whether the best kidney donors were
those with recessive sickle cell anemia (blacks) or recessive Tay Sacks (Jews). This is often not
an easy determination, to be sure, but its difficulty cannot be an excuse for not trying. That
would be much like saying that the difficulty of distinguishing between an (intentional) taking
and "mere regulation" justified the conclusion that a regulation could never be a taking, even if
the private owner is left with totally valueless property. The need to examine the degree to
which those who bear the bulk of the burden in Washington v. Davis situations are outcasts
goes to the very heart of Type II reasoning. If a significant burden is also placed on people
who hold legislative power, then - just as in cases in which adequate compensation of the
losers is required or analogous burdens are placed on "all of us" - the legislative decision is
deserving of great respect because it is truly majoritarian. If, instead, the burden rests mainly
on outcasts, the legislative decision is as suspect as would be an attempt to build a public park
without compensating the landowner whose property was taken.
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der other clauses of the Constitution has frequently focused on impact
rather than intent. 107
Of course, one can view some of these clauses, such as the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause, as barring certain actions even if
they are conducted in a nondiscriminatory way. Such a Type I view
is probably appropriate for some "punishments" such as torture.1 0 8
107 For example, violations of the Establishment Clause and incidences of cruel and unusual
punishment have been held unconstitutional without regard to intent. See, e.g., Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 172-73, 183 (1976) (explaining that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
punishments that are "grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime," that involve the
"unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," or that are "totally without penological justifica-
tion"); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 4o8 U.S. 602, 612 (i97i) (explaining that to be constitutional, a
statute's "principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion");
supra p. 93 (discussing the irrelevancy of intent to takings claims). But cf. TRIBE, supra note
io, § i4-io, at 1214 ("Eighth Amendment claims based on official conduct that does not purport
to be the penalty formally imposed for a crime require inquiry into state of mind . . . ."). In
its most recent Eighth Amendment case dealing with prison conditions, Wilson v. Seiter, iii
S. Ct. 2321 (i99i), the Court held that prisoners must prove intent amounting to "deliberate
indifference" on the part of a prison official before a cruel and unusual punishment challenge
can be maintained. See id. at 2326. This case is yet another example of the Court's troubling
and increasing reluctance in non-economic contexts to take an impact-based view of its role.
10s See, e.g., Charles Black, Mr. Justice Black, the Supreme Court, and the Bill of Rights,
HARPER's MAGAZINE, Feb. i6i, at 63, 67 ("[Tlhe right not to be tortured is entirely unsuitable
for 'balancing' against competing considerations of convenience, comfort, and safety . . ").
Does Type I apply to the death penalty as well? That is, is that punishment sufficiently
violative of fundamental rights to be barred regardless of how "fairly" or nondiscriminatorily it
is applied and how openly and thoughtfully it is enacted? Different Type I proponents would
of course look to different sources to decide that question. Some would look to the specific
intent of the Framers. See, e.g., Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Inflicted": The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 859-6o (1969) (arguing that the Framers
misinterpreted the historical meaning of language in the English Bill of Rights that supplied the
language of the Eight Amendment). Others - more wisely - would ask whether capital
punishment is viewed today in the same way that the Framers viewed punishments that they
considered to be cruel and unusual. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 241-42 (1972)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (referring to the evolving standards for punishment in a humane and
maturing society). One way to make such a comparison would be to see if factors such as rarity
of imposition and prevalence of extreme procedural protections for capital punishment make it
resemble those rarely imposed and procedurally hedged punishments that existed in England
but were clearly viewed by the Framers as cruel and unusual (such as drawing and quartering
and flogging from town to town). Other Type I proponents - such as Justice Frankfurter -
would look to whether English-speaking peoples have capital punishment. See, e.g., Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. i65, 169 (1952) (noting that regard for the requirements of due process
requires the Court to determine whether proceedings "'offend those canons of decency and
fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples'" (quoting Malinski v.
New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416-17 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))). Still others would
simply look to general philosophy or search their souls. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 228-31
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that capital punishment always violates the Constitution); id.
at 231-32 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (same).
On the Court today, the majority seems to consider only whether a national "consensus"
exists against capital punishment - a most implausible view of the Court's role with respect to
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But a proponent of Type II would also read the clause as barring
some punishments only when they are, for example, applied to "them"
and not to "us," to those who kill or rape "us" and not to those who
kill or rape "them." 10 9
What is striking is that, whatever one ultimately thinks of Ack-
erman's general thesis,11 0 Type II review has been supported by cru-
cial language or by leading cases directly associated with each of the
three great Constitution-making moments of our history - the found-
ing, the post-Civil War Reconstruction and the New Deal. The Con-
stitution in general and the Bill of Rights in particular are replete
with language indicating an abhorrence of discrimination, slavery
being the tragic exception.1 1 ' The Thirteenth, 112 Fourteenth, 113 and
Type I rights even if the search for consensus were adequately conducted, which it usually is
not. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-71 (1989) (holding that capital punish-
ment of 16- and 17-year-old murderers does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in
part because the various state laws failed to demonstrate a consensus condemning such a use
of capital punishment). If consensus is the goal, why should it stop at the national border?
Why should it not look to other democracies that share many of our values? Justice Frankfurter
may have suggested such an approach through his infelicitous and offensive phrase "English-
speaking peoples," which nevertheless is much sounder in its aims that Justice Scalia's search
for a national consensus. Scalia's search was particularly questionable in Stanford. See infra
PP. 143-45. With Justice Scalia's strange use of consensus one should compare Justice Stewart's
use of similar language in Gregg. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179 (referring to "society's endorsement
of the death penalty for murder"). Justice Stewart was not, of course, engaged in Type I
jurisprudence in Gregg, but rather was looking at the results of the Type Ill remand the Court
had decreed in Furman.
Strikingly, in a case last Term in which consensus would have suggested that a punishment
was unusual, to say the least, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, nevertheless held that such
a consensus was not enough to bar the punishment. See Harmelin v. Michigan, i x S. Ct.
2680, 2698-99 (I99x) (upholding a life sentence without parole for first-time possession of one
and one-half pounds of cocaine).
109 A person who believes that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause was primarily an
antidiscrimination clause would focus attention on whether the punishment was applied equally
to all similar murderers or only to those whose killings seemed worse because of the polity's
biases. See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 248-49 & n. i (Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing that
statutes that leave juries untrammeled discretion in imposing the death penalty violate the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments). Thus, such a person would strike down death penalty
laws if they were applied disproportionately to outsiders. But she would also strike them down
if the killing of insiders were systematically viewed as a more heinous crime than the killing of
outsiders. To such a person McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (987), would be the ultimate
failure of the Court to do its job.
110 See supra pp. io6-07 (discussing Ackerman's thesis).
"I Among the clauses having an antidiscrimination component are the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, the Bills of Attainder Clause, id. art. I, § xo,
cl. x, the Establishment Clause, id. amend. I, and the Takings Clause, id. amend. V. But see
Amar, supra note 45, at 1133 (arguing that the Bill of Rights' original purpose was mainly to
protect against abuse by the federal government and not to protect against discrimination).
112 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (prohibiting slavery).
113 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (requiring states, inter alia, to provide "equal protection of the
laws").
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Fifteenth"t 4 Amendments, together with a great deal of post-Civil
War legislation such as the Freedman's Bureau laws," 5 are critical to
antidiscrimination theory.116 And the unmistakable assertion of Type
II authority in United States v. Carolene Products," 7 when the New
Deal Court was busily renouncing much of its Type I jurisprudence,
completes the picture." 8 Indeed, it is hard to think of any principle
114 U.S. CONST. amend. XV (prohibiting discrimination in voting rights "on the basis of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude").
Is Freedman's Bureau Acts, ch. 9o, 13 Stat. 507 (186S); ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173 (x866); ch.
135, i5 Stat. 83 (1868). The Freedman's Bureau Acts of x865, i866, and 1868 created, and
later extended the operations of, a federal agency designed to assist southern refugees and
freedmen, particularly blacks, in areas such as medical aid, education, and land acquisition.
See Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 71 VA. L. REv. 753, 760-83 (i985).
116 The Civil War amendments not only represented dramatic statements and applications
of the principle in themselves, but they also came to require the application of almost all
previous federal constitutional antidiscrimination notions to the states as well as to the national
government. In this regard, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause must be
read together with the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as an affirmation of the underlying
antidiscrimination principle itself. Similarly, the contemporaneous Freedman's Bureau laws
demonstrate that "affirmative action" was not necessarily a violation of that principle. See
Freedman's Bureau Act, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173, 175 (x866) (conveying disputed lands to "heads
of families of the African race"). "From the closing days of the Civil War until the end of
civilian Reconstruction some five years later, Congress adopted a series of social welfare programs
whose benefits were expressly limited to blacks." Schnapper, supra note 15, at 754. To the
extent one is concerned with either original intent or language, it is hard to avoid the conclusion
that the Civil War amendments applied the antidiscrimination principle explicitly to former
slaves and broadened its scope with respect to both the states and with respect to other more
general discriminatory practices not enumerated in the original charter. Cf. Amar, supra note
45, at 1136 (stating that the view of the Bill of Rights as a preeminently antidiscrimination
document stems from the post-Civil War period).
"7 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
1s In the New Deal reworking of the Constitution, the Court abandoned certain libertarian,
Type I pretensions that had increasingly influenced its behavior over the previous 30 or 40
years. The Court stopped defending many previously assumed fundamental rights, such as the
property rights protected in the earlier Lochner era. See supra note ii; see also Cass R. Sunstein,
Constitutionalism After the New Deal, ioi HARV. L. REV. 421, 438 (1987) (arguing that the
New Deal involved the abandonment of some rights enshrined in the existing common law).
At the same time, however, it immediately and forcefully reasserted its role when discrimination
was involved. This was the great significance of Carolene Products, for it signalled that although
it was retreating from a libertarian, Type I view of the Constitution, the Court was in no way
abandoning its role under the antidiscrimination prototype.
That this approach was based not merely on the equal protection language in the Consti-
tution, but on a broader antidiscrimination principle, can be seen in cases such as Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). In that case antidiscrimination principles were used to invalidate
federal racial segregation policies in Washington, D.C. public schools, despite the absence of
any equal protection language in the Constitution applicable to the federal government. See id.
at 499-500. Bolling has meant that the requirements placed on the states by Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (954), apply to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause. Yet the Fifth Amendment neither has in it, nor can be read to incorporate,
the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection language. See Steven G. Calabresi, Note, A
Madisonian Interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, 91 YALE L.J. 1403, 1420 (1982).
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of our Constitution, not even the separation of powers or federalism,
that has been more resoundingly reaffirmed at all three times than
the antidiscrimination principle.
Traditional doctrine also supports Type III review. Here, I need
not go into great detail because Alexander Bickel's writings have
already made the case. 19 The hoary doctrine requiring strict inter-
pretation of statutes in derogation of the common law can be seen as
representing judicial control of hasty or ill-considered legislation. A
core purpose in narrow, and often destructive, construction of such
statutes is ensuring that the legislature will make rights-implicating
changes in the common law only after explicit and thoughtful consid-
eration. Similarly, the "modern American Doctrine which refuses to
impute to Congress the casual intention to make vast and far-reaching
changes . . . in the federal balance,' 120 can be seen as a judicial
device for forcing caution and consideration in legislation that affects
fundamental structural rights. The Lincoln Mills case 12 1 and Chief
Justice Hughes's magisterial opinion in Sorrells v. United States
122
present similar methods of judicial control.
Type HI review also can be used to prevent legislatures from
hiding, that is, to keep them from avoiding difficult issues that may
be politically dangerous to decide openly. To prevent such evasion of
responsibility, a court may strike down a law or regulation that in-
fringes on a constitutionally penumbral right and require a clearer
statement from Congress. Thus, in Kent v. Dulles12 3 the Court held
that Congress's delegation of power to issue passports to the Secretary
of State did not give the Secretary unbridled discretion to restrict a
citizen's right to travel.124 If Congress wanted to allow the Secretary
to deny passports to communists, as he had been doing, Congress
would have to grant the authority explicitly. 125 Further typical ex-
Justice Black's decision to join the majority in Boiling, despite all his statements about the
emptiness of substantive due process (apart from the Fourteenth Amendment's incorporation of
the first eight amendments) suggests that he too was wedded to the existence and centrality of
the antidiscrimination principle. See infra note 169.
119 See sources cited supra note 68.
120 Bickel & Wellington, supra note 68, at 8.
121 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-59 (1957) (compelling an
employer to arbitrate a dispute with its employees' union pursuant to the Labor-Management
Relations Act, ch. 120, § 30(a), 61 Stat. 136, 156 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 185 (1988))).
122 287 U.S. 435, 446, 452 (932) (upholding an entrapment defense and rejecting the gov-
emnment's literal interpretation of a statute as an unintended consequence of casual legal lan-
guage).
123 357 U.S. I6 (1958).
124 See id. at 128-29.
125 See id. at 13o. Because the Court held that Congress had not explicitly delegated
authority to restrict the travel of communists, the Court did not rule on the constitutionality of
such a restriction. See id. at 129-30.
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amples of anti-hiding Type III review include Thompson v. Okla-
homa,126 Furman v. Georgia,127 Greene v. McElroy,128 and Judge
Newman's concurrence in Abele v. Markle.1
2 9
Even the traditional principle that statutes should be interpreted
strictly to avoid a constitutional issue1 30 is a classic example of a Type
III judicial role. The principle rests on the notion that judges should
not attribute to the legislature an intention to impinge on fundamental
rights unless the legislature has carefully considered the issue and
clearly expressed its intention. 13 1
126 487 U.S. 815, 857 (1988) (raising the possibility that state legislatures did not realize
children could be executed under their own statutes).
127 408 U.S. 238, 240 (1972) (per curiam) (remanding to the states, in effect, the issue of the
constitutionality of the death penalty); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-8I (1976)
(plurality opinion) (accepting the states' reaffirmation of capital punishment).
128 360 U.S. 474, 506-07 (1959) (finding that a loyalty security program established admin-
istratively, which did not permit confrontation of witnesses, was unlawful without explicit
executive or congressional authority).
129 342 F. Supp. 800, 81o (D. Conn. 1972) (Newman, J., concurring) (striking down an old
anti-abortion law because its original justification no longer existed), vacated, 410 U.S. 951
(1973).
130 See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, ii S. Ct. 1759, 1788 (19i) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Court should not reach "constitutional questions unnecessarily"); see also infra pp. 141-
42 (discussing Rust in detail).
131 The doctrine that typifies, as much as any, the Type m anti-hiding approach is, of
course, nondelegation. This doctrine, often declared dead after the New Deal, has shown
repeated signs of life - albeit in many cases implicitly. Obviously, what was unconstitutional
to Chief Justice Hughes in the 193os as undue delegation, see, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935) (holding unconstitutional a statute delegating
to the executive the authority to approve industry-written "fair trade" codes); Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935) (rejecting presidential regulations on the petroleum
industry as the product of an unconstitutionally broad and standardless delegation of legislative
power), would typically not be so today. But this is not because the concept of undue delegation
has changed. Rather, it is because the entitlements to which the concept was applied no longer
seem even putatively fundamental. See supra note i i (discussing the rise and fall of the Lochner
era). The doctrine can thus be readily applied to new cases in which a challenged rule
approaches the violation of fundamental rights. In the ig5os, for example, Justices Black and
Douglas and Chief Justice Warren sought to use Chief Justice Hughes's nondelegation doctrine
to require legislative second looks in several cases. See, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474,
507 (1959) (involving the creation of loyalty security programs); Barenblatt v. United States, 360
U.S. 109, 140 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that because the House Un-American
Activities Committee's power to investigate communist activity threatened First Amendment
rights, such power should be recognized only if explicitly delegated by Congress); Kent v. Dulles,
357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958) (involving rules restricting the issuance of passports). At the same
time, they all assumed that Chief Justice Hughes's cases were wrongly decided because they
involved such (by then) settled issues as the extent of the federal commerce power. See Bar-
enblatt, 360 U.S. at 14o n.7; Kent, 357 U.S. at 129. Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Greene
originally included citations to Chief Justice Hughes's second look opinions. See Greene, 360
U.S. at 474. They were removed at the request of Justice Douglas, as Justice Black told me
when I clerked for him, because - I believe - Justice Douglas did not want the possibility of
a second look to be emphasized in that case. In Kent however, Justice Douglas himself made
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Why are antidiscrimination and constitutional accountability so
important in the United States? It is too long a story to discuss in
any depth here, but a few historical and sociological observations may
be worth noting.
As for anti-scapegoatism and antidiscrimination, one observation
comes immediately to mind. We are a nation of immigrants; 13 2 a
nation of slaves and of slave owners; 133 a highly heterogenous society
in which many groups at various times - and still today - feel,
often justifiably, consistently excluded.'134 Discrimination and scape-
goatism have been our curse and our history. The occasional victories
over these sins have been our true glories. 13S The danger remains as
similar citations. See Kent, 357 U.S. at 129.
Ironically, the most recent example of an explicit invocation of the nondelegation doctrine
was then-Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion in Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petro-
leum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980). Justice Rehnquist argued that new benzene standards set by
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration should be overturned because of an invalid
delegation of legislative authority by Congress to the Secretary of Labor. See id. at 687-88
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist emphasized that setting the benzene standards
involved a difficult balancing of costs and economic efficiency with the potential benefits of
preserving workers' health. See id. at 685. That balancing, he believed, should have been
conducted by Congress itself, not by an administrative agency. See id. at 686-87. It is possible
to view his position as requiring a Type III approach when the fundamental right to life and
health is involved. Given that his opinion worked to weaken the protections given to life and
health, it seems more likely - and more characteristic - that Justice Rehnquist was concerned
with resurrecting and protecting corporations' fundamental rights to property, but that he was
unwilling to say so openly. In any event, such an opinion was really an outlier in this Court's
otherwise dismal record on Type III review. If anything, it provides further evidence, like
Justice O'Connor's dissent in Rust, that the Rehnquist Court is fully aware of the potential uses
of Type I review. The Court's record simply suggests that it has no principled basis for
selecting the cases in which it applies Type III review. See infra pp. 140-5o.
132 See generally JOHN BODNAR, THE TRANSPLANTED: A HISTORY OF IMMIGRANTS IN
URBAN AMERICA (1985); JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
NATIvIsM i86o-I925 (2d ed. 1988).
133 For a general discussion of American slavery and its legacy, see EDMUND S. MORGAN,
AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM (1975); GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA:
THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (1944); and C. VANN WOODWARD, THE
STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d rev. ed. 1974).
134 See GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW 108-14 (1985);
GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 170-73 (1978).
13- See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. I, 19-20 (1958) (holding unanimously that deseg-
regation must proceed despite extraordinary local opposition); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding unanimously that segregated public schools were inherently un-
equal); CHRISTOPHER MARTIN, THE AMISTAD AFFAIR 196-97 (1970) (describing John Quincy
Adams's argument before the Supreme Court on behalf of the Africans who had overpowered
the crew of the slave runner Amistad; the Africans were ultimately freed); see also CALABRESI,
supra note 134, at 104-05 (discussing Cooper).
Two of the best recent books on the civil rights movement reflect in their titles the difficulty
of that struggle, a difficulty that nonetheless leaves us with a retrospective sense of glory. See
TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1954-1963 (1988);
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great today as ever that we will assert values in our governmental
institutions that we cannot really live up to and instead impose the
burden of protecting those values on the outcasts of our society.
Several reasons explain our desire for Bickellian constitutional
accountability. Our checks and balances, separation of powers, and
federalism all increase the ease with which legislatures and executives
can hide, singly and in combination. They allow government deci-
sionmakers to duck the real issues and, if pressed, to blame someone
else. Checks and balances in particular impede the repeal of old laws,
including those that have over time come to violate entitlements that
philosopher-judges deem fundamental; and this survival of old laws
is a particularly important, if frequently unnoticed, form of hiding. 1
36
Two factors may explain the special danger in America of hasty and
ill-considered legislation. The lack of strong party discipline and
structures means that laws are often patched together quickly toward
the end of a legislative session. 137 And the rootlessness of our frontier
DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE SOUTHERN
CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (1986).
136 Compare, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. i86, i96 (1986) (refusing to declare
unconstitutional a Georgia anti-sodomy statute enacted in i816 and rarely enforced) with Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding unconstitutional a nineteenth-century
statute outlawing the use of contraceptives even though the Connecticut state legislature persis-
tently refused to repeal the law). The statute in Griswold presents a prime example of hiding
through the failure to repeal old laws. When the Connecticut statute outlawing the use of
contraceptives was enacted in 1879, it was quite consistent with many state laws and with the
then-prevailing view of rights in this country. Over the years, however, attitudes changed, and
the law came to be viewed by many as violating fundamental rights. Still, one can sympathize
with the position taken by Justices Stewart and Black - and also, of course, by Judge Bork
- that it was hard to find in the Constitution any Type I prohibition against such an "uncom-
monly silly law," Griswold, 381 U.S. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The problem was simply
that the law, although unwanted, unworkable, and incapable of reenactment, was politically
hard to repeal. It was easier for legislators to use checks and balances to duck the issue than
to vote one way or the other on it. For a discussion of Griswold, see CALABRESI, supra note
72, at 8-9, 21.
Philosopher-judges may have been right that contraception had come to be viewed as a
fundamental right. Justices Black and Stewart and Judge Bork were also right, however, that
judicial recognition of contraception as a Type I right meant, in fact, that no principled limit
on court creation of Type I rights could thereafter be easily established. See Griswold, 381
U.S. at 521, 524 (Black, J., dissenting); BORK, supra note 5, at 99-IOO. The correct answer
lay not in Bork's criticism of the decision, but rather in a Bickellian remand that would have
forced the legislators to speak out if they truly favored such a law. If legislators were unwilling
to reenact the law, this new non-Type I right should have been left unviolated as a result of
inertia. See BICKEL, supra note 6, at 147-49, 154 (recommending the use of the concept of
desuetude by the Court in the predecessor case to Griswold, Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (i96I),
to force a second look at the Connecticut law and arguing that desuetude had been implicitly
recognized by Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion in Poe); see also CALABRESI, supra note
72, at 129-31, 135-38 (discussing factors leading to judicial reconsideration of old laws). This
is not to say that Griswold - like Bowers - did not raise Type II issues as well.
137 See CHARLES R. WISE, THE DYNAMICS OF LEGISLATION: LEADERSHIP AND POLICY
CHANGE IN THE CONGRESSIONAL PROCESS 271-72 (1991). Wise points out that "legislation
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immigrant society makes us particularly prone to fads, to demands
for conformism from "outsiders" (all of us at one point or another),
and to the requirement that we prove ourselves to be i20% Ameri-
can.'-38 These factors lead to bursts of haste and its excesses when a
fad or a passion arises. They also lead to a polity that needs, but has
never been able to create in its legislative process, safeguards against
such windbursts.139 None of these concerns matters terribly much if
hastily enacted or issue-ducking laws are relatively trivial. But when
such laws touch areas where government perhaps ought not to tread,
at a minimum a thoughtful legislative consideration that focuses the
eyes of the people squarely on the law in question is required.1
40
passed in a last-minute rush at the end of a congressional session is unlikely to be understood,
let alone supported on its merits, by a majority of the people's representatives." Id. at 321-22.
He indirectly ascribes the cause to "[d]ivided party government, interest group control, [and]
institutional fragmentation of power." Id. at 321.
138 For example, Representative Gerald Solomon of New York, who favored a constitutional
amendment to ban flag burning, accused House Speaker Thomas Foley, who opposed it, of
"'deliberately gagging io million veterans'" and "'kowtowing to ilk like the Communist Youth
Brigade."' Chris Harvey, Speaker Hurries Flag Vote, WASH. TIMES, June 21, 199o, at A5
(quoting Gerald Solomon). For further discussion of the anti-flag burning hysteria and its
implications for judicial review, see note 86.
139 Fear of popular passion was, of course, one of the reasons for the complex system of
checks and balances the Framers created. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 378-79
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (arguing that the Senate would provide a bulwark
against "improper acts of legislation" and "the impulse of sudden and violent passions"). Time
has added more checks and balances to the system, most importantly through the creation of
powerful legislative committees, which are perhaps the major current, non-constitutional "check"
on populist frenzies. Occasionally, these committees have successfully played the role of mini-
Houses of Lords. When the wind of passion is strong enough, however, these legislative
committees have frequently proven inadequate to the task, even on issues whose lasting majority
support is more than doubtful. For example, as Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee
during the height of the McCarthy Era, Representative Emanuel Celler managed for years to
prevent extreme anticommunist legislation from leaving his Committee. See N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
2, 1955, at 27 (Celler introducing a bill to require court approval before wiretapping and to
limit wiretapping to cases involving national security or kidnapping); Celler Schedules Wiretap
Hearings, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1955, at 78 (Celler calling the illegal use of wiretapping power
a "racket"); Celler Asks Curb on All Wiretaps, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1955, at 22 (Celler
continuing to resist internal security legislation by declaring that wiretaps should not be permitted
at the discretion of the Justice Department, but rather only after a court order from a federal
judge); 2 in House Score Leak Proposals, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1957, at 12 (Celler declaring
that legislative proposals on wiretapping promoted by Commission on Governmental Security
would be unconstitutional). But Celler could not hold back the political forces forever, and his
Committee eventually approved a wiretapping bill. See Wiretap Bill Gains, N.Y. TIMES, May
15, r958, at 59 (Celler's subcommittee approving a compromise bill authorizing the use of
wiretapping evidence in federal court cases involving espionage, treason, subversion, or kidnap-
ping). I discuss the tension between haste and hiding with respect to checks and balances
above. See supra note 70.
140 "The point after all is to ask Congress for sober reconsideration, leaving to Congress the
last word. To raise constitutional doubts is to inhibit future legislative action." Bickel &
Wellington, supra note 68, at 34. Justice Stone noted that every law must ultimately be based
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B. The Canadian Approach
The Canadian Constitution seems to me to be, at least nominally,
a wonderful example of an essentially Bickellian constitution. That
is certainly one way of viewing the celebrated non-obstante clause
within its bill of rights.141 The non-obstante clause says that even
enumerated rights - provisionally enforced by the Supreme Court -
may be abrogated by the legislature, but only if the legislature ex-
plicitly decides to do so. 142 This legislative intention to violate a
right, moreover, must be restated at least every five years.143 How
all this will be worked out remains to be seen. There are indications,
for example, that some provinces are trying to avoid its second-look
objectives. 144 Whatever ultimately happens, the explicit recognition
of Type III approaches in the Canadian Constitution make that
charter worthy of particular attention.
The Canadian approach is also interesting because there are ex-
ceptions to the non-obstante clause in the bill of rights. These excep-
tions affect subjects, including "language" rights, that apparently re-
quire stronger antidiscrimination protections - Type II review. 145 In
on "the sober second thought" of the people. Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United
States, 5o HARV. L. REV. 4, 25 (1936).
141 CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms),
§ 33; see also Paul C. Weiler, Rights and Judges in a Democracy: A New Canadian Version,
i8 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 51, 8o-86 (1984) [hereinafter Weiler, Rights and Judges in a Democracy]
(arguing that Canada's non-obstante clause is "an intrinsically sound solution to the dilemma of
rights and courts"); Paul C. Weiler, Writing a Constitution to Protect Minorities: The Canadian
Experience, in MINORITIES: COMMUNITY AND IDENTITY 315, 322-25 (C. Fried ed., 1983)
(explaining the non-obstante provision as a political arrangement that draws on the strengths of
both the legislative and judicial branches).
142 See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms), § 33; Weiler, Rights and Judges in a Democracy, supra note 141, at 81-82.
143 See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms), § 33. The requirement of reenactment after five years is a twist that Bickel himself
never called for. It is, however, profoundly Bickellian and shows how much those who pushed
for the Canadian Charter understood the underlying reasons for what they did. Cf. CALABRESI,
supra note 72, at 133-34 (discussing the appropriateness of sunsetting for a statute that "does
not fit the law at large and is no longer supported by the circumstances that engendered it").
144 In June 1982, Quebec passed a law purportedly reenacting every Quebec statute with an
added "notwithstanding the Charter" clause. See Weiler, Rights and Judges in a Democracy,
supra note 141, at 90 n. 114. One might argue that such a law does not undermine the importance
of a second look; it merely makes the second look coincident with the first look. Such an
argument, however, misses the point of requiring a second look. The legislature is supposed to
look at the law at a later time and in that way to consider the Court's statements on the law,
to weigh public opinion, to wait for any crises to mellow, and generally to reflect further on the
issue.
It is precisely for this reason that second look has become an increasingly popular mode of
decisionmaking in the United States. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. XII (requiring proposed
constitutional amendments to be passed by two consecutive state legislatures before being
submitted to popular referendum, unless the initial legislative vote is greater than three-
fourths in favor).
145 The right to use either English or French in all official proceedings and the right to
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these areas, nondiscrimination seems to be mandated as firmly as in
the United States in the sense that there is no simple second-look
option. The antidiscrimination principle, however, does not seem to
apply in the general way that it does in the United States; rather, it
applies only to specific areas in which discrimination is especially
feared. This structure suggests a realization that particular kinds of
discrimination are prevalent in Canada and extremely dangerous,
146
but, at the same time, reflects a less general fear of the exclusion of
groups from the political processes. 147
C. The English Approach
England is, of course, considered a great example of a nation using
a Type IV approach in which fundamental rights are deemed to be
best determined and protected by the legislature. 148 Again, a few
choose to have one's child instructed in either English or French are at the core of the rights
exempted from the non-obstante clause. See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Ca-
nadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), §§ r6-23. For a detailed discussion of the language
rights issue in Canada, see RONALD WARDHAUGH, LANGUAGE & NATIONHOOD: THE CANADIAN
EXPERIENCE (1983).
146 The need for judicial control over language discrimination, despite the general second-
look framework that guarantees the last word to legislatures in most instances, is obvious to
anyone acquainted with Canadian history. See generally ANNE F. BAYEFSKY, CANADA'S CON-
STITUTION ACT 1982 AND AMENDMENTS 944-64 (1989) (presenting a documentary history of
Canadian constitutional politics, particularly relating to negotiations with Quebec over language
rights); THE MEECH LAKE PRIMER: CONFLICTING VIEWS OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTIONAL Ac-
CORD 209-31 (Michael D. Behiels ed., 1989) (describing historical tensions between Canada's
English-speaking majority and French-speaking minority).
147 The absence u; a felt need for ultimate judicial power to avoid discrimination in general
is not easily explained. After all, Canada, like the United States, is a nation of immigrants.
Perhaps it stems from the nature of Canadian immigration, which, until World War 11, derived
predominantly from the United Kingdom. Approximately two-thirds of pre-war immigration
was from the British Isles and northern Europe. See 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA CANADIANA 236-37
(1972). Post-war migration to Canada was much broader. See id. at 237-38. In the atmosphere
that followed World War II, this immigration perhaps has given rise to less intolerance than
characterized the United States' reaction to earlier and poorer immigrants. More likely, the
reason behind the relative lack of caste discrimination in Canada is the absence of slavery and
all that followed from it. The non-obstante clause approach to general discrimination may,
instead, derive simply from the desire to compromise between U.S. and British constitutional
approaches. Whatever the reasons, though, the result remains distinct, and distinctly suited to
Canadian history and reality.
Of course, none of this is to say that Canada is free from racial discrimination against its
non-white minorities. See, e.g., Clyde H. Farnsworth, Montreal Journal; Quebec's New Mi-
nority Issue: Blacks Charge Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, i991, at A4. See generally ROBERT
A. HUTTENBACY, RACISM AND EMPIRE: VHITE SETTLERS AND COLORED IMMIGRANTS IN THE
BRITISH SELF-GOVERNING COLONIES, 1830-19IO, at 125-27 (1976) (describing racist attitudes
common to English colonies, including Canada); W. PETER WARD, WHITE CANADA FOREVER
(1978) (describing Canada's century of hostility toward Asian immigrants).
14S See 0. HOOD PHILLIPS & PAUL JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
25 (7th ed. 1987) ("Parliament can legally pass any sort of law whatsoever."); see also G. W.
Jones, The British Bill of Rights, 43 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 27, 29-30 (i990) (noting that the
British have historically believed that their fundamental rights would not be threatened by
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possible explanations come to mind. England has long described itself
as a homogeneous country in which discrimination was a problem
that could be adequately handled through ordinary political pro-
cesses. 14 9 As for avoiding hastiness and hiding, that of course, has
always been one of the supposed justifications for requiring the House
of Lords to approve all laws.' 5 0
More recently, the decline of the political power (as distinguished
from the judicial power) of the House of Lords, has undermined the
role that body can play in checking hasty legislation. Commentators
now suggest that hasty or thoughtless infringement of rights is not a
serious problem because the rootedness of the society, the possibility
of easy repeal of laws, and the strictness of party organization and
discipline, all combine to make "last minute" legislation less likely.' 5 '
parliamentary supremacy). Some may argue that, because England has no formal written
constitution, it is meaningless to talk of its having any conception of judicial review. England
may indeed represent a regime with only Type IV protections, but this is not simply because it
lacks a written constitution. A written constitution does foster judicial review; it may even
require it. But countries without written constitutions can still have healthy traditions of judicial
review. See, e.g., Simeon C.R. McIntosh, West Indian Constitutional Theory: An Essay, 32
How. L.J. 735, 759-6o (1989) (arguing that a written constitution is not a necessary or sufficient
condition for judicial review).
149 See, e.g., Jones, supra note 148, at 29 (stating that Britain has never needed a constitution
or bill of rights to protect individuals because "[tihe people on the whole have trusted their
rulers and each other. . . . The trust of each other arose [partially because] . . . [tihey were a
population that was not as mixed as those in many other countries. There were few glaring
differences of race, religion, ethnic origin or colour.").
150 Lord Carrington has argued that the role of the House of Lords is to provide "further
consultation" and "second thoughts" before legislation is enacted. See, e.g., 365 Parl. Deb.,
H.L. (5th Ser.) 1742 (1975). The House of Lords can no longer stop legislation desired by the
Commons, but it can slow legislation down for two years. The Parliament Act, 1911, I & 2
Geo. 5, ch. 13, § 2, and the Parliament Act, 1949, 12, 13, & 14 Geo. 6, ch. 103, made it
possible for the House of Commons to enact legislation over the disapproval of the House of
Lords. Under the Acts, the Lords have retained only the power of delay. To override a veto
or simple inaction on non-fiscal legislation by the Lords, the House of Commons must simply
approve an act in two successive sessions and allow one year to elapse between the second
reading and final passage. See J.A.G. GRIFFITH & MICHAEL RYLE, PARLIAMENT: FUNCTIONS,
PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURES 240-44 (1989); see also DONALD SHELL, THE HOUSE OF LORDS
203-07 (1988) (describing the change in understanding of the Lords' power to delay and its
infrequent use in recent years).
The House of Lords, however, has recently tried to defend the antidiscrimination principle
through its much reduced powers as critic and delayer of legislation. The 26 Anglican bishops
in the House of Lords, led by Lord Ramsey, Archbishop of Canterbury, took strong stands
against discriminatory changes in immigration laws. See Dennis Hevesi, Lord Ramsey, 83, Dies
in Britain; Former Archbishop of Canterbury, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1988 at 34 (discussing the
role of Ramsey and other bishops in the House of Lords in fighting discriminatory legislation).
151 Some British commentators emphasize the role of internal opposition in Parliament itself
in protecting rights. See, e.g., Donald R. Shell, The British Constitution in 1989, 43 PARLIA-
MENTARY AFF. 397, 397 (i99o) ("[T]he two party system, with a strong opposition contesting
with the government for power, has provided a form of checks and balances, which elsewhere
has been derived from a written constitution.").
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These commentators also contend that hiding is not a serious problem
because responsible legislatures are open and do update laws. 
1 5 2
Nevertheless, although the Canadian approach to judicial review
seems to me to be interestingly appropriate for Canada, 15 3 I find much
that is subterfuge in the English approach, even for England. The
danger of haste and hiding is there, and in fact, English courts do
often exercise Type III authority - perhaps increasingly since the
decline of the House of Lords - allegedly over the administration
and the bureaucracy, but in effect over the legislature as well. 154 This
supervision ends up being very similar to American and Canadian
Type M jurisprudence, even though it is effected through broad
interpretation of statutes and ultra vires and delegation notions
rather than through formal doctrines of judicial review. 155 But there
are limits to what can be done indirectly, and one wonders whether
British rootedness does sufficiently protect rights or whether a bill of
rights with a non-obstante clause would not serve England better
today. 156
152 Cf. Jones, supra note 148, at 30 (describing traditional British reliance on elected bodies
subject to effective political pressures to bring about necessary legal redress).
Is3 Canada's judicial review system may not, however, adequately protect racial minorities.
See sources cited supra note 147.
154 See A.P. Le Sueur, The Judges and the Intention of Parliament: Is Judicial Review
Undemocratic?, 44 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 283, 289 (I99i) ("In fact, under the existing consti-
tution, judges already have power to set aside legislation."). Courts may disregard the intent
of Parliament by interpreting only the text of a statute, see id. at 284, or may disregard the
language based on the "policy or purpose behind the legislation," id. at 286. But the most
important exercise of Type III power is in the realm of "subordinate legislation," regulations
authorized by Parliamentary delegations of legislative power. Even if the regulation must be
approved by both Houses of Parliament and has been so approved, the courts can declare the
regulations ultra vires as "not strictly in accordance with the Act" on the grounds that the
ratification was not "an Act of Queen, Lords, and Commons... immune from judicial review."
SIR WILLIAI WADE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 863 (6th ed. 1988).
Iss See, e.g., Fairmount Invs. Ltd. v. Secretary of State for the Env't, 1,976] 1 W.L.R.
1255, 1263 (H.L.) (classifying lack of procedural justice as ultra vires on the grounds that "it is
to be implied, unless the contrary appears, that Parliament does not authorize . . . the exercise
of powers in breach of the principles of natural justice"); Regina v. Miah, (1974] 1 W.L.R. 683,
694 (H.L.) (barring prosecution by interpreting a statute to make it consistent with the prohi-
bition on ex post facto laws in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 195o, art. 7, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 228); Central Control
Bd. v. Cannon Brewery Co., [I919] App. Cas. 744, 752 (H.L.) (rejecting executive action as
an ultra vires act in light of the presumption "that an intention to take away the property of a
subject without giving him a legal right to compensation for the loss of it is not to be imputed
to the Legislature unless that intention is expressed in unequivocal terms"). The result is that,
in spite of the lack of the "constitutional status of their American . . . [counterparts, British
judges] have staked out for themselves a strong and well-defined position as the protectors of
the citizen against unlawful acts of government." BERNARD SCHWARTZ & H. WADE, LEGAL
CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES II
(1972).
156 Some distinguished British judges and scholars favor creating a written bill of rights for
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More serious than the problems of hiding and haste, in my view,
is the illusion of cultural homogeneity underpinning the belief that
England does not need antidiscrimination protections. Think of the
recent English citizenship laws designed to limit immigration from the
former colonies and their link to the massive influx into Britain of
people of color. If England was once homogenous, is it at all so
today?
s5 7
At the same time, the texture of discrimination in English life may
still be quite different from that in the United States. Historically,
discrimination in England revolved more around class differences than
around ethnic or racial backgrounds. ' 5 8 Class biases are more difficult
Britain. See, e.g., Lord Scarman, Bill of Rights and Law Reform, in 1688-I988: TIME FOR A
NEW CONSTITUTION 103, io8-io (Richard Holme & Michael Elliott eds., 1988) (recommending
a written constitution that preserves the separation of powers, enumerates rights to be protected,
and establishes a supreme constitutional court with jurisdiction to review executive and legis-
lative action); Lord Wade, Introducing a Bill of Rights, in Do WE NEED A BILL OF RIGHTS?
17, 19-22 (Colin M. Campbell ed., 198o) (presenting a draft bill to make the provisions of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights enforceable in British courts); MI-
CHAEL ZANDER, A BILL OF RIGHTS? 68-74 (3 d ed. 1985) (proposing a classic second-look
approach: establishing a bill of rights but granting Parliament power to override it only by
explicit action). For the arguments against a British bill of rights, see Jones, supra note 148,
at 36-4o.
IS7 Recent legislation suggests that Britain is now feeling the pressures of a more heterogenous
population. See, e.g., British Nationality (Hong Kong) Act, 199O, ch. 34, § i(i) (setting a limit
of 5o,ooo residents of Hong Kong who may be registered as British citizens before 1997);
Immigration Act, 1988, ch. 14, §§ i, 3(1) (amending the Immigration Act, 1971, ch. 77)
(eliminating advantages conferred on Commonwealth citizens who were settled in the United
Kingdom prior to 1973 and limiting "rights of abode" and the right of appeal to holders of a
U.K. passport or certificate of entitlement); British Nationality Act, 1981, ch. 61 (limiting the
"right of abode" in the United Kingdom, and replacing citizenship of the United Kingdom and
the Colonies with three separate and unequal citizenships: British citizenship, British Dependent
Territories citizenship, and British Overseas citizenship). The last named act gave full British
citizenship rights only to those whose ancestral connections --"descent in the male line"-- were
with the United Kingdom and Colonies. Id. at § 14. It is no coincidence that the best-known
British cases in which the courts have sought to apply "higher law" are in the area of antidis-
crimination and immigration. See, e.g., Regina v. Home Secretary ex parte Phansopkar, I Q.B.
6o6, 621-23 (C.A. 1976) (holding that delay in granting entry into the country to the Indian
wife of a resident of Britain could not be tolerated, taking into account the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S.
221).
158 Historians have had a field day with eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain, claiming
that the legal system existed in large part to intimidate the poor and maintain the privileges of
the rich. See, e.g., DOUGLAS HAY ET AL., ALBION'S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND 49-56 (1975) (arguing that the legal system of eighteenth-
century England provided both the ideology and the practical mechanism for class subordina-
tion); E.P. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS 202-03 (1963) (high-
lighting the grievances felt by working people as a result of capitalist exploitation); E.P. THOMP-
SON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 206-18 (1975) (arguing that the
eighteenth-century introduction of the death penalty for a wide variety of offenses was the
product of deep conflict between economic classes). But cf. Mitchell C. Stein, Note, Law and
Legitimacy in England, 18oo-r832: Bringing Professors Hay and Thompson to the Bargaining
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to eradicate through antidiscrimination approaches to judicial review
than are caste biases. Judges in England, as in most countries, gen-
erally are drawn from socially and financially elite groups. When they
are not, they often are quickly co-opted into the elite. 159 Such a
culture of the bench may render judges more sensitive than legislators
to caste bias. Unlike those a few social rungs ahead of the outcast
group, judges may be somewhat more distanced from caste conflict. 160
But the elite outlook of the judiciary may also leave judges insensitive
to class and wealth discrimination. 16 1 Popularly accountable legisla-
tors, although less than adequately sensitive, may still prove more
effective guardians than the courts for this type of discrimination.
The unfortunate fact remains, however, that in the United States,
as in England, neither the courts nor the legislatures have proven
very effective at ensuring that the fundamental rights of poor people
are not diminished in a discriminatory way. Thus, it appears that in
practical terms it will not be sufficient to state, as Professor Ackerman
has in conversation, that the next great step in equal protection law
Table, 68 B.U. L. REv. 621, 649-51 (1986) (proposing that, although the English judicial system
began the century as a tool to suppress the working class, the working class soon learned that
it too could manipulate the legal system to its benefit).
159 In England, the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1925, x5 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 49, § 9,
establishes a requirement of at least io years of practice as a barrister for one to qualify for
judicial appointment. See THE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAw 1020 (Earl Jowitt & Clifford
Walsh eds., 1959). The long-standing social distinction between barristers and other lawyers
thus further entrenches the elite composition of the high court bench. It is understandable that
the English political left is "deeply suspicious of the judges' narrow, elitist background." Lee,
supra note 84, at 785.
Some have pointed out the privileged backgrounds of American judges as well. See, e.g.,
Terence Moran, Reagan Administration's Legal Legacy, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 1o, 1988, at 5
(reporting on the importance of having "friends in the right places" during the judicial confir-
mation process); Charley Roberts, Official Defends Reagan Selection of White, Male Judges,
L.A. DAILY J., Feb. 3, 1988, at i (noting that of President Reagan's 367 judicial nominees,
only 1.6% were black and only 8.4% were women).
160 Cf., e.g., E. Lambert Wallace & Donald M. Taylor, Assimilation Versus Multiculturalism:
The Views of Urban Americans, 3 Soc. F. 72, 72 (presenting a Detroit-based study finding
strong support for multiculturalism and racial diversity among middle-class whites and middle-
class blacks, but finding "[tihe working class white American sample . . . distinctive in its
rejection of multiculturalism and in its negative attitudes toward other ethnic and racial groups").
161 Several dissenting Justices on the United States Supreme Court have attacked majority
decisions for their insensitivity to class differences. For example, in Rust v. Sullivan, I I I S.
Ct. 1759 (199), Justice Blackmun argued that "to hold that the doctor-patient relationship is
somehow incomplete where a patient lacks the resources to seek comprehensive health care from
a single provider is to ignore the situation of a vast number of Americans." Id. at 1782 n.3
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun went on to quote a passage that Justice Marshall
had written when dissenting from an opinion written by Justice Blackmun himself: "'[Ilt is
perfectly proper for judges to disagree about what the Constitution requires. But it is disgraceful
for an interpretation of the Constitution to be premised upon unfounded assumptions about how
people live."' Id. (quoting United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 460 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)).
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will be the finding that certain wealth distributional differences are
unconstitutional. Judicial enforcement of such an expansion of equal
protection doctrine would almost certainly fail, not for lack of power
or the absence of constitutional language on which judges could rely,
but for lack of commitment or interest. 162 If we are serious about
class and wealth discrimination, we must look beyond our constitu-
tional history and framework and seek new approaches and new
institutions to protect the poor against discriminatory treatment.
But why not encourage the courts to exercise Type II protection
of the poor, even without expecting judges to be especially effective
at it? What is the harm in urging such an additional safeguard? The
answer lies in the danger that judicial review of economic legislation
will be employed primarily to protect the wealthy.
At times the upper classes have, in fact, been made the scapegoats
of populist majorities. 163 It might seem that the courts could play an
162 The United Sates Supreme Court has failed to act in many cases that involved economic
discrimination. See, e.g., Rust, iiI S. Ct. at 1778 (upholding a regulation prohibiting employees
of federally funded family planning programs from discussing abortion with their clients);
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 511-13 (1989) (upholding a statute
prohibiting publicly funded hospitals and clinics from counseling clients on abortion or perform-
ing abortions that are not necessary to save the mother's life); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,
316 (i98o) (holding that, even when an abortion is medically necessary, the state is not required
to provide government funds for abortion because "[tihe financial constraints that restrict an
indigent woman's ability to enjoy the full range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice
are the product not of governmental restrictions on access to abortions, but rather of her
indigency"); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470-71 (1977) (finding that a regulation limiting state
benefits for abortions to cases in which abortion was medically necessary did not discriminate
against the class of women unable to pay for abortions); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. i, 28 (1973) (refusing to find that the economically disadvantaged constitute
a suspect class whose equal protection rights are violated by public education financing systems
that rely on local property taxation schemes). Some state courts have been more active. See,
e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 363 (N.J. 199o) (unanimously holding that New Jersey's
school financing scheme violated the state constitution as applied to the state's poor school
districts and ordering the legislature to amend the scheme to ensure equal funding for all
districts).
163 The classic example of this genre of scapegoatism was Teddy Roosevelt's stump speech
attacking the economic power exercised by "malefactors of great wealth." Mr. Roosevelt's Speech
at the Laying of the Corner Stone of the Pilgrim Memorial Monument, Provincetown, Massa-
chusetts, LIVING AGE, Sept. 14, 1907, at 691, 692.
The history of debt nullification movements, state infringements of private contracts, and
paper money acts provides examples of the populist classes wielding the power of majoritarian
politics against the rich. See PATRICK T. CONLEY, DEMOCRACY IN DECLINE: RHODE ISLAND'S
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1776-1842, at 74-Io6 (1977) (arguing that the Rhode Island
legislature's decision to print large amounts of paper money almost led to a civil war between
the pro-paper money majority and the class of wealthier creditors forced to accept devalued
bills in payment for debts); BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION 4-14 (1938) (arguing that the frustration of the rich with populist legislation that
favored debtors over creditors prompted the demand for the Contracts Clause). Rhode Island
politics during the paper money period came to represent everything the drafters of the Consti-
tution hoped to avoid.
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adequate antidiscrimination role in such cases. But courts often prove
at least as ill-equipped here as they are in preventing discrimination
against the poor. Here, the judge's class links and biases become so
obvious that any decision a court makes is bound to raise justifiable
suspicion. 164 It is no accident, therefore, that many thoughtful people
are reluctant to entrust protection against class bias, either against the
rich or against the poor, to the judiciary. Distrust of the courts has
led one astute economist, who is concerned with countering bias
against the rich, to explore alternatives to judicial authority or legis-
lative majorities to safeguard against populist abuse. 165 Those con-
cerned with discrimination against the poor should be equally inven-
tive.
IV. REINVIGORATING TYPE II AND TYPE III JUDICIAL REVIEW
To this point, the discussion has been a mainly descriptive typology
of the four models of judicial review, their underlying normative
assumptions, and their applicability in the United States and other
countries. Yet it should be clear by now that I have strong views
about the role and relative merits of these four models in the United
States. Whatever the solution in other countries, I do not believe that
in the United States we can effectively protect fundamental rights
without substantial judicial involvement. But, although I endorse a
role for Type I judicial review, I also suggest limitations for that role.
As I implied earlier, our problems with an aggressive Type I
approach date from the New Deal. The New Deal's rewriting of our
Constitution offered, in Carolene Products, a resolution of the inter-
play between the activist state and efforts to protect against discrim-
ination. But this revision never faced the conflicts between the activist
state, with its concomitant rise of communal obligations, and individ-
ual, libertarian-based rights. The "Old Court" of the Lochner era was
The question remains whether clauses such as the Takings Clause and the Contracts Clause
represent a successful constitutional response by the wealthy and, given these clauses, whether
the rich need the independent protection given by the more general antidiscrimination principle.
But the failure of the Contracts Clause to amount to much of anything despite its powerful
language, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § zo, suggests that the existence of the specific clauses may
not be enough.
164 See, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 472 (1921) (construing the
Clayton Act to permit the enjoinment of a machinist union's secondary boycott and other
activities when the union had "merely a sentimental" interest in the outcome of a strike against
a printing press manufacturer); see also FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR
INJUNCTION 165-73 (1930) (criticizing Duplex).
165 See JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY Io5-o6 (1975) (arguing that courts
should be strictly confined to the role of enforcing an independently agreed-upon social contract).
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declared wrong in its Type I defense of property against one brand
of state activism, but what Type I defense could then logically be
offered to protect life and liberty against another brand of statists?
What is the difference - former Judge Bork, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
and Justice White might ask - between Chief Justice Warren or
Justice Brennan and the "Old Court" except that, with no special
historical justification, the two groups would accord Type I protection
to a different set of rights?
166
Long before Bork and Brennan took up arms in this controversy,
Justice Black saw the New Deal dilemma and sought to resolve it in
originalism. Aggressive Type I protection adheres, he argued, to the
first eight amendments, applied to the states as well as to the federal
government, to anything else that can be linked to specific constitu-
tional language and to nothing, nothing else. 167 But even as fertile
and aggressive an expounder of language-based rights as he ultimately
found this solution inadequate. He was reluctantly forced to dissent
in Griswold v. Connecticut,16 8 and he clamorously, though happily,
violated his Type I principles in Bolling v. Sharpe.
169
Using a broader and more sophisticated definition of the interests
that require Type I protection may seem to help safeguard rights, but
166 See supra notes i6-18 and accompanying text; cf. Brennan, supra note i9, at 436 ("The
view that all matters of substantive policy should be resolved through the majoritarian process
. .. ultimately will not do.").
167 Justice Black believed it was the Court's duty to enforce certain rights regardless of
whether legislatures acted hastily, by delegation, or in a discriminatory way. He limited those
rights, though, to ones he thought explicit in the language of the Constitution, especially the
first eight amendments. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 69-70 (1947) (Black, J.,
dissenting), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. i, 6 (1964). Most of these rights concerned
the creation and preservation of democratic institutions, institutions to which the protection of
other rights was entrusted. Not all of Justice Black's Type I rights, however, fit this description.
The right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and to be free from double jeopardy
are not simply "structural rights" designed to make democracy work: they are substantive
libertarian rights that, according to Justice Black, the Constitution explicitly placed beyond
ordinary majoritarian control.
168 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507-09 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (ex-
pressing strong distaste for a law forbidding the use of contraceptives among married adults,
but nevertheless finding no constitutional right to privacy that might invalidate the law).
169 347 U.S. 497 (1954). For a discussion of Bolling, see note xiS8. When I questioned
Justice Black on how he could justify his support for the majority opinion in Bolling despite its
blatant violation of his own judicial philosophy, he responded as follows: a wise judge chooses,
among plausible constitutional philosophies, one that will generally allow him to reach results
he can believe in - a judge who does not to some extent tailor his judicial philosophy to his
beliefs inevitably becomes badly frustrated and angry. (Justice Black may have been thinking
of Justice Robert Jackson, whose basic constitutional philosophy fit more comfortably with the
political views of his law clerk, William Rehnquist, than with his own.) A judge who does not
decide some cases, from time to time, differently from the way he would wish, because the
philosophy he has adopted requires it, is not a judge. But a judge who refuses ever to stray
from his judicial philosophy, and be subject to criticism for doing so, no matter how important
the issue involved, is a fool.
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at a cost. The looser the link to language, original structure, and
intent, the greater the danger of judicial imposition of elite values.
The more judges and philosophers are left to define for themselves
the areas forbidden even to the post-New Deal state, the greater the
danger that they will impose their own libertarian (or communitarian)
values on a polity that has failed to specify at a constitutional level
just how far the activist state can go.
Justice Frankfurter also saw the problem and pursued a solution
diametrically opposed to that proposed by Justice Black. For him,
Type I protection could apply to any possible rights, whether origi-
nalist, enumerated, or newly minted. 170 But courts had to be ex-
tremely restrained and only use their Type I powers in the most
extreme cases. In his celebrated Holmes Lectures at the Harvard Law
School, Professor Bickel ruefully reviewed the failure of both Justice
Black's and Justice Frankfurter's attempts to limit courts and noted
that any definition of fundamental right, whether as broad as Justice
Frankfurter's or as narrow as Justice Black's, will have flaws and will
easily break down. 171 Such definitions of rights cannot make U.S.
courts exercise the needed self-restraint unless the courts are given
other means by which to deal with repeated systemic legislative abuses
of what judges - and like-minded philosophers and scholars - per-
ceive to be fundamental rights, even if the rights are highly contro-
versial. Courts can restrain themselves in the face of single, chance
abuses of rights they deem fundamental; it is unrealistic and perhaps
wrong to expect the same of them when the abuses are frequent and
systematic. 172 Systematic abuse suggests that either the judge's defi-
170 See, e.g., Adamson, 332 U.S. at 67-68; West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 647-48 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
171 See BICKEL, supra note 6, at 86--90 (exploring the weaknesses in Justice Black's language-
based approach to the Bill of Rights); BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND PROGRESS, supra
note 68, at 34 (stating that Frankfurter "never successfully identified sources from which [the
judgment of the Court] was to be drawn").
172 Various Justices on the current Court have professed their passive and restrained philos-
ophy. Nonetheless, the Court has shown no more restraint in the face of what it regards as
systemic abuses than did previous Courts. This Court differs from the Warren Court principally
with respect to the areas in which it finds such abuses. But that is not a matter of approach
to law, but only of ideology. A single example will illustrate this point. The disfavor with
which the Court views products liability suits is, of course, a political view, and such a view
may explain the Court's decision in Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988). The
Court held that a federal common law, supposed not to exist, overruled the laws of the states
and immunized those who had contracted with the government from products liability claims,
notwithstanding Congress's failure to grant such immunity. See id. at 512. Although a political
view may explain the result, it cannot justify the opinion's bad law and worse economics or
make the result any less activist or aggressive in either its anti-federalist or anti-states-rights
result. This is not to say that there may not be good reason for legislatures to restrain the
recent proliferation of products liability suits. See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Current Insurance
Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1525 (1987) (arguing that expanded tort
liability leads to an erosion of insurance coverage). The current administration also links
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nition of fundamental rights is wrong or the legislature is systemati-
cally wrong.
I believe such abuses can be prevented only by returning to ex-
pansive and systematic judicial enforcement of the antidiscrimination
principle and constitutional accountability, Type II and Type III pow-
ers respectively. The central claim of this Foreword is that Type II
and Type III powers have been too long ignored or used in only a
haphazard way.
There are two ways of restoring Type II and III judicial review
to a major role in a Constitution that also requires some Type I
protection of rights. The first, which I do not favor, requires that
Type II and III review, if applicable, always take precedence over
Type I review. Thus, judges evaluating legislative, executive, or
administrative action should always first check to see if either discri-
mination (Type II) or rights-implicating haste or hiding (Type III) is
present and, if so, invalidate the action on those grounds alone. Only
if no such legislative pathologies are present or if they were present
but the legislature corrected them - by either repassing a nondiscrim-
inatory version of the law (Type II) or by passing the same law
deliberately and openly (Type III) - should the court resort to Type
I review. Finally, to the extent that Type II and Type III review
have, through their opportunity for a second look, ensured that gov-
ernment action is nondiscriminatory and constitutionally accountable,
Type I review can - and should - be more deferential than it would
otherwise be. In other words, we should expect Type I judicial action
intended to protect a fundamental right to be justified by a particularly
strong reason if Type II and Type III review have first been faithfully
employed.
This approach has the great advantage of neatness and simplicity,
but it is insufficiently protective of rights that, even after the New
Deal, remain clearly central to our constitutional framework. It ul-
timately rests on a dubious skepticism about the degree of consensus
that exists in the United States over the parameters of Type I review.
It fears that if any kind of Type I review is allowed to trump Type
II or III review, judges will tend to use Type I as many do now
whenever they have a majority to support it,173 and relegate Type II
economic competitiveness to tort reform. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVE-
NESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN AMERICA 1-3 (1991).
173 See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 58o (1985) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) (predicting that the majority opinion overruling the established interpre-
tation of the Commerce Clause will itself be overturned in time by a new Court majority); see
also William Rehnquist, Remarks at the Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference (June 28, 1991)
(transcript on file at the Harvard Law School Library) (arguing that if "the Supreme Court as
currently constituted views, after mature deliberation, a particular decision as being wrong," it
should be "free to change it").
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or Im review to ad hoc use in cases in which the Court could not
make up its mind. Such a judicial attitude would necessarily under-
mine the value of Type II and III review as principled approaches to
judicial review. It would lessen the effectiveness of these approaches
as restraints on those with an overly broad conception of Type I
review and as bases for action for those who, fearful of imposing their
own values on the majority, now resort to an overly narrow conception
of Type I.
But there does exist in our polity a degree of consensus over the
propriety of Type I protection for certain categories of rights. Despite
the New Deal, the centrality of these categories remains an undisputed
part of our constitutional tradition; such categories at least include
most of the enumerated rights and even some structural rights. 174 To
treat even these rights as subject to legislative reconsideration inevi-
tably and unintentionally begins an erosion of these rights that is
neither justified nor desirable. And the erosion proceeds even if the
legislature confirms the validity of the rights on remand. What is
more, some structural rights require Type I protection because without
them no executive and legislature that we would trust to exercise a
valid second look can exist. 175 As to these rights, a remand rather
than a direct assertion of the structural requirement makes no sense
at all.
Thus, a better approach would occasionally allow Type I review
to take precedence in cases involving a limited but important set of
rights. Of course, this approach risks allowing activist judges to
expand Type I protection until it approaches Justice Brennan's and
the old New Deal Court's use of it. The risk can be contained,
however, as long as courts appreciate the dangers of judicial autocracy
inherent in overbroad uses of Type I protection and recognize the
efficacy of protection afforded at less risk by Type II and III review.
If Type H and III are truly given their due, I would feel comfortable
limiting Type I to aggressively interpreted enumerated rights and to
those structural rights that have been recognized as an essential part
of our Constitution from the very beginning or have been clearly and
properly adopted in a genuine constitutional moment. I would avoid
the application of Type I protections to even such popular, open-
174 See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text. None of this is to say that we cannot
still argue about the parameters of such rights. Similarly, we can debate the degree to which
judges should be expansive in applying Type I protection to these rights. How broad or how
narrow should they be? Here Justices Black and Stewart, who would probably have accepted
similar definitions of the rights subject to Type I review, would certainly part company.
17- The right to a regime of one person, one vote comes readily to mind. But cf. Lucas v.
Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 735 (1964) (invalidating a departure from the one-
man, one-vote standard even though the new measure had been approved by a popular refer-
endum in which each voter counted equally).
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ended concepts as the "right to privacy.' 76 And this is so although,
were I to choose, I would prefer many of Justice Brennan's results to
those of Judge Bork.
If judges are power-hungry scoundrels, of course, neither my def-
inition of judicial power nor any other will work. If instead, as Bickel
suggested, definitions of rights and judicial restraint break down in
the face of systemic violations of the rights judges hold dear, the
availability, use, and effectiveness of Type II and Type III review in
protecting rights should suffice to elevate those theories of Type I
review that are less open-ended than that espoused by Justice Bren-
nan.
Conversely, one can hope that judges who have no sympathy with
the alleged rights will nevertheless support a second look when a
strong argument has been made that a violation of a potentially
significant, non-enumerated right occurred in a hidden or hasty way,
or, just as important, that the violation has been enacted because the
burden falls primarily on outsiders. Requiring a second look would
not in these circumstances amount to imposing the judge's elite moral
values on the polity - Judge Bork's and Justice Black's oft-expressed
reason to fear judges. In reality the only values imposed are consti-
tutionally grounded ones that bar discrimination and require the leg-
islature to speak openly and thoughtfully when rights are at stake.
To the extent that "anti-rights" judges fail to require a second look,
they will no longer be able to hide behind a false populism or major-
itarianism. They will be exposed as willful statists or classic bigots.
In the end, however, both forms of restraint depend on the plau-
sibility of two propositions: that absent hiding, haste, and discrimi-
nation, legislatures will adequately protect rights, and that the danger
of having courts exercise Type II and Type III powers is less than
the danger of not having them do so. The question remains: why are
judges better and less dangerous than legislatures at detecting and
avoiding discrimination or haste and hiding if they are not necessarily
better and less dangerous at detecting and avoiding violations of
fundamental rights generally? There are at least three answers, two
of which I have already discussed.
First, the inquiries involved in Type II and Type III adjudication
have an objective quality that is absent in non-enumerated, non-
originalist Type I adjudication. For Type II, the inquiry is the iden-
tification of historically excluded groups; for Type I, it is the iden-
tification of haste or hiding. Second and more importantly, legislatures
are uniquely inept at identifying instances in which they have bur-
dened only those to whom they need not answer (Type II), and at
176 For a case applying such a right, see, for example, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485 (1965). As I have repeatedly suggested throughout this Foreword, however, laws such
as those in question in cases like Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. X13 (1973), and Griswold often deserve
Type II or Type III scrutiny.
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correcting their refusals to be held constitutionally accountable (Type
III). Third, legislatures' ability to reenact similar laws that are not
the product of discrimination or of haste and hiding minimizes the
dangers of allowing judges to make Type II and Type III decisions.
If a statute is struck down on Type III review, the legislature may
pass the very same provision as long as it is reenacted deliberately
and openly. Similarly, legislatures can choose to make universal the
burdens imposed by any government action struck down under Type
II review. 17 7 Thus, a court enforcing a judge's finding of discrimi-
nation or haste or hiding does not deprive the legislature of the last
word. 178
If legislatures choose not to assert the last word, as I believe will
often be the case, so be it. Legislative acquiescence would merely
highlight the instances in which judges were better than legislatures
at protecting penumbral or newly minted rights. If the legislature
instead reenacts the law, and places the burden on all of us deliber-
ately and openly, I may or may not agree with the result, but I will
at least know that society does not rate as fundamental what the judge
(and perhaps I) deemed to be crucial. A valid second look will have
occurred. In a mini-Ackerman sense, "The People" will have spoken.
And in a democracy, when one is dealing with "judge-found" rights,
that is no small thing.
V. THE REHNQUIST COURT'S FAILURES
The Rehnquist Court can be criticized for aggressively using Type
I jurisprudence to define new rights and to resurrect old ones. It has
employed Type I review to protect "rights" that are hardly
enumerated 179 and to reaffirm enumerated rights in cases in which
they have long been deemed not to apply.'8 0 It can be even more
177 See supra pp. 91-93.
176 For one example of the legislature having the last word, see the discussion of Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), in note 71.
179 See, e.g., Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc., III S. Ct. 2298, 2310 (1991) (invoking separation of powers principles although the
phrase never explicitly appears in the Constitution); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946 (983)
(same). In his dissent in Metropolitan Washington Airports, Justice White criticized the Court
for relying on "expanding nontextual principles." Metropolitan Wash. Airports, II1 S. Ct. at
2317-18 (White, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist joined Justice White's dissent. Thus,
in this line of cases, the Chief Justice is out of line with the Court that bears his name. See
id. at 2312-21; Chadha, 462 U.S. at 1013-x6 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). But cf. Nixon v.
Administrator of General Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 545-61 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (con-
tending that the principle of separation of powers bars Congress from seizing official papers of
the president).
10 See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (holding that requiring
beach-front property owners to grant public easements over their beach in order to obtain
development permits is not permissible regulation but an unconstitutional "taking"); cf. United
States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 678-79 (1987) (holding that no remedy against the state is
available to a former master sergeant involuntarily subjected to LSD experiments).
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severely criticized for its failure to accord full Type I protection to
rights admitted to be "enumerated" and to be relevant to the case.18
It must also be criticized for the particular way it has, especially
last Term, systematically undermined its role as guarantor of proce-
dural due process in criminal cases. It would be worrisome enough
if it had passively begun to relax or reverse the oversight that Supreme
Courts of different outlooks and compositions had slowly, over the
decades, come to treat as essential. 182 But the dramatic, non-incre-
mental, and aggressive way in which the Court has relinquished
oversight - by reaching out for cases, 183 by deciding issues well
181 See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., iII S. Ct. 2456, 2460, 2463 (x9gi) (finding that
nude dancing implicated the First Amendment, albeit only "marginally," but that the public
interest in banning the conduct outweighed any First Amendment interest in the conduct's
expressive content); id. at 2468-69 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing that nude
dancing is subject to First Amendment protection but allowing regulation because of the state's
interest in preventing the secondary effects of adult entertainment establishments); Maryland v.
Craig, 11o S. Ct. 3157, 3165-67 (199o) (holding that a state's interest in the physical and
psychological well-being of child abuse victims may be sufficiently important to outweigh a
defendant's enumerated right to confront his accusers in court); cf. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 431-35 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that, although flag burning implicates
the First Amendment, a Texas statute prohibiting flag desecration is not unconstitutional). But
cf. Barnes, xii S. Ct. at 2465 (Scalia, J., concurring) (concluding that the First Amendment
does not apply and that the statute prohibiting nude dancing should be upheld on the ground
that moral opposition to the activity supplies a rational basis for its prohibition).
182 In Arizona v. Fulminante, IxII S. Ct. 1246 (I99r), the Court sought to overrule a clear
line of precedent dating back at least to Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (I945), which
held that, when a coerced confession has been admitted into evidence, a conviction will be set
aside even though the evidence apart from the coerced confession might have been sufficient to
sustain the jury's verdict. See Fulminante, xiI S. Ct. at 1264-65; Malinski, 324 U.S. at 404.
Two other cases severely curtailed the availability of habeas corpus review in federal courts, a
right solidified as early as 1953. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 545-48 (1953) (Jackson,
J., concurring). In one of these cases, Coleman v. Thompson, xIi S. Ct. 2546 (1991), the Court
reinterpreted Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (r989), to require that federal law be plainly involved
in a state court decision in order to reach the "plain statement" test. See Coleman, xII S. Ct.
at 2557-59. The Court further determined that a procedural default in the state courts is a
sufficient state ground to deny habeas review of the state conviction. See id. at 2565. In the
other case eroding federal habeas review, McCleskey v. Zant, iii S. Ct. 1454 (x991), the Court
held that the abuse of the writ doctrine does not require a showing of deliberate abandonment
of a ground of appeal by the petitioner in a first petition in order to bar subsequent habeas
review. See id. at 1470-71.
183 In Payne v. Tennessee, ixI S. Ct. 2597 (I99I), the Court chose to grant certiorari even
though the lower court ruled that any constitutional error "that might have occurred was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Payne v. Tennessee, iII S. Ct. 1031 (1991) (mem.)
(Stevens, J., dissenting from the Court's grant of certiorari); see also Payne, iII S. Ct. at 2631
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (reiterating his objection to reaching the constitutional issue). Justice
Marshall similarly objected to the majority's decision to overrule two precedents concerning a
question addressed by neither the state courts nor the petition for certiorari. See id. at 2619
(Marshall, J., dissenting); see also McCleskey, IxI S. Ct. at 1477 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the Court for overruling Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. x (1963), when such
action "was not even requested by respondent at any point in this litigation" (emphasis in
original)).
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beyond the case before it,184 by unnecessarily applying its rulings
retroactively,185 and by pursuing extra-judicial lobbying 186 - be-
speaks a willfulness that is unseemly, injudicious, and dangerous. 187
The Rehnquist Court has a right to believe that previous Courts
developed too many procedural safeguards. It has a right to favor
capital punishment, even if previous Courts came to the edge of
declaring it unconstitutional.188 But the Court's desire to see people
184 In Fulminante, the Court held that coerced confessions could be harmless error, despite
the fact that at least five Justices found that the confession at issue was harmful. See Fulminante,
xIxI S. Ct. at 1257. The issue of harmless error need not have been decided.
185 In McCleskey, the Court changed the rules governing abuse of process in habeas cases
and applied the new standards to bar a petition in a capital punishment case. See McCleskey,
xxx S. Ct. at 1470-75. Justice Marshall attacked this approach in dissent and said, "The Court's
utter indifference to the injustice of retroactively applying its new, strict-liability standard to
this habeas petitioner stands in marked contrast to this Court's eagerness to protect States from
the unfair surprise of 'new rules' that enforce the constitutional rights of citizens charged with
criminal wrongdoing." Id. at 1485 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
186 Extra-judicial lobbying is not problematic per se, but implementing judicially what one
is unwilling to wait for the legislature to do is unacceptable. In his dissent in McCleskey, Justice
Marshall stated, "Confirmation that the majority today exercises legislative power not properly
belonging to this Court is supplied by Congress' own recent consideration and rejection of an
amendment to § 2244(b)," which would have limited the right to habeas appeals. Id. at 1482
(referring to 28 U.S.C. § 2244, which allows some judicial discretion in entertaining applications
for habeas corpus review). Justice Marshall continued: "[T]his Court does not function as a
backup legislature for the reconsideration of failed attempts to amend existing statutes." Id.
Chief Justice Rehnquist had earlier lobbied Congress directly for amendment of § 224 4 (b). See
Linda Greenhouse, Rehnquist Renews Request to Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1989, at A21
(reporting that Chief Justice Rehnquist had sent a letter to Senator Joseph Biden urging Congress
to act on a proposal Chief Justice Rehnquist had initiated for speeding federal court review of
death sentences).
187 The Rehnquist Court has overturned time-honored Supreme Court practices in other
areas as well, most notably in its treatment of precedent. For instance, in Payne, Chief Justice
Rehnquist articulated a novel theory of precedential value that declined to require the "extraor-
dinary showing that this Court has historically demanded before overruling one of its prece-
dents." Payne, iII S. Ct. at 2621 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Instead, Chief Justice Rehnquist
treated cases decided by "the narrowest of margins" and "over spirited dissents" as ripe for
reconsideration. Payne, xII S. Ct. at 2611. Further, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that
although "[c]onsiderations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property
and contract rights, where reliance interests are involved, the opposite is true in cases .. .
involving procedural and evidentiary rules." Id. at 261o (citations omitted). The members of
the Court's conservative majority do not all subscribe to this theory. Justices Kennedy and
Souter both continue to believe a "'special justification' necessary to depart from precedent.
Id. at 2618 (Souter, J., joined by Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467
U.S. 203, 212 (984)). Justices Kennedy and Souter, however, joined in the decision in Harmelin
v. Michigan, iII S. Ct. 2680 (igi), which severely limited a 5-4 ruling in Solem v. Helm,
463 U.S. 277 (1983), and circumscribed proportionality review of sentences under the Eighth
Amendment. See Harmelin, 1Ix S. Ct. at 2696-97.
188 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that the death
penalty as applied in the cases at issue was unconstitutional). In separate concurring opinions,
Justices Brennan and Marshall found the death penalty categorically impermissible under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. See id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 370-71
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whom it deems guilty 8 9 executed, and quickly, does not give the
Court the right to dismantle, in one Term or so, what earlier Courts
had built up over many decades. The criticism should be especially
severe because, in contrast to the Warren Court, which at times
showed a similar willfulness and was criticized for it,190 this Court
falsely declares itself to be dedicated to judicial restraint.191
Still, for all the validity of these criticisms, no failures of the
Rehnquist Court are more important than its reluctance to use Type
II and Type III approaches - which were often clearly available to
test for nondiscriminatory majoritarian support for a law - coupled
with the Court's failure to protect the plausible rights asserted in such
cases, allegedly because according the rights Type I protection would
be anti-majoritarian. Such judicial behavior reflects either woeful
ignorance or a willful "statist" desire to negate the alleged rights
regardless of their true majoritarian support. Because members of the
current Court have made arguments reflecting Type II or III juris-
prudence when it has suited them, 192 ignorance of the doctrines seems
(Marshall, J., concurring). Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White found the death penalty
unconstitutional as applied without reaching the question of its per se invalidity. See id. at
256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 308-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 31o-14 (White,
J., concurring).
159 For example, the Court maintains an exception to its formalistic habeas rules for cases
in which the prisoner is "actually innocent." In Coleman v. Thompson, iiI S. Ct. 2546 (i991),
Justice O'Connor "reaffirmed" that "a state procedural default of any federal claim will bar
federal habeas unless the petitioner demonstrates cause and actual prejudice." Id. at 2564. The
Court held that this standard would be met in those cases in which "a constitutional violation
has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent." Id. (quoting Murray
v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)). But how will the court know when someone is "actually
innocent"? The presumption that they will "just know it when they see it" is the height of
willful foolishness.
190 See, e.g., BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT, supra note 68, Y.20-2I (attacking the
Court for considering political realities as a factor in its decisionmaking); ELY, supra note 9, at
73-75 (acknowledging general criticisms of the Court's interventionism).
191 See, e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 846 (1985) (opinion of Rehnquist, J.) ("'Prior to
reaching any constitutional questions, federal courts must consider nonconstitutional grounds
for decision.'" (quoting Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99 (1981))); Kremens v. Bartley,
431 U.S. 119, 136 (1977) (opinion of Rehnquist, J.) (reiterating "the long-established rule that
this Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise
facts to which [the rule] is to be applied"' (quoting Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v.
Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (i885))); Furman, 408 U.S. at 470 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) ("[J]udicial self-restraint is surely an implied, if not an expressed, condition of the
grant of authority of judicial review."). But see sources cited supra note 173.
192 See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, iiI S. Ct. 1759, 1788-89 (19i) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(invoking "our time-honored practice of not reaching constitutional questions unnecessarily");
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 857-58 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)
(reiterating the "familiar principle" that "we should avoid unnecessary, or unnecessarily broad,
constitutional adjudication" in order to avoid deciding whether the death penalty was consti-
tutional when imposed on a felon who was 15 years old at the time of his crime).
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less likely than an aggressive desire to negate rights whether or not
the representatives of "The People," if given the chance, would choose
to affirm the rights at stake. To illustrate my point, I discuss a few
cases in which Type III remands were appropriate and not used. I
then turn to the Court's failures with respect to Type II review, the
enforcement of the antidiscrimination principle.
Rust v. Sullivan 93 is a dramatic example of the willful rejection
of an alleged right. A Type III remand would have been an appro-
priate way of seeing whether "The People" or their representatives
wanted the possible right to be questioned. A bureaucrat read a
federal law - admitted by the Court to be unclear on the issue1 9 4 -
to prohibit doctors working in partially federally funded clinics from
discussing abortion, even as a possibility, with their patients. The
regulation necessarily raised serious First Amendment questions.
Many would say the case so clearly implicates free expression that
Type I protection was unquestionably appropriate. Others would
argue that when federal funds are involved, the First Amendment
question is sufficiently attenuated that Type I protection is not nec-
essarily called for (although they would admit that federal funding
does not in itself mean that the First Amendment and Type I protec-
tion may not be appropriately involved). 195
Under the circumstances, the obvious answer would seem to be to
read the statute to avoid the issue and let the legislature decide
whether it really wished to enact a rule that might infringe on a
fundamental right. Only then would the Court need to decide whether
a Type I right was, in fact, involved. This approach is vintage Bickel.
It might even have been Bickellian if the law clearly delegated the
power to make this kind of regulation to the bureaucrat (for then the
undue delegation doctrine would have been an appropriate way of
creating a Type III remand). But a remand is certainly appropriate
when the law is accepted by all to be so unclear1 96 that it can be
fairly read to avoid the constitutional problems.
Ignorance cannot explain the Court's failure to read the law this
way, for Justice O'Connor pointed out the Type III solution in her
dissent. 19 7 Although one can only speculate about the Court's reason,
the speculation is not far fetched. The Chief Justice, who wrote for
193 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1990).
194 See id. at 1767.
195 Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion specifically exempted from his Rust holding federally
funded or supported universities, because he considered them "traditional sphere[s] of free
expression . . . fundamental to the functioning of our society." Id. at 1776.
196 See id. at 1767 (agreeing "with every court to have addressed the issue that the language
[of the statute] is ambiguous").
197 See id. at 1788-89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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the Court in Rust, has missed no occasion to further his statist, anti-
rights view of the First Amendment or to create and expand doctrines
that weaken the amendment's scope. 198 For him, Rust was a great
opportunity. Justices such as Justice Scalia, who are normally reluc-
tant to limit speech, were blinded in Rust by the fact that the speech
in question dealt with abortions. Their willful desire to do anything
to cast doubt on Roe v. Wade - even though that case was not in
issue in Rust - gave the Chief Justice his chance. The fact that no
representative of the people had ever decided to try to limit speech,
that no majoritarian requirement that a putative right be limited was
involved, did not matter. The case stands not as a decision about
abortion, which is legally speaking irrelevant to it, 199 nor as an illus-
tration of a Court yielding to majority wishes, but as a prime example
of result-oriented judicial activism, equal to any excess for which the
Warren Court was attacked. 200
The United States v. Monsanto20 1 decision from an earlier Term
represents another paradigm missed opportunity for Type HI review.
The case involved a statute that provided for the seizure of the assets
of a defendant charged with certain offenses, such as drug dealing,
when the assets apparently derived from the alleged criminal activ-
ity. 202 The prosecutors had invoked the statute to freeze funds the
defendant intended to use to pay for his defense lawyer's fees. 20 3
198 See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar, iiI S. Ct. 2720, 2744-45 (i9gi) (opinion of Rehnquist,
C.J.) (holding state restraints on the speech of lawyers representing clients in pending cases
permissible under the First Amendment); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., III S. Ct. 2456, 2460
(i99i) (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.) (describing nude dancing as "only marginally" within the
"outer perimeters" of the First Amendment); Texas v. Johnson, 49! U.S. 397, 435 (I989)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that a conviction under a Texas law for publicly burning
an American flag at a political protest did not violate the First Amendment).
199 The government presumably could not pass a law banning abortion-related speech, at
least not when abortions are legal. Still, it is worth emphasizing that what the Court has done
in Rust is to allow the government to bar the provision of information regarding an activity
that was at the time not merely legal but also, whatever the Court believes should ultimately
happen, still a constitutional right.
200 Nor was this the only case last Term that was ripe for some kind of Type HI review.
See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, IiI S. Ct. 2382, 2387-88 (igi) (holding that the Fourth Amend-
ment permits the police to board buses in order to question passengers and request permission
to search their luggage); Wilson v. Seiter, iII S. Ct. 2321, 2326-27 (I99!) (deciding that a
prisoner raising an Eighth Amendment challenge to the conditions of his confinement must show
a culpable state of mind on the part of prison officials); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,
In S. Ct. I661, 1670 (1991) (extending the time a detainee arrested without warrant may be
held prior to a judicial determination of probable cause). Type I review could have been
appropriate, because in each case, the official conduct in question implicated a fundamental
right, and yet no majoritarian body had openly, recently, and deliberately authorized the
conduct.
201 491 U.S. 6oo (x989).
202 See id. at 602-03.
203 See id. at 603-04.
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Writing for the majority, Justice White made the staggering statement
that Congress never considered the application of the statute to pre-
trial orders freezing funds that were earmarked for private defense
lawyers. 20 4 Justice White argued that, because Congress never spe-
cifically considered the application of the statute to funds earmarked
for other purposes - such as payment of stockbroker fees or laundry
bills - Congress's silence could not cut against the government.
20 5
The Court's failure to distinguish between a requirement of clear
congressional intent when a government action implicates a funda-
mental right - here the right to choose one's own counsel20 6 - and
when the action patently does not is mind boggling. Such reasoning
displays either a complete ignorance of constitutional law and
doctrine20 7 or a blatantly political desire to get drug dealers at any
cost to our constitutional framework. Someone not so ideologically
driven - Bickel from his grave - might well ask: what is to be lost
by seeing if Congress really meant to limit criminal defendants, yes,
even alleged drug dealers, in their choice of counsel? If it did, perhaps
it would be a valid legislative judgment, but the initial policy choice
is one for Congress, not for the courts.
The same analysis applies to another recent set of disastrous Su-
preme Court opinions: those upholding capital punishment of minors
204 See id. at 6o8 n.8.
205 See id. at 6o8-o9.
206 The Sixth Amendment guarantees "effective" assistance of counsel to all state and federal
criminal defendants facing felony charges. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771
(1970) ("[Dlefendants facing felony charges are entitled to the effective assistance of competent
counsel."); cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (requiring states to provide counsel
for indigent felony defendants). The right to effective assistance of counsel has long been
understood to be a "fundamental" right. See, e.g., McQueen v. Svenson, 495 F.2d 207, 213
(8th Cir. 1974).
207 Professor Bickel has argued that an intent to violate constitutional rights or make dramatic
changes in our federal structures should not be imputed to Congress in the absence of clear
language and legislative history. See generally BICKEL, supra note 6, at 150-52, 157-59, i65-
66. This principle requires interpreting statutes on the assumption that they were not intended
to infringe on constitutionally protected areas. Justice O'Connor provided a fine example of
such interpretation in her opinion in Rust v. Sullivan, iiI S. Ct. 1759 (1991), when she declared:
It is enough in this case to conclude that neither the language nor the history of [the
statute] compels the Secretary's interpretation [as expressed in the disputed regulation],
and that the interpretation raises serious First Amendment concerns. On this basis alone,
I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and invalidate the challenged
regulations.
Id. at 1789 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Similar reasoning can be found in other cases. See, e.g.,
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 575 (x988) ("[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious
constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such
construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress."); see also Barenblatt v. United States,
360 U.S. 109, 139-40 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting) ('[M]ore is required of legislatures than a
vague delegation . . . ." When Congress "reach[es] to the very fringes of [its] power," "it must
be prepared to say so expressly and unequivocally.").
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and the retarded. In these cases, the Court counted state laws to
determine whether a consensus against such punishments existed. 208
Quite apart from the questionable validity of that approach to deter-
mining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, 209 the Court
utterly failed to consider that many of the states that nominally per-
mitted such punishments had not tried to execute minors or retarded
people, or even focused on the issue recently, if ever.210 Once again,
a Bickellian approach would not legitimate a punishment that at least
implicates a fundamental right, 211 even if the punishment might not
ultimately violate the right. Rather, the burden should be placed on
those who would do something most civilized lands forbid 212 to show
that majoritarian support for it in fact exists. Failure to follow this
208 See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 371 (1989) (finding that "a majority of
the States that permit capital punishment authorize it for crimes committed at age 16 or above");
see also supra note io8 (discussing the death penalty cases); infra note 21o (same).
209 See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 383 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (disputing the majority's method
of assessing whether a punishment is cruel and unusual); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
8x5, 869-72 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that there is no rational basis for viewing a
drop in the total number of executions of minors under age x6 as indicative of a national
consensus on whether such executions are cruel and unusual); cf. Harmelin v. Michigan, III S.
Ct. 2680, 2699, 2701 (ig9i) (holding that a mandatory life term for drug possession is not cruel
and unusual punishment even though such harsh sentences are not accepted in other states).
210 In upholding the death penalty for minors, Justice Scalia pointed out that 25 of 37 states
authorizing capital punishment had procedures by which 17-year-olds could face the death
penalty, and 22 of those 37 states had procedures by which i6-year-olds could face death. See
Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370. He concluded that there is no consensus with respect to treating
minors differently from adults for purposes of capital punishment. See id. at 371.
Dissenting, Justice Brennan argued that Justice Scalia's counting of states to determine
consensus failed even on its own terms: the 14 states that have no death penalty are presumably
just as, if not more, opposed to executing minors as they are to executing anyone else - which
would give a tally of 27 to 23 against executing minors. See id. at 385 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Furthermore, Justice Brennan questioned the majority's presumption that a state that authorizes
capital punishment and also has judicial procedures for certain minors to be tried as adults has
unequivocally sanctioned the execution of minors. Justice Brennan claimed that i9 of the 22
states that could theoretically execute 16-year-olds had not yet "squarely faced the question."
Id. at 385. In other words, only three of the 50 state legislatures have explicitly authorized
death for i6-year-olds. In fact, some states hastened to change the laws when minors were
condemned to death. The Stanford decision is especially troubling in view of the Court's quite
appropriate use of Type I jurisprudence in a similar case involving the executions of minors
under age i6. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 833-38.
211 See BICKEL, supra note 6, at 129 ("[I]t is no small matter, in Professor Black's term, to
'legitimate' a legislative measure. The Court's prestige . . . enable[s] it to entrench and solidify
measures that may have been tentative . . . . [It] can generate consent and may impart
permanence."); CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN
A DEMOCRACY 52-53 (1960) (arguing that, when the Supreme Court reviews and fails to strike
down a statute, it legitimates the statute).
212 See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL PUBLICATIONS, USA: THE DEATH PENALTY: DE-
VELOPMENTS IN 1987, at 1-3, 41-43 (1988) (discussing the worldwide repeal of death penalties
and the existence of international agreements recognizing the goal of eliminating capital punish-
ment). According to Amnesty International, "all the European Community Member states,
either have abolished, or no longer apply the death penalty." Id. at 42.
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approach, once again, bespeaks either ignorance or an activist desire
to impose such penalties, regardless of what the majority wishes.
Perhaps one may understand the fear that the present Court's
majority feels toward former Justice Brennan's open-ended view of
rights. However, one must deem either extraordinarily ignorant or
radically retrograde the Court's utter lack of attention to the judicial
roles defined by such traditionalists as Alexander Bickel and Felix
Frankfurter, 2 13 and derived from Chief Justice Hughes, Justice Bran-
deis, and others long before.
Bickellian second-look doctrines are designed to make legislatures
and executives accountable, to make them responsive to the people.
Failure to use the doctrines reflects a presumably ideologically based
desire on the part of the Court to encourage laws that may infringe
on nontextual fundamental rights, rather than the Court's oft-spoken
assertion that it only wishes to let majoritarian bodies have their
way.
2 14 The Court allows violations of rights that "The People" have
not determined to allow. As such, the Court's behavior is as virulently
anti-majoritarian as that which it decries.
An analogous argument can be made concerning the Court's failure
to use Type II antidiscrimination doctrines, although there its failure
is somewhat less patent and more complex. Actually, the Court's
decision last Term in Hernandez v. New York, 2 15 was a patent failure.
The Court held that the use of peremptory challenges to dismiss
bilingual Latino jurors during voire dire did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause. 2 16 Nonetheless, as my discussion of abortion
throughout this Foreword suggests, the most obvious refusal to con-
sider Type II approaches can be seen in the various cases in which
the Rehnquist Court has sought to limit or undermine Roe v. Wade.
2 17
213 See Richard A. Epstein, A Man of Two Clashing Principles, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1987,
§ 3, at 3 (calling Bickel "a liberal democrat and judicial conservative"); Robert P. Hey, Souter
Praised for Intellect, but Short on Specifics, CHRIST. SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 17, 1990, at i (calling
Frankfurter "conservative"); Al Kamen, A Force Against Judicial Activism, WASH. POST, July
2, 1987, at Ai, A16 (referring to Bickel as "a conservative legal scholar"); Anthony Lewis, Court
in a Hury, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1991, at A29 (same).
214 See, e.g., Jeffrey Stempel, The Rehnquist Court, Statutory Interpretation, Inertial Bur-
dens, and a Misleading Version of Democracy, 22 U. TOL. L. REv. 583, 608 ('99i) (criticizing
the Court for placing additional burdens on plaintiffs in civil rights cases and for disingenuously
minimizing the ease of majoritarian reversals of such decisions); sources cited supra note 191.
2-1 11 S. Ct. 1859 (I99).
216 See id. at 1867.
217 One other case that could be seen as a failure to deploy Type II review last Term is
Powers v. Ohio, iii S. Ct. 1364 (199), in which the Court invalidated a prosecutor's use of
peremptory challenges to exclude a black juror in a case with a white defendant. See id. at
1370. Invoking the Equal Protection Clause, the Court rested its decision only on Type I
grounds, ignoring antidiscrimination grounds. See id. The Court skirted possible Type II
grounds for its decision when it admitted that the exclusion of jurors based solely on race is
stigmatizing, but failed to distinguish the sort of stigma that attaches to blacks, an outcast
group, from the much less worrying kind of stigma that may attach to whites. See id.
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Roe v. Wade can be viewed as a case according Type I protection
to an unenumerated, judge-found right, grounded in libertarian phi-
losophy - a right that can be described either in terms of privacy or
in terms of ownership of one's own body. The dissent and an increas-
ing number of Rehnquist Court Justices have challenged this basis for
the decision by saying that it has no constitutional foundation. These
Justices have asked why the legislatures should not be permitted
to favor communal (good samaritan) values such as fetal lifesaving
instead of a right to choose to have an abortion. Long ago a friend
put it to me rather brutally in this way: if a state can order some-
one to refrain from chopping down something as trivial as a
tree, why can it not order someone to refrain from destroying a
fetus?
To the follower of Type II jurisprudence the answer is obvious:
because the burden of preserving trees falls in a nondiscriminatory
way on all of us, while the burden of fetal lifesaving falls solely on
women. Yes, it falls only on women who engage in sex - voluntarily
or not. But that response does not address the Type II problem: the
burden does not fall on men who do the same thing. As a result,
sexual conduct is burdened by anti-abortion laws in a way that treats
men and women differently. Does that disparate treatment make such
laws invalid under an antidiscrimination approach?
The answer depends on many factors. First: Are women a dis-
criminated-against category? Were they so at the time of Roe v.
Wade? Are they so now in all states, or just in some? These inquiries
in turn raise all sorts of questions about the legislative representation,
financial independence, and past treatment of women in the polity as
a whole and in the relevant jurisdictions. All of these questions go
to the issue of whether legislatures can be counted on to look after
women's rights as they would men's, or whether they are apt "cheaply"
to further some values they presumably believe in, because the burden
falls on women.
Second, do the relevant jurisdictions have a significant number of
other laws that require good samaritanism and lifesaving obligations?
Do they require such service when the cost of these efforts in liber-
tarian autonomy is borne by those whom the legislators represent and
is as heavy as the costs of unwanted pregnancies are to women? It
is no answer to say that all such cases are in some ways different
from abortion. Of course they are. The point of the question is
simpler than that; it is to see whether the jurisdiction in general rates
communal values, such as lifesaving, above individual autonomy, or
just happens to do so in an admittedly somewhat different situation
in which the parties burdened are "outsiders."
Third, have the relevant jurisdictions made a genuine attempt to
spread the burden to all of us, or have they left it on the pregnant
women? Even short of actual compensation for pregnancy, which
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presents some complex problems, 2 18 one can consider what kind of
prenatal care exists, what kind of postnatal facilities are available,
what kinds of job security and leave for pregnancy are required, and
the degree to which the jurisdiction is willing to tax itself - that is,
all of us - to ease the burden on those it would require to carry a
pregnancy to term.
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, has any attempt been made
to place an analogous burden on men who engage in sex generally, or
on the pregnant woman's partner specifically? My seemingly fanciful
invasions of privacy requiring such men to save lives by being trans-
plant donors, might well be considered.
2 19
My point is not, however, even to begin to approach the issue of
the validity of Roe v. Wade and of anti-abortion laws under Type II
jurisprudence. 220 It is only to indicate the kinds of issues that a Court
215 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
219 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. Of course, there remains the question of
whether fetuses qualify as an outcast group. If fetuses do, however, and anti-abortion laws are
regarded as genuine attempts to benefit an outcast group, such laws raise other antidiscrimination
concerns because they help these outcasts by exclusively burdening another outcast group,
women. In a sense, this raises the same issues as certain kinds of affirmative action - in
particular, preferential programs whose burdens fall disproportionately on groups such as Jews
and Asian-Americans. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. For other general discussions
of Roe v. Wade in terms of antidiscrimination notions, see CALABRESI, supra note 134, at 97,
99-101, 108-14; and Donald Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 U. MICH. L. REv. 1569 (1979).
22o Interestingly, substantial Type III (Bickellian) issues are also raised by the Court's retreat
in recent )ears from Roe v. Wade. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, Iii S. Ct. 1759, 1778 (1991)
(upholding regulations forbidding employees of federally funded family planning programs from
discussing abortion or abortion-related activities with clients); Webster v. Reproductive Health
Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 511 (1989) (upholding a state law preventing the "use of public employees
and facilities for the performance or assistance of nontherapeutic abortions"); Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297, 326 (i98o) (upholding a state regulation prohibiting the use of federal Medicaid
funds to reimburse poor women for the cost of abortions); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521
(i977) (upholding a city hospital policy of not providing nontherapeutic abortions); Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (,977) (upholding a state regulation excluding the funding of nonther-
apeutic abortions from a state welfare program). How will the Court deal with old anti-abortion
statutes that Roe and its progeny invalidated? Will it simply ignore the fact that for a time
these statutes were held to violate fundamental rights and allow them to be enforced? Or will
it require present day legislatures to indicate just what kinds of anti-abortion laws, if any, they
really want? The same may apply to anti-abortion laws that were passed since Roe and that,
until Webster, were clearly invalid. Will the Court - incorrectly - assume that such laws
were passed in a world in which both pro-choice and pro-life parties were really engaged in the
legislative struggle and hold them valid, or will it conclude that such laws were legislative
"freebies" - passed by legislators who were pressed by pro-life advocates and not made subject
to significant counterpressures because the pro-choice people relied on past decisions to render
the laws void? These last statutes present harder cases than those of pre-Roe laws, but the fact
that until Roe, the whole legislative trend was toward "liberalization" of abortion, while after
that decision it went decidedly the opposite way, cannot lightly be ignored by a Court that cares
about bringing forth majoritarian results.
Of course, if the Court starts from the proposition that abortion is wrong and that its job
is to favor anti-abortion laws, an activist re-validification of old anti-abortion laws can be readily
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would concern itself with if it were truly trying to find out whether
anti-abortion laws were wanted by "The People" or were enacted only
because the dominant legislative majority was not burdened by such
laws. That the Rehnquist Court not only asks none of these questions,
but also makes no suggestion that certain answers to them might
make a reversal of Roe v. Wade more likely (because such a reversal
would occur in a context in which legislatures could genuinely be
relied upon to take women's rights as seriously as men's), suggests
that the Court is not moved primarily by the allegedly weak consti-
tutional foundation of Roe v. Wade nor by a desire to defer to ma-
joritarian wishes. Rather, it indicates that what is motivating the
ever-growing number of dissenters from Roe v. Wade on the Court is
their personal antipathy to abortion. Overruling Roe v. Wade, but
only if men are made to bear similar burdens to women, or if women
are adequately represented in legislatures, would greatly increase the
chances that states will permit abortions. Such a result would not be
troublesome to those who object to Roe v. Wade for its allegedly
nonmajoritarian basis or its reliance on a non-enumerated "right to
privacy." It would be anathema to those who despise abortions.
Individual Justices have, of course, a perfect right to abhor abor-
tion. But if that is what moves them, they are no different from what
they claim the Roe v. Wade majority to have been: judges who are
willing to impose their own values on the polity. And that is very
different from judges who use Type II jurisprudence to learn what
the polity's true values are when the whole polity must bear the
burden of enforcing those values.
This point can be seen even more dramatically in cases such as
Rust, which involved regulations that in practice make abortion much
harder for the poor than the rich, and Hodgson v. Minnesota,22 1 which
involved rules that make abortion harder for minors. 22 2 These cases
understood. But let no one be fooled. It would not be majoritarian deference that moved the
Court. It would be plain old-fashioned ideology. The same is not true of the reverse position.
Like it or not, Roe v. Wade was decided; it did create a constitutional right. Whether it did so
correctly or not is a question that the Court can legitimately address. But given that such a
right was recognized, the Court cannot, without abandoning passive virtues and acting willfully,
fail to use that right as the starting point and hold valid only those abortion restrictions enacted
by legislatures that have taken a current and open position flowing from a debate in which all
sides are genuinely engaged.
My position on this is, of course, neutral with respect to the merits of pro-choice and pro-
life. It implies that the opposite starting point would be appropriate if the previously recognized
fundamental right had been that of the fetus. Cf. Judgment of Feb. 25, z975, Entscheidungen
Des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 39 BVerfGE i (finding a liberalized abortion law unconstitu-
tional because it granted insufficient protection to the fetus's right to life).
221 ]io S. Ct. 2926 (599o).
222 See id. at 2944, 2970 (upholding a state law requiring two-parent notification and a 48-
hour waiting period after notification as long as a judicial bypass option is available to a minor
seeking an abortion).
[Vol. io5:8o
HeinOnline -- 105 Harv. L. Rev.  148 1991-1992
THE SUPREME COURT - FOREWORD
underscore the result-orientation of the Rehnquist Court's anti-abor-
tion contingent. Rather than focusing on whether similar restrictions
would be enacted if all women were subject to the restrictions (instead
of only the poor and those who because of youth are necessarily not
represented in legislatures), the Court blithely upheld the restrictions
because, one is tempted to speculate, they reduced the number of
abortions. Type II jurisprudence would find these rules more ques-
tionable than generalized anti-abortion laws, because poor women and
under-age women are surely even more powerless than women in
general.
Of course, as I noted earlier, most courts are inadequate protectors
of rights when discrimination on the basis of wealth is involved, 223
and thus one should not be surprised at the Rehnquist Court's failure
to use Type II analysis in such cases. The Court's unwillingness to
consider the young as a category requiring special judicial protection
is more germane, 224 however, and more indicative of its general re-
luctance to submit laws to Type II remands when the result of those
laws accords with the Justices' own desires and values.
Equally indicative of the Rehnquist Court's more general failure
to understand its Type II functions are the cases in which the Court
has required discriminatory motives rather than impact as a prereq-
uisite to invalidating laws. 225 Such decisions have to be based on the
belief that discriminatory laws are passed, by and large, by bigots.
But most laws that discriminate are passed by well-meaning people
who favor a given result as long as they do not have to pay for it.
The Rehnquist Court would be appalled if it were told to uphold
all uncompensated takings of land unless an intent to discriminate
against the landowner could be shown. 226 It would respond that a
public purpose does not save such actions. We all want access to the
sea or a beautiful park as long as someone else pays. The point of
the Takings Clause is to make sure that we all pay. But that is
precisely the point of all Type II jurisprudence. By moving to motive
requirements - in cases in which it has little sympathy with the losers
and much sympathy with the "value" supposedly fostered by the
challenged rule - the Rehnquist Court once again demonstrates that
223 See supra pp. 128-30.
224 See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment does not preclude the death penalty for 16- or 17-year-old offenders); Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 26o, 276 (1988) (holding that the First Amendment does not
prohibit censorship of a public high school newspaper by the principal). To the extent that the
Court has been sympathetic to children at all, it has been so only with respect to very young
children. See Maryland v. Craig, ixo S. Ct. 3157, 3169 (iggo) (upholding, against Sixth
Amendment challenge, a state procedure permitting child abuse victims to testify without face-
to-face confrontation with the defendant).
225 See supra notes io6-07 and accompanying text.
226 See supra p. 93.
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it is not concerned with discerning the values held by an open and
nondiscriminating legislative majority. It is simply playing the old
game of approving what it likes.
Let me be clear. The majority in Roe v. Wade was also imposing
its own values. That is an appropriate criticism made of Justice
Brennan's Type I approach to constitutional adjudication. Similarly,
the issue is not my view, or yours, of the desirability of Justice
Brennan's values as compared to those of Justice Scalia. The point
must be deeper.
There are rights in our Constitution that appropriately have been
accorded Type I protection. They tend to be those rights that are
enumerated, that were clearly intended in this nation's constitutive
moments, or that are truly necessary to the establishment of represen-
tative legislatures and executives. The failure of the Rehnquist Court
to give full protection to some of these rights - allegedly out of fear
of judicial abuse - is misguided, especially in view of the Court's
willingness to accord Type I protection to some much less well-
grounded rights. 22
7
In other situations, however, the government or its minions enact
rules that come close to infringing on enumerated rights or that violate
what many, including judges and philosophers, deem to be funda-
mental rights despite their lack of firm grounding in our Consitution
or its revisions. As to these, our tradition is best served by seeing to
it that the people, or the people's representatives, acting openly and
with the people watching them, express themselves. Do "We The
People" really want such a putative right to be violated? Such mini-
constitutional moments can be meaningful statements of the people's
values only if the burden of the violation falls on all the people or on
those who dominate its legislatures and not just on the weak, the
outcasts, the little ones of our society. 228 Type II and Type III
jurisprudence allow the people to be heard in such cases. In each
case, the danger that the Court will ultimately impose its values on
the polity when it remands such rules for Type II or III violations is
small, because - unless the polity wishes to discriminate - the polity
can affirm its values and can in practice declare the putative right to
be unimportant. 229
227 See supra p. 137.
228 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, I9o-9i (1986) (upholding a Georgia anti-
sodomy law but limiting its application to homosexuals); see also cases cited supra note 162
(upholding severe burdens on poor women).
229 There is no doubt that some judges will approach Type II and Type III review aggres-
sively, some passively, and still others with caution - just as many judges do with respect to
Type I review. See supra note 98. Yet for many of the reasons already discussed, the variations
brought on by activism or passivity in defining the relevant Type II and Type III terms, such
as "historically excluded" or "haste" or "hiding," are not nearly as significant - and dangerous
- as analogous variations with respect to definitions of Type I review of "fundamental rights."
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Remanding when few would say that a right is involved, or when
the legislature has already acted openly, or when there is no discrim-
inatory burden on the underrepresented, can be willful. But a failure
to remand when many believe that a right is at stake and when haste
or hiding has occurred, or when the burden of the rule falls on those
who cannot protect themselves in legislatures is at least as willful. It
represents an effort to avoid letting the people express their views in
an open and nondiscriminatory fashion. It is nothing more than an
activist attempt to further a result the judge favors.
I believe that the Rehnquist Court's failure to use Type II and III
approaches constitutes just such result-oriented judicial activism - it
exhibits a selective enforcement of rights generally supporting state
power and eroding libertarian values. Obscuring this activism behind
claims of deference to majority wishes is both false and hypocritical.
As serious as the Rehnquist Court's failures are in other areas, such
as supervision of procedural fairness in criminal cases, none is more
serious and ultimately more destructive of our constitutional structure
than the failure properly and judiciously to apply Type II and Type
III review.
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